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 My dissertation research explores the impacts of ethno-regional power dominance, trust, 
and violent conflict in a resources-rich multiethnic, sub-Saharan African state. This dissertation 
examines the impact that ethnic power dominance has on the relationship between conflict and 
civil society in a resource rich sub-Saharan African (SSA) nation examined. Relying upon intra-
state case study analysis of the socio-political climate in Nigeria, I argue that distrust in the 
national government, when motivated by ethno-regional cleavages has an accelerating influence 
on the incidence of conflict. Using cross-national survey data in conjunction with field interview 
data, this research finds that in the regions where socio-political trust is low, and civil society is 
weak, there is a higher incidence of violence and tensions. However, in the regions where civil 
society is active and salient, the incidence of violence is comparatively lower.  The overarching 
conclusion of this study is that despite the presence of ethnic power dominance in a resource rich 
state, high levels of socio-political trust and an active civil society have a mitigating influence on 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This research seeks to examine how causal and accelerating factors contribute to conflict, 
and how the mitigating influence of civil society contributes to peace and political stability. The 
beleaguered political history of African nations is fraught with a myriad of problems. Chiefly 
among these problems is the prevalence1 of the protracted war that began shortly after 
independence. Hitherto the epoch of colonialism, Africa consisted of different classifications of 
political units, including lineage groups, villages, townships, and tribal kingdoms. Interactions 
among the African nations were primarily for commercial purposes. There were no rigidly drawn 
boundaries between these political entities. Hence, occasional disputes occurred between 
members of different towns over issues including farm land boundaries, unresolved minor 
disputes, or religion. 
Between 1960 and 2000, post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa2 engaged in a significant 
number of internecine conflicts that became so endemic the region earned the notoriety of 
becoming the most violent among the developing regions of the world (SIPRI 1999, 20 cited in 
Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 13). The literature on conflict in the region is replete with a plethora 
of causal factors, with one of the focal issues in African politics being the impact of ethnicity on 
the behaviors and performances of the states. Moreover, it is striking and at the same time 
sobering that the incidence of violence in Africa has triggered a domino effect across the region. 
In fact, during the 1990s, Africa topped the list of politically unstable and economically 
impoverished regions in the world.3 The region that was once revered for its abundant natural 
                                               
1 Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) disagree vehemently with economic studies’ disregard for the significant impact of 
ethnicity on the prevalence of violence. 
2 Please note that Sub-Saharan Africa, Sub-Sahara African states, and Africa are used interchangeably throughout 
this research. 
3 Collier and Gunning (1999) “Why has African states grown slowly?” provides an in-depth analysis of the causes 
and implications on poverty in Africa. 
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resources and a promising political future in the early 1960s has descended into a vicious cycle 
of poverty and political instability of varying magnitudes.  
The question is not only why, but also how has violent conflict become so prevalent in 
sub-Saharan Africa? In addition to examining the accelerators and causal mechanisms, finding 
workable ways of mitigating violent conflict in Africa has never been more urgent because of its 
devastating consequences for the affected states. To be specific, post-war countries survive under 
a tentative peace characterized by deepening crises, including distrust of rival ethnic groups or 
the state, social fragmentation, economic destitution, and political unpredictability. 
Unfortunately, more than five decades of earnest efforts by researchers and policy makers have 
failed to transform SSA into a sustainably peaceful region; finding solutions to preventing 
conflict in SSA is not yet feasible. A further question that stems from this observation is, why is 
SSA still the amphitheater of violent conflict? This research seeks to answer these questions by 
examining the different approaches to conflict management in Nigeria.  
The debates on the role of ethnicity in violence have generated a vast amount of 
literature. However, it is worth noting that ethnicity has become the most prominent concept in 
conflict literature in multiethnic states. Perhaps the rise of ethnicity to prominence is the upshot 
of the controversy that surrounds its ontology and epistemology on one hand, and its relevance to 
categorization of violence on the other hand (Kalyvas 2003, 479). Emphasizing the roles of 
ethnicity in conflict, Horowitz4 cited in Varshney 2007 that “until recently ethnicity was a 
backwater of social science” (p. 276). Similarly, other studies have supported the observation 
that ethnicity has not been accorded its rightful place in conflict literature. For instance, 
Ismagilova (1978) notes that “many scholars seek the sources of ethnic prejudices and biases in 
                                               
4 See Horowitz (1985) for robust discussion on the nature and dynamics of the interactions and conflict among 




the subjective world of the individual rather than in social relationships. However, ethnic 
interrelationships become especially aggravated during an internal (national) political crisis” (pp. 
82-83). Yet three decades after Horowitz made the thought-provoking statement, ethnicity still 
remains a controversial concept. In view of these seeming ambivalent and lackluster stances 
from opposing sides, it is justifiable to ask, “how much of the complex ethnic situation do we 
really know” (Osaghae 1999, 63). In addition, to what extent have the perceptions of researchers 
regarding the significance of ethnicity changed in the study of civil wars? This question demands 
contextual examination of the assumption that countries that have experienced civil war tend to 
be more susceptible to another outbreak of war.  
Some studies have asserted that while ethnic identity may seem to be of legitimate 
political concern in the multiethnic states, it is not the immediate trigger of violence in sub-
Saharan Africa (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80; Bates 2008, 9). Furthermore, some analysts have 
challenged the ontological foundation of the term ethnicity (Chandra 2006, 400). However, 
irrespective of divergent perceptions of ethnicity, an irrefutable fact remains that it is a 
prominent factor in the analysis of violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Against the backdrop of the above, this research aims to address the questions: how and 
why do the risk factors cause violent conflict? It is noteworthy that these overarching questions 
have not received enough attention from conflict scholars. This dissertation’s research will 
examine the potential mitigating influence of civil society in sub-Saharan Africa. The underlying 
assumption is that preventing the onset of conflict tends to engender an enduring peace, while 
post-war reconciliation of the dispute among warring ethnic groups will only impose a 
precarious peace. While the study of relationships between associational life and politics is not 
new, it is notable that much of the previous analyses on the phenomenon in Africa has focused 
on the context of transition to democracy and less on conflict mitigation. Therefore, this 
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dissertation research will examine three ethnic regions in Nigeria to determine how ethnicity 
accelerates violent conflict and how civil society can mitigate the concomitant violence in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
Background of the Study  
While some analysts have questioned the ontology5 of ethnicity, the most significant 
controversy lies in the role that ethnicity plays in triggering and aggravating violent conflicts. 
Attempts at answering the question have generated an intense debate among social scientists. 
Two contrasting models have emerged that propose different strategies for resolving violent 
conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The first model argues that ethnicity, language, religious fractionalization, and 
politicization of ethnic identity in sub-Sharan Africa constitute significant risks for the outbreak 
of violence (Ismagilova 1978; Osaghae, 1999; Adedeji, 1999). The earliest perception of the 
causes of conflict involving ethnic groups is the ancient hatred theory (Geertz, 1963; Rabushka 
and Shepsle, 1972). Another term for ancient hatred in literature is primordialism. The term 
primordialism refers to “a passionate and deeply-felt attachment to one’s own ethnic values and 
identity” (Conversi 2002, 269). The perseverance of primordialism in the politics of SSA raises a 
question about the rationality of primordialism and ethnic nationalism. Kaufman 2006 (37) 
argues that the political entrepreneurs exploit the fear of their ethnic group members for the 
purpose of accumulating and maintaining power. To explain the connections that exist between 
ethnicity and violent conflict, it is imperative to trace the history of identity politics and the 
implications for disruptions in social relations (Osaghae and Suberu 2005, 5).  
Some studies also point out that the divisive nature of ethnic identity politics dates back 
                                               
5 See Kalyvas (2003) for detailed discussion on ontology of political violence and the arguments surrounding the 
roles of ethnicity in violence. 
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to the colonial administrations’ administrative strategies (Nnoli 1998). Cederman, Min, and 
Wimmer (2009, 2010) show that once we account for the political exclusion and competition 
along ethnic lines, ethnic diversity “... in and of itself has no effect on the likelihood of civil 
conflict.” It is noteworthy that a state where a powerful ethnic group dominates and excludes the 
less powerful groups risks triggering violent conflict. Nevertheless, while the relationships 
between ethnicity and violent conflict have long been established, some studies have argued that: 
“Although polarization and fractionalization capture different aspects of ethnicity, they still seem 
unable to establish a clear link between ethnic diversity and conflict” (Kovacic and Zoli, 2013, 
3). 
Understandably, this model stipulates that any proposition for resolving violent conflict 
in Africa must include, if not begin with, addressing the problems that emanated from 
ethnonationalism. The astute advocates of this proposition have yet to form a sufficient 
explanatory mechanism for analyzing ethnicity-conflict phenomena. To this end, this dissertation 
research seeks to determine the missing elements of social relations in conflict-ridden states and 
examine the role of civil society in ameliorating the relationships between state and ethnic 
groups. Perhaps a good relationship between state and ethnic groups could engender sustainable 
peace and political stability in sub-Saharan African states.  
In contrast, the second model contends that the relationships between ethnicity and 
violent conflict are either weak or unproven. More often than not, supporters of this viewpoint 
argue, “Surely, ethnic antagonism, nationalist sentiments, and grievances often motivate rebels 
and their supporters. But such broad factors are too common to distinguish the cases where civil 
war breaks out” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76). Similarly, resource dependence theory argues that 
states that rely on resource-rent are more susceptible to experiencing high incidences of violent 
conflicts than those that do not (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, 819). According to the 
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institutional theory, weak or failed political institutions are the leading causes of violent conflict 
because the states with such predicaments are susceptible to attack from rebellious ethnic groups 
as they lack the capacity for creating and sustaining workable and equitable policies (Herbst 
1990; 2000; Englebert, and Tull 2008; Arriola 2009; Howard 2012). In turn, climate theory 
posits that factors including population surges, environmental change, and resource scarcity 
contribute immensely to violent conflict in multiethnic states (Lawry 1990; Homer-Dixon 1994; 
Bachler 1998;6 Urdal 2005; Benjaminsen 2008).  
Interestingly, the theories that fail to consider ethnicity as a significant factor in conflict 
analysis have not been able to provide compelling explanations to substantiate the claim that 
ethnicity actually sustains peace rather than contributes to the onset of violence. However, 
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000, 265) disagree with the economic theory’s notion that ethnic 
diversity is not a serious threat to peace. The question is, how does ethnic diversity make Africa 
safer? Perhaps Kovacic and Zoli’s (2013) position deserves more attention as they succinctly 
suggest that there is not yet a broad consensus on whether or not ethnic polarization actually 
causes conflict or not. Hence, there is need for in-depth studies to establish the impact of ethnic 
diversity and fractionalization7 on conflict or peace (p. 12). 
Moreover, some issues appear as recurrent themes across all causal explanations of the 
theories mentioned above. First, various theories in conflict literature agree that at the centers of 
violent conflicts in multiethnic states are conterminous issues, including lust for power and the 
struggle for resource control. Additionally, each school of thought contends vigorously that the 
factor it emphasizes is the decisive issue in the analysis of the causal mechanisms of violent 
conflict. The inherent flaw in all the theories highlighted above is the assumption by each theory 
                                               
6 Bachler and Spillmann (1996) demonstrate that the Malian Tuaregs perceived the controversial government 
sedentarization policies designed to modernize the society as a program that is meant for marginalizing the Tuaregs. 
7 See Alesina et al., (2002) for far-reaching analysis of ethnic fractionalization that elucidates the role of ethnicity on 
social, economic, and political developments in multiethnic societies. 
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that it is capable of explaining the cause of violence without cognizance of its potential 
dependence on the others. Paradoxically, despite the role of ethnicity in sub-Saharan African 
conflicts, these theories fail to acknowledge historical evidence and thus fail to emphasize the 
mechanisms for conflict mitigation. Therefore, this dissertation research argues that although 
ethnic diversity and ethnic identity politics are inherent characteristics of sub-Saharan African 
states, their impact on politics have not been the same. Why does it seem as if the states in SSA 
are impacted and respond differently to the problems of ethnicity? This dissertation research 
assumes that these differences reflect the variations in the mitigating influences of civil society in 
SSA states.  
 
Research Questions  
This dissertation research seeks to answer two questions that have not been satisfactorily 
answered in the extant literature regarding the causes of violent conflict in SSA. The questions 
that inspired this study are as follows: 
First, how do the perceptions of citizens about government policies influence the causal 
mechanism of violent conflict in ethnically diverse, resource-rich sub-Saharan African states?  
Second, how does social capital influence citizens’ perceptions of government 
institutions’ performance in ethnically diverse, resource-rich, sub-Saharan African states?  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Case Selection 
This dissertation research focuses on a single case because it affords the researcher the 
opportunity to conduct field research within the limited time frame for a dissertation and the 
availability of resources. Previous studies show that sub-Saharan African states have shared 
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political histories and problems. However, it is important to note that political institutions at the 
center of this research are not the same everywhere. Putnam (1993) pointed out that to evaluate 
institutional performance we must examine “how well a political institution manages essential 
internal affairs” (p.65). On that note, it is appropriate for this dissertation research to focus on a 
single case.  
Examining different regions within a single multiethnic and multi-regional state tends to 
provide an opportunity for an in-depth understanding, which can guide similar research in other 
contexts or serve as a precursor for investigating multiple cases. As Yin (2014) noted, focusing 
on a single case allows for an in-depth analysis of phenomenon by comparing the perceptions of 
people from the different regions. So, this research seeks to analyze a resource-rich, multiethnic 
state that is organized structurally into regions and ethnically fractionalized. Thus, Nigeria is 
selected as the research context because it comprises most if not all the factors that are relevant 
to answering the questions this dissertation research seeks to answer.  
Even though most of the SSA states are ethnically diverse and resource-rich, Nigeria is a 
better choice because of its deep-rooted characteristics mentioned above. With over two hundred 
and fifty ethnic groups, Nigeria is the most ethnically diverse and fractionalized sub-Saharan 
African state. While another sub-Saharan African state (Botswana) is heavily dependent on 
resource-revenue, it is not as ethnically diverse and fractionalized as Nigeria. Unlike Nigeria, 
where ethnic groups are concentrated under geo-political regions, Botswana, with only seven 
ethnic groups, is less ethnically fractionalized. Moreover, the overlapping nature of ethnic groups 
and regions of settlement provides a unique opportunity for analyzing how the interwoven 
characteristics of interethnic and interregional relationships influence political trust.  
Some studies support the idea that the level of trust by different groups for political 
institutions is influenced by many factors, chiefly among which is the cognizance of the 
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externalities (Coleman 1994).8 Factors including the regional arrangement of the ethnic groups, 
the inclusion or exclusion of members of the ethnic groups in the administration, the extent to 
which the ethnic groups benefit from distribution of public goods and services, how the political 
institutions treat members of different ethnic groups and other factors differentiate Nigeria from 
Botswana or any other sub-Saharan state. 
Finally, even though Nigeria was one of the first group of African states to attain 
independence and was once revered as the giant of Africa, it has experienced more political 
instability and violent conflict than most of the sub-Saharan African states. Thus, Nigeria is the 
most ideal case or context for this analysis because it epitomizes all the characteristics that this 
research considers as potential independent variables for the analysis.  
 
Data  
This research relies on data collected through interviews and survey questionnaires 
administered across the geopolitical zones within the three ethno-regional divisions in Nigeria 
during June, July and August 2018. The interview data was used for descriptive analysis of the 
perceptions of Nigerians about the issues examined. Besides that, I also analyzed Afrobarometer 
survey data (Round 7) for Nigeria, which was collected in 2017. Afrobarometer data was 
collected randomly through survey exercises that captured the entire country. Furthermore, the 
participants in the Afrobarometer data drew from different ethnic groups and regions, and 
different socio-political, cultural, and economic spectrums. Additionally, Armed Conflict 
Location and Events Data (ACLED) data on the incidence of conflict in Nigeria between 1997-
2018 was explored for the purpose of understanding the different types of conflict incidents that 
are documented during the period. The secondary sources of data include archival research 
                                               
8 See Putnam (1993). “Making democracy work: Civic tradition in modern Italy” for an analysis of Coleman’s 
theory of externalities.  
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through libraries, government and private institutions, and non-governmental sources such as 
research institutions and civil-group information outlets. This data search focuses on information 
pertaining to the dynamics of ethnic power relations (Cederman and Girardin, 2014), and the 
impact of accelerating factors on the causes of conflict; the political histories that explicate 
conflict management; and the mitigating influence of civil society.  
The respondents for my field interview were selected through the snowball sampling 
method, whereby initial contacts introduce the researcher to other potential respondents (Kalton 
and Anderson 1986). Because of the difficulties of time and resources that are required to engage 
in an elaborate random sampling method of data collection, my initial contact began with two 
people. Through these two contacts, one a senior official at the Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos, South-West, and one a senior official at the Nigerian Institute of Social 
and Economic Research (NISER) Ibadan, South-West Nigeria, I was introduced to public 
officials, community leaders, civic group activists, and average citizens. Of the 42 people I 
contacted, I interviewed 30 individuals. While all the ethnic groups were not represented because 
of the low number of interviewees, there was representation from each of the six geo-political 
zones, which are sub-divisions of the three regions. Overall, I interviewed people in Abuja 
(FCT), Benue state (North-Central), Delta State (South-South), Enugu State (South-East), 
Kaduna State (North-West), Lagos and Oyo States (South-West), and Taraba State (North-East). 
The community group leaders interviewed also include individuals from organizations including 
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC); the Mdzough U Tiv (MUT); Idoma National Forum (INF); the 
Omi Ny’ Igede (NY); Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); 
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP); the Arewa People’s Congress; the 
Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN); Committee for the Defence 
of Human Rights; Green House Resource Center; and Campaign for Democracy.  Of the 30 
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respondents there were 7 senior public officials, 9 community leaders, 10 members of the public 
(whose statuses were not disclosed) and 4 people who described themselves as political activists.  
 
Methods of Analysis 
This analysis is based upon a single case study method. A case study method is an in-
depth analysis of specific context(s) for understanding a complex phenomenon. As (Yin 2014, 
16) articulates, it is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the 
“case”) in depth and within real-world context.” The nature of the field interview questions 
outlined for this research requires an analytical and interpretative method of analysis. To this 
end, I utilized data collected through the field interview for descriptive and interpretative 
analysis. Afrobarometer data is also analyzed using Chi-square bivariate statistics to test for 
associations between the dependent and independent variables.  
 
Goals of Research 
This dissertation research seeks to achieve two goals. First, it seeks to analyze the causal 
mechanisms of violent conflicts with the view to explaining the roles of ethnicity (ethnic 
dominance). Second, it seeks to explore the mitigating influence of civil society in the conflicts 
in SSA. Ultimately, this dissertation research seeks to analyze the causal mechanisms of violent 
conflict in Nigeria with the goal of determining why and how ethnic factors accelerate violent 
conflict in SSA9 To achieve these goals, this dissertation research goes beyond the explanatory 
purview of extant literature by analyzing the role of civil society in fostering social capital and 
political trust that contributes to political stability. The nucleus of this theory is social trust that 
                                               
9 See Osaghae (2001). “The role and function of research in divided societies: the case of Africa.” Researching 
violently divided societies: ethical and methodological issues for more discussion on the nature, characteristics of 
divided states and the implications for violent conflict. 
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emanates from the feelings of the composite ethnic groups toward the state. The theory is fully 
described in chapter four.  
 
Relevance of Research  
Sub-Saharan Africa is the most ethnically diverse region and the constituent states have 
experienced vicious cycles of civil wars. With a population of nearly two hundred million and 
high spate of violence, Nigeria is the best analytical referent for this dissertation research 
because of the reasons mentioned above. Interestingly, despite the efforts of scholars and the 
government, the region has remained one of the most volatile politically, making the choice of 
this research topic, the case study and scope, significant. Moreover, violent conflict constitutes 
an impediment to political stability and economic advancement in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Researchers have investigated the phenomenon and proffered many recommendations for 
managing the conflicts. Therefore, it is essential to reexamine why and how resource-
dependence, institutional crisis, and ethnicity are still revered as causal or accelerating factors of 
conflict in Africa. Moreover, the utilization of a mixed method case study method for analyzing 
the dynamics of the causal mechanisms has the potential to shed light on the viability of the 
theoretical framework that this research explores. Finally, this dissertation research will 
contribute to the conflict literature by supporting or rejecting the accelerating roles of ethnicity in 
conflict, the mitigating influence of civil society in conflict, and the essence of social trust in 
facilitating sustainable peace. 
 
Chapter Outline  
Chapter One: This introductory chapter provides the foundation and background of the 
study. It summarizes the statement of research problems, the conceptualization of terms, research 
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questions, data and method of analysis, the goal of the research, the significance of the research, 
and the outline of the study.  
Chapter Two: This chapter explores the extant literature on violent conflict in Africa. It 
focuses on the arguments of the different perspectives on the causal factors and management of 
violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Chapter Three: This chapter is the theoretical framework of the dissertation research. It 
focuses on the causal mechanism of violence by exploring the role of political trust in the 
perceptions of citizens and their reactions to government policies and performances. It addresses 
the notion of trust and distrust and why and how citizens choose to trust or distrust the 
government.  
Chapter Four: This chapter presents the research methodology. It explains the method for 
data collection using the analytical method. It also lays out the events, issues, or variables that 
are explored in this dissertation research,  
Chapter Five: This chapter analyzes the case study and presents the findings. It examines 
the trends and dynamics in the incidence of violent conflicts in Nigeria to understand how 
ethnicity and power domination occur in resource-rich multiethnic states. 
Chapter Six: This chapter concludes the research. It summarizes how the research 
questions were addressed. It also summarizes how the research accomplished its goals. It 
concludes by proposing recommendations for future studies. 
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In this chapter, I examine the extant literature on violent conflict with the view to 
explaining why sub-Sahara African states are prone to violent conflict, how conflicts occur, and 
how to mitigate these conflicts in order for Africa to experience sustainable political stability and 
economic development. To this end, this chapter seeks to accomplish three goals. First, it 
explores the literature on violent conflict in ethnically diverse and resource-rich states. Second, it 
examines the roles of accelerating factors in the onset and escalation of conflicts. Third, it 
critically assesses the mitigating influences of civil society on conflict in ethnically diverse and 
resource-rich sub-Sahara African states. In conjunction, this chapter examines how literature has 
analyzed violent conflict, their findings, and the areas that requires further explanation. 
It is legitimate to ask why Africa is a hotspot for the study of conflict. It is striking, and at 
the same time sobering, that of all the regions of the world sub-Saharan Africa presents the most 
fertile ground for analyzing the causes, accelerators, dynamics, duration, and impacts of conflicts 
(Horowitz 1985; Osaghae 1999 & 2001). While there is no argument that sub-Saharan Africa is 
the most divided region, an important question is how relevant is ethnicity to violent conflict in 
Africa? This has led analysts to focus on the effects of ethnicity as a factor of conflict. 
Interestingly, analysts have come up with divergent findings, which has led to further questions 
about what we really know or do not know about ethnicity.  
In addition to the debate on the causal factor, another issue that has emerged as 
significant to the analysis of conflict in the SSA is the role of civil society. The assumption that 
civil society may have a mitigating influence on virulent conflict stems from the notion that 
citizens are likely to acquiesce to an entity that bears a considerable measure of trust. The debate 
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on the phenomenon of conflict in Africa has attracted different approaches for investigating the 
problem and proposing options for resolutions. Among the propositions for maintaining political 
stability is the role of civil society in conflict mitigation and resolution. This role must be 
examined carefully to provide unambiguous explanation for how conflict erupts in developing 
multiethnic states. Researchers have engaged in concerted efforts to conceptualize conflict in the 
ways that explicate the objectivity of their research and at the same time increase knowledge. 
The task is complex and challenging considering the difficulties associated with identifying a 
coherent definition of social concepts. Literature of conflict shows that conflict has attracted a 
plethora of definitions based on divergent views of nature, actors, dimensions, and the intensity 
of the acts that constitute conflict. Therefore, for the purpose of clarity in this research context, 
conflict refers to a disruption in the orderly process of social relations. Conflict can manifest in 
different forms and levels of intensity and tends to have different magnitudes of effects. The fact 
that conflict does not lend itself to a simplistic universal definition is consistent with the 
challenges of concept definitions generally in the social sciences. 
According to Waltz (1959), war is the physical display of the innate attributes of humans. 
In a rather blunt manner Waltz writes, “Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected 
aggressive impulses, from stupidity” (p. 16). Deducible from the above is the observation that 
attempts at defining conflict often leads to the explanation of the causal factors, types, contexts, 
and the transformation of conflict. It is worthy of note that beyond the orthodoxy of endless 
preoccupation with the search for causal factors, cognizance should also be accorded to 
dynamics of intergroup relationships as shaped by the expected ends that they seek to achieve. 
Relationships in a social system that entail competing interests are consistent in the tendencies to 
degenerate into conflict of varying magnitudes if the interests of the disparate actors are 
irreconcilable (Schmidt and Kochan 1972, 359; Galtung 2009, 35).  
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It is in view of the above that Thomas (1992) defines conflict as “the process which 
begins when one party (ethnic group) perceives that another group has frustrated, or is about to 
frustrate, some concern of its’ (p. 265). Furthermore, Thomas emphasizes the significance of 
conflict process and structure (pp. 265-266). What the above suggests is that conflict may 
manifest in structural or non-structural form. But what are the fundamental differences between 
structured and non-structured types of conflict? Are they caused or accelerated by different 
causes? According to Galtung (2009), “conflict is unstructured if it evolves from a contact 
without prior interaction, while structured conflicts normally emanate from contradictions among 
parties that have had previous interaction” (p. 48). Therefore, the nature and characteristics of 
conflicts may vary from one context to another. First, conflict can be violent or non-violent. 
Second, conflict can be structural or non-structural. Furthermore, non-violent conflict can evolve 
from different types of disagreement but seldom rise to violent combat. Violent conflict, 
however, involves violent physical combat and fatalities. Structural war normally stems from an 
unsatisfactory hierarchical pattern of relationship. In structural relationships, the dominant group 
often exploits the state’s institutions for relative advantage while suppressing or excluding rival 
groups. Third, the characters of the parties involved influence the characteristics, ramifications, 
and duration of the conflict. Hence, among other factors, some scholars have noted that the best 
way to assess a conflict phenomenon is to examine the intensity of violence (Gurr 1969; Wright 
1990). The problem with such exposition is that it assumes that all conflicts involve violence. It 
is instructive to note that this research does not lump all conflicts together. Rather, it focuses on 
violent conflict. 
Another problematic issue for the analysis of conflict is the classification. First, why is 
classification necessary? Second, what are the standards for classifying conflict? Although 
classification may shed light on the specific nature of the conflict analyzed, its absence ought not 
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to be misconstrued as a weakness. Similarly, if analysts cannot agree on a universal definition of 
a concept, it is unfathomable to expect any imposition of generally acceptable standards for 
defining or measuring a transient social concept such as conflict. For example, some scholars 
classify conflict as rebellion, civil war, ethnic war, structural, or nonstructural, whereas others 
disagree fervently with the idea of categorization. Other researchers reject the practice of 
characterizing conflict as “ideological, ethnic, religious, or class war” (Kalyvas 2003, 476). 
Furthermore, they argue that identities are not permanent at all levels of relationships. The 
rationale for this argument is that people do not always think the same way as the elites who 
exploit them (Kalyvas 2003, 475).  
Drawing from the opposition to characterizing or labelling conflict, it is imperative to ask 
whether analysts can convincingly explain the conflict in SSA without reference to germane 
issues such as ethnicity. The term ethnicity refers to a descriptive term for explaining the 
different cleavages among the people in a society based on identity factors including race, color, 
language, and indigeneity.10 The debates about the theoretical connotation and significance of 
ethnicity to violence have not been satisfactorily resolved, as analysts seem unrepentantly 
divided based on their views of the value of the concept. Ethnicity is an essential concept 
because the countries affected by violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are multiethnic states. 
Interestingly, there is a disagreement among scholars on the relevance of the concept in the 
analysis of violent conflict.  
In view of the above, the trends in debate on conflict show two patterns. For one, scholars 
are divided based on the analytical approaches they adopt, which includes quantitative, 
qualitative, and mixed methodologies. It has been noted that the approach scholars embrace 
inevitably impacts their selection of cases, conceptualization of variables, and the research 
                                               
10 This research does not include religion as a factor of ethnicity but recognizes it as a form of identity variable. 
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process and findings (Ross 2004b). Another factor that tends to influence researchers is their 
background (intellectual and ideological orientation, biases, the connections between analysts 
and the research context or lack of it thereof). It is not surprising that analysts are impacted by 
various preferences. In view of the potentially negative import of the researchers’ biases, Pondy 
(1967) suggests that it is probably more prudent to refrain from assessing conflict research 
findings from the premises of the analysts’ conceptualization of terms.  
Meanwhile, ongoing debate on violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa has not adequately 
examined the role of ethnic-related factors. It is astounding that some scholars have erroneously 
depicted ethnicity as a low risk factor in the explanations of violent conflicts in multiethnic 
states. Thus, it is legitimate to examine how the extant literature explains the causal mechanism 
of the protracted violence in ethnically diverse states as opposed to the relative stability and 
peace in less diverse11 states. Fundamentally, it has been acknowledged that a majority of the 
sub-Saharan African states are ethnically diverse in nature (Bates 2008; Osaghae 1999). 
However, there remains an intense debate on the role of ethnicity. Interestingly, ethnic conflict 
scholars need to be more unambiguous with the operationalization of their analytical 
frameworks. Specifically, there is need for clarity on the causal influence of ethnicity in conflict 
in general, and as a tool for understanding the dynamics of politics in primitive and divided 
states. And while there is indeed a case to be made about the vagueness of the term ethnicity 
(Chandra 2006), it is also plausible that ethnic competition remains a pivotal phenomenon in any 
analysis of conflict in divided societies.  
Despite agreement across the schools of thought that the SSA region consists of 
multiethnic states, some analysts have either expressed reservation about the extent to which we 
                                               
11 Ideally, there are no ethnically homogenous states in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, instead of classifying the 
states into heterogeneous or homogeneous states, this dissertation research conceives the ethnic compositions of 
African states as highly diversified or less-diverse states. 
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can attribute violent conflict to ethnic factors, or reject the idea that ethnicity causes conflict. For 
instance, it has been argued that: “Peaking interest in academic study of civil war has coincided 
with a sharp decline in the incidence of new global civil wars” (Sambanis 2002, 215). Some 
scholars have wrongly rejected the term ‘ethnic’ conflict on the grounds that the depiction of its 
specter as “endemic or on the rise everywhere is unproven” (Gilley 2004: 1157). The challenge 
for scholars who perceive the relevance of the study of civil war indiscriminate from this 
perspective fail to recognize the debilitating vulnerabilities of the SSA that persist even after the 
decline in wars during the 1990s. Hence, such conjecturing is narrow-focused because it lacks 
explanation of the sporadic spates in violence observed in countries like Nigeria and South 
Sudan from the late 1990s until late 2014. 
Conversely, it has been reported that ethnically diverse states (authoritarian or 
democratic) are more susceptible to violent conflict than their homogeneous or less-ethnically 
diverse counterparts (Varshney 2007, 278). To be precise, a host of other studies have argued 
that ethnicity is the most significant factor in the study of violent conflicts and politics in Africa 
(Haider 2014; Diamond 1987; Varshney 1987; Horowitz 1985). In a similar vein, some recent 
studies have corroborated the assertion that ethnicity is a pivotal issue in the analysis of African 
conflict (Carlson 2016; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Harkness 206; Janus 2016; and 
Varshney 2007). Consistent with that perception, Zerfu, Zikhali, and Kabenga (2008) find “the 
interaction of ethnic nepotism has a mutually reinforcing and negative effect on trust levels” (pp. 
172-3). Thus, on the role of ethnicity, this dissertation research agrees with the viewpoints of 
scholars who find strong relationships between ethnicity and violence in Africa. Indeed, the 
nature of violent conflicts in Africa raises questions about the roles of ethnicity and ethnic 
mobilization as triggering factors. Moreover, the “fluidity of ethnic boundaries and identity in 
the divided states has led to a deepened controversy about the salience of ethnicity in conflict 
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analysis” (Osaghae 1999, 58). Yet the purported fluidity of ethnicity does not justify Chandra’s 
(2006) attempt to jettison the relevance of the term for explanation of causal mechanism of 
conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, irrespective of how analysts conceptualize ethnic identity, the 
irreducible fact remains that Africans have always perceived themselves as pluralistic people. 
Another study asserts that “even if ethnic identities are not primordial, and inter-ethnic 
animosities are absent, ethnicity may still facilitate strategic coordination and enforcement” 
(Blattman and Edward 2010, 17). Another prominent scholar also questions the accuracy of the 
perspectives of the dissenters in the extant literature of conflict thus: “How much of the complex 
ethnic situation do we really know?” (Osaghae 1999, 63).  
In sum, any suggestion that ethnicity is not a salient issue in the analysis of violent 
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa seems at the very least myopic, because at the root of most of the 
conflicts in divided countries is the issue of identity politics. Conflict in Africa is often broad and 
protracted in nature. It is understandable that the debate on African conflict has led to the 
identification of numerous causal factors. However, the schools of thought that identified these 
causal factors have presented vigorous arguments to demonstrate the importance of their ideas as 
opposed to others. It is noteworthy that the current literature is inadequate because of the 
infatuation with finding, measuring, and describing, causal factors, which leads to a dearth of 
non-econometric literature that perceive conflict as a complex phenomenon with variegated and 
often interwoven components. In support of this viewpoint, Haider (2014) notes that “each of the 
factors may constitute a cause, dynamic, and or impact of conflict” (p. 6). For instance, one may 
ask how can we categorize the factors that led to civil war in the West African countries of 
Nigeria 1967, Liberia 1989, and Sierra Leone 1991? How are these wars different from the 
Ugandan 1981, Rwandan 1994, and Congolese 1988 civil wars? How can the knowledge gained 
from this analysis help to shape or reshape our views and ability to construct conflict as a 
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veritable causal mechanism? This research analyzes the import of each school based on its 
contribution to the body of knowledge in conflict study.  
 
The Structural Causes and Accelerators of Violent Conflict 
Structural causes of war are the necessary conditions12 that motivate competing ethnic 
groups to opt for war as a means of seeking for redress when they perceive the pattern and their 
relationships with other groups as inimical to their group’s interests. Moreover, structural causes 
of war are factors that are measurable and can be used to predict onset of war. The structural 
factors refer to various political and economic factors that incite competitions among disparate 
ethnic groups. These include the status of the economy, regime type, state and society relations, 
access to political arena for popular participation, and ethnic composition of state (homogeneity 
or heterogeneity). Although some studies have identified these factors as the causes of violence 
in SSA, some studies have also argued that while they may be necessary, they are not the 
sufficient causes that trigger war (Rugumamu 2002: 10; van der Maat, 2010:3). From that 
standpoint, it is appropriate to question the accuracy of the conjecturing that structural factors of 
conflict are necessary but not considered as sufficient for the causal processes of war.  
The prominent theories in conflict literature exemplify the above observations about the 
divergent perspectives on the cause of violence because while they share similar views on the 
significance of causal (structural) factors, they have not yet demonstrated that the factors they 
analyzed are sufficient causes of violent conflicts in multiethnic resource-rich states. The 
theories reviewed in this research include institutional, economic, and environmental theoretical 
frameworks. Each theory lauds its points of emphasis in addition to presenting its theory as the 
best approach for predicting the likelihood while at the same time explaining the causes of 
                                               




violence. Each of these theories also rejects the significance of social (ethnic) factors as 
sufficient conditions for acceleration of conflict. 
Thus, it is logical that the recommendations each of these schools proposed for resolving 
violent conflict are derived from the causal factors they emphasized in their analyses. Hence, this 
study assumes that because conflicts in sub-Saharan African states have spiraled into a protracted 
and crippling stage despite the avalanche of proposals for peacekeeping and peace enforcing, 
research focus ought to shift from contemporary strategies for resolution to potential mitigation 
strategies. To this end, it is important as a precursor to analyze the prominent theories for the 
causes and strategies for resolving violent conflicts.  
 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Natural resource wealth is the most cited cause of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The question is, how do natural resources and commodity export dependence motivate conflict? 
And to what extent do they affect the magnitude, duration, and impact of the conflict? A 
prominent argument against natural resources is the adverse effects it bears on state that depends 
on it to the detriment of other sectors of the state’s economy. A common assumption is that the 
sudden discovery of natural resources in Africa is an anathema to political stability and peace in 
the region. But then, how exactly do resources actually cause conflict, and what types of 
conflicts are associated with it? It is important to note that there are resource-rich states like 
Botswana, Norway, and Indonesia, that are politically stable and thriving economically. This 
observation raises important questions whether mere dependence on resource wealth in itself 
causes war. Holmberg (2008) argues that the susceptibility of a resource-rich state to conflict 
centers on the management of resources and factors such as the population, migration, and 
adverse climatic conditions on agriculture. Consistent with Holmberg’s postulation, Jensen and 
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Wantchekon (2004, 819) contend that “the behaviors of citizens in the resource-rich states that 
are heavily reliant on resources are motivated by issues concerning the distribution of resource 
rents, not ideology.” It is quite remarkable that in addition to dependence on resource-wealth, 
regime behavior and the opposition’s response are indisputable factors.  
Therefore, “rather than asking whether resource-wealth causes war or not, analysts 
should focus on how and the extent to which the two interact because some studies have argued 
that they are directly related (Homer Dickson 1994). Such studies also argue that the production 
of natural resources in the conflict zones is related to the number of total combat deaths” (Lujala 
2009, 15). Aside from the inability of the government to consolidate resource-wealth for 
developing other sectors of the economy, it also responds aggressively to the grievances 
expressed by oppressed groups. Paradoxically, some patrimonial states like Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia have so far been able to avoid violent conflict while countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
and Sudan failed. Responding to that paradox, Le Billon (2001, 580) notes, “It would be an error 
to reduce armed conflict to greed-driven resources war, as political and identity factors remain 
key, the control of local resources influence the agenda and strategies of the belligerents.” The 
question that stems from the above assertion is why do ethnic groups engage in zero-sum 
struggle for power in resource-rich states? Could effective institutional management and/or 
distribution strategies have averted such struggle for relative advantage? This will be addressed 
in the analysis chapter. 
It seems plausible that the dependence on one source of revenue exposes a multiethnic 
state to many risks, though not all analysts agree. In fact, some studies contend that oil-wealth 
has neither a causal effect on regime instability, patronage, coercion, nor causes the onset of war. 
For example, among those that reject resource dependence as a causal factor of violent conflict, 
Smith (1999) writes about the regimes in oil-rich states thus: “First, they tend to fare better than 
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others, despite the volatility of their revenue base. Second, they fared well during the oil burst of 
1986 and beyond. This suggests two plausible mechanisms for regime maintenance that belie the 
weak-state assumptions associated with oil wealth … Many of these regimes may have had 
robust social coalitions that went much deeper than the simple purchase of legitimacy” (p. 242). 
This line of argument is in stark contrast with those that find direct relationships between oil, 
other natural resources, and the onset of civil war. Interestingly, in contrast to the oil-as-spoil 
thesis,13 ethnic diversity, just as economic volatility,14 tends to have a significant negative impact 
on civil war (p. 240).  
While there is abundant evidence supporting the fact that Africa does not have a 
monopoly of natural resources, the dependence on resource-wealth is a pervasive problem in the 
continent. Meanwhile, the controversy over the salient role of natural resources on conflict is not 
yet settled. Although it may be true that oil can fuel secessionist agitation, it is also possible that 
oil provokes other types of conflicts that do not result in secessionist campaigns. Dunning (2008) 
posits that what determines how natural resources will instigate violence is not necessarily the 
regime type, but the system of resource control and distribution of public goods. In a different 
study, Smith opines that the controversies surrounding the relationship between resource-wealth 
and war evolve from how scholars have conceptualized resources (p. 243). 
It is rather intriguing that while recent studies posit that natural resources cause, intensify, 
and prolong civil war, it is a striking observation that there is a dearth of scholarly focus on 
articulating how the causal process works (Ross 2004a). This is a crucial aspect of analysis of 
conflict that deserves more scholarly attention than it currently receives. In fact, the question of 
                                               
13 Smith (1999) does not reject the roles of resource control or looting as motivations for rebellion, rather the authors 
disavow the attempt at undermining the other effects of oil such as ethnicity and grievance. 
14 For more on economic volatility, refer to Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. “Economic 




how or why natural resources lead to civil war is one of the focal issues that inspired this 
research. Acknowledging the significance of causal process, Ross (2004) argues, “Certain types 
of natural resources — oil, gemstones, and drugs — have indeed influenced the onset and 
duration of civil wars … most of the civil wars … were influenced by natural resources through 
several mechanisms simultaneously, which may help account for the analytical muddle of some 
earlier studies …” (p. 37-38). To further support Ross’ observation, analysts still disagree on 
how natural resources and conflict are related. Paradoxically, despite his considerable effort, it is 
disconcerting that Ross (2004, 50) also asserts that “grievance mechanisms are only observable 
in non-separatist conflicts.” Ross’ contradictory arguments gives credence to the need for 
providing unequivocal explanations for causal mechanism when presenting reports of analysis. 
Furthermore, Ross (2004b) pointed out that “we still know little about the process that 
ties natural resources to conflict” (p. 338).15 Ross’ statement here accentuates the observation of 
this dissertation research that in spite of the plethora of analysis, there is insufficient explanation 
for how natural resources actually cause war. Increasing the pressure on the campaign to support 
the need for causal mechanism is the discovery that more than a decade after Ross’ emphasis on 
causal mechanism, analysts are yet to fully embrace the import of causal mechanism. 
Interestingly, there does not seem to be a remarkable improvement in the literature concerning 
the lack of causal mechanisms. For Dunning (2008), natural resources can stimulate democracy 
as well as authoritarianism, depending on the approaches of the regime to resource control and 
distribution. In contrast, quite a number of scholars disagree with the liberal view on the effect of 
the connections between natural resources and conflict. For instance, Tsui (2006) contends that 
the discovery of natural resources may constitute a debilitating impediment to political stability 
unless “well-defined property rights are established to minimize rent-seeking activities in the 
                                               
15 For further analysis on the inadequacies of extant literature concerning the ties between natural resources and 
conflict, please see Ross 2004 a; Humphreys 2003. 
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political sector” (p. 25). This approach seems to address individual rather than group interests.  
The contention that resource-wealth tends to inhibit political stability is not an unfounded 
thought. However, the creation of workable policies inevitably requires the consensus of 
different groups in the state which is not only difficult to achieve but is seldom pursued by some, 
if not all, ethnic groups. So, irrespective of the divergent approaches to analyzing the impact of 
natural resources, it is imperative to note that a country’s dependence on natural resource-wealth 
is not in itself a cause of violence. By the same logic, dependence on resource-wealth can only 
cause, accelerate, or prolong war if other factors are involved. This assertion draws from the 
findings in the body of literature which challenged the notion that resource-wealth can 
unilaterally cause political instability without the connivance of some accelerators (Elbadawi and 
Sambanis 2002; DeNardo 1985; Mueller & Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Reno 1995; Fearon 
& Laitin 2003; Le Billon 2003, Gylfason 2001).16 Against the backdrop of the above, it is 
important to understand how resource-wealth causes violent conflict.  
Sambanis (2002) submits that “With respect to conflict resolution, we need more 
evidence on the condition under which different strategies are likely to succeed so that we know 
when to choose territorial partition as opposed to federalism or other forms of power-sharing” (p. 
239). The implication of what I refer to as Sambanis’ warning is that analysts must be open-
minded and consider history as relevant component of their data. Otherwise, attempts by 
policymakers at reconciling the diverse ethnic groups will always result in tentative peace.  
In view of the above, the underlying assumption is that highly fractionalized states are 
susceptible to the risk of civil war because of inherent discontents that come with the 
antagonistic nature of their intergroup relations. The assertion above is inconsistent with the 
finding that there are indisputable differences between individual and group grievances (De 
                                               
16 See Ross (2004 b: 530-351) for a detailed compilation of findings by different analysts on the relationship 
between natural resources and conflict. 
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Soysa 2002: 397). The question at hand is whether the relationship between group grievances 
and war are real or imagined. Furthermore, they argue that power dominance is relevant only in 
the states where the largest ethnic group constitutes between 45-90 percent of the entire 
population. Paradoxically, there is not yet a sufficient explanation for the rationale behind the 45-
90 percent threshold set by the advocates of this standard as the condition to accept the relevance 
of ethnic power dominance to violence, even though it is identified as a proxy for grievance. The 
observable flaw in this conceptualization of dominance standard is its arbitrariness and the fact 
that power dominance in multiethnic states does not always evolve from the strength.  
 
Environmental Theory of Violent Conflict 
Environment-conflict literature offers two interwoven alternatives for explaining the 
effects of environment on the onset, acceleration, duration, and ramification of conflict. First, the 
Malthusian scholars contend that the rapid increase in population places pressure on 
environmental resources. Pressure resulting from population increase leads to scarcity, which in 
turn causes conflict (Reuveny 2007). Second, resource scarcity scholars attribute conflict 
phenomenon to the impact of environmental changes in conjunction with population increase on 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Accordingly, unmitigated changes in the environmental 
elements can cause drought, reduction and loss of agricultural produce, flood scarcity, depletion 
of resources, and resource-capture. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) find that increase in “rainfalls 
correlate with civil war and insurgency, as conflict outbreak is more likely in wetter years” (p. 
12). Therefore, both drought and ferocious rainfall are related to outbreak of war, though in 
different ways. 
To this end, Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi (2012)17 assert that “environmentally induced 
                                               
17 Bernauer, Thomas, Tobias Böhmelt, and Vally Koubi alluded to the works of other environmental scholars. For more on these 
sources of environmentally induced conflict including Skaperdas 2003, 1992; Garfinkel 1994; Shurke 1993; Haavelmo 1954. 
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economic hardship and migration have the tendencies to cause violent conflict primarily in those 
states where political institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms are either missing, have 
failed, or are weak” (p. 1). Therefore, “scarcity can sharply increase the demands on key 
institutions … while simultaneously reducing their capacity to meet those demands” (Homer-
Dixon 1994, 2). Fragile states that depend overwhelmingly on resources are incapable of 
addressing the attendant economic impacts equitably. Therefore, when confronted with the 
enormity of resource scarcity, the predatory elites may opt for an inequitable resource-wealth 
distribution formula for recruitment and mobilization. This could trigger violent reactions from 
other ethnic groups (Homer-Dixon 1994, 6).  
Nordås and Gleditsch (2007)18 agree that climate change may expose a state to a 
precarious risk of violent conflict but note that environmental theories of conflict are flawed by 
the absence of evidence to substantiate the environment-conflict arguments (p. 631). 
Corroborating the skepticism noted above, Reuveny (2007)19 cited in (Gleditsch 2007) that “in a 
study of 38 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 19 conflict cases show that 
environmental pressure is clearly mixed with inter-ethnic violence that predates migration” (p. 
362). What does this tell us about the role of environment as a pivotal factor of violent conflict? 
Nevertheless, while environmentalists may have valid points about the impact of 
environmental change, on resource scarcity, and the socio-economic affairs of the states, they 
have not been able to successfully show how environmental factors cause violent conflict 
without the input of other accompanying factors — economic, social, and political factors — 
perhaps because of its inadequate explanatory mechanism. Although environment-conflict 
theories may not have been able to persuasively demonstrate the connection between 
                                               
18 Nordås and Gleditsch (2007) draw from studies that found relationships between climate change and environmental scarcity, 
grievances and civil war which culminate in the reduction of states capability to mitigate attendant problems, including Barnett 
and Adger (2007); Hendrix and Glaser (2007); Meier, Bond, and Bond (2007). 
19 Cited in Nordås and Gleditsch (2007, 362).  
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environmental change, degradation, or scarcity and violent conflict, it is conceivable that 
environmental factors can trigger violent conflict if there is a vacuum of mitigating factors. 
Viewed from a different perspective, is it not possible that the underlying cause of rebellion is 
the accumulated effects of grievance while environmental disaster is the triggering event that 
exposes the state’s lack of capacity to deal with those insurmountable grievances? 
Consistent with above, Benjaminsen (2008) extrapolates from the case of the Malian 
Tuaregs’ rebellion thus: “There was already a strong feeling among the nomads and Tuaregs in 
Mali of being marginalized by state policies of modernization and sedentarization” (p. 832). This 
viewpoint has been corroborated by other studies. For instance, Percival and Homer-Dixon 
(1998) explain that “opportunities for collective action can decrease, even under conditions of 
environmental scarcity, when the power of potential challenger groups is diffused by vigorous 
horizontal interaction within society and vertical interaction between civil society and the state” 
(pp. 281-282). In a similar vein, Urdal (2005) submits that, albeit population increase and land 
scarcity could lead to an increase in the risk of violence, the effects are not strong enough to 
conclude that an increase in population constitutes security risk for the state (p. 430). What these 
suggest is that environmental factors may not be enough to trigger violent conflict without some 
extraneous factors. So what factors usually support environmental change to stimulate conflict in 
Africa? The argument against environmentally-induced violence derives from the experiences of 
United States and other developed countries. These multiethnic (or multiracial) states have 
experienced environmental crises like hurricanes and tornadoes, but there is no evidence that any 
of those events have directly resulted in violent conflict. Therefore, some environmentalists are 
beginning to modify their views on the relationships between environment and conflict. For 
instance, Reuveny (2007) notes that the effects of environmental change only leads to conflict if 
it coincides with the conditions or events such as “competition, ethnic tension, distrust, socio-
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economic fault lines, and overdependence on natural resources” (p. 659).  
Furthermore, Salehyan (2008) argues that “the effect of climate change on armed conflict 
is contingent upon a number of political and social variables” (p. 315). In a similar vein, Koubi, 
Bernauer, Kalbhenn, and Spilker (2012) show that climatic variability seldom leads directly to 
conflict and conclude that “climate variability measured as deviations in temperature and 
precipitation from their past … does not affect violent intrastate conflict through economic 
growth” (p. 124). Considering this recent trend, it is not arbitrary to suggest that the relationships 
between environmental problems and conflict is weak. Presumably, a safe explanatory 
mechanism for the environmentalists is that which sees conflict as the effect of aggregate factors 
including population pressure, climate change, resource scarcity, and ethnonationalist factors. As 
of this moment, each of the micro causal theses emphasizes a single issue that sometimes appears 
deterministic and unsystematic in the sense that virtually all cases of environment-conflict 
phenomena seem to have occurred where political, economic, and social decadences are 
covariate factors.  
If viewed from a different perspective, it is arguable that even under the circumstances of 
environmental hazards, violent conflicts can and have been prevented. As Salehyan (2008) aptly 
puts it: “Improving the administrative, judicial, and policing capacity of states can head off 
conflicts over basic resources. Moreover, mediation, arbitration, and alternative dispute-
resolution mechanisms at the local and international levels can prevent conflict from arising” (p. 
325). Furthermore, Nel and Righarts (2008) affirm the argument that natural disasters increase 
the risk of violence, but also find that “income inequality … is an important intervening factor 
that partially determines when and where natural disaster can lead to a rapid-onset of conflict. 
Moreover, the risks of conflict that are attributable to natural disasters tends to be more prevalent 
in states with mixed political systems than in autocracies or consolidated democracies” (p. 179).  
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It follows that the impact of weak political institutions’ capability can be more 
detrimental than that of environmental change when a state is bedeviled by an environmental 
crisis. In such a state, the disenchanted groups may use the attendant conundrum to carry out 
their grievances against the state though said grievances tend to be unrelated to the 
environmental problems. What can we infer from the above? Does it imply that strong states 
prevent aggrieved ethnic groups from exploiting natural disasters as excuses to launch attacks 
against the state? This research assumes that the strength of the state is a peripheral factor, and 
what matters most is the ability of the state to gain the trust and support of all of the constituent 
ethnic groups. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that there is no immediate connection 
between the form of government that a state operates and the onset of conflict prevention or 
resolution. Based on that same logic, Walker (1999), referring to the cases of Malawi, South 
Africa, and Mozambique contends, “There is no undeniable relationship between democracy and 
natural disaster” (p. 257). But does that imply conflict occurs at the same rate in democratic and 
non-democratic states?  
While there may not be a mandatory relationship per se between democracy and the 
management of natural disaster, it is probable that a chaotic situation that persists for too long 
can call into question the ability of the government to provide relief to its citizens. Such a 
scenario tends to bolster the groups’ appeal to symbolic20 sentiment of their members, especially 
if the groups that control the state are able to provide some largesse in terms of relief for their 
members. The above begs to question the explanatory mechanism of environmental literature 
that suggests increases in population and environmental variability are direct causes of conflict. 
A refutation of that supposition corroborates the idea that environmental theories are relevant 
only when they are combined with other cognate factors.  
                                               
20 For detailed explanation of symbolic politics see Kaufman (2006). 
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Institutionalist Theory of Conflict 
Institutional theory is an all-encompassing analytical construct. Like economism,21 it 
explains all spectrums of the problems in a political unit from the viewpoint of the structural 
framework, rules, and institutional capacities. Furthermore, institutional theory claims that a state 
is likely to enjoy political stability if it possesses and maintains viable institutional structures and 
sustainable rules. From that standpoint, institutional theory posits that political stability in any 
state depends on the degree to which a state’s institutional structures and rules serve the interests 
of the citizens across social cleavages and political affiliation. As Easterly (2001) noted, 
“Institutions that give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from expropriation, grant 
freedom from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for public services that would 
constrain the amount of damage that one ethnic group could do to another (p. 690). Indeed, 
Easterly suggests that a good institution fosters peace while a weak or failed institution allows 
conflict. 
However, the assumption here is not in any way a suggestion that political institutions do 
not play significant role in engendering political stability. In fact, the state’s institutional 
structures and enforceable rules are essential ingredients of peace. Rather, it is an attempt to call 
attention to the thought that certain circumstances have contributed to the eruption of conflicts in 
sub-Saharan Africa. And even some states with established institutions have descended into 
turmoil and failed. So, why and how do states that have political institutions experience 
internecine conflict? Wantchekon (2003) finds that institutions in sub-Saharan African states are 
weak because of the perverse clientelist system or personal rule22 that permeates “strong 
                                               
21 Economism as used in this dissertation derives its meaning from Merriam-Webster that defines it as a theoretical 
viewpoint that emphasizes economic goals or interests. 
22 See Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg (1984, 421) for full discussion on the theory of personal rule which 
encapsulates all forms of non-institutional practices in sub-Saharan African politics, including coups, plots, 
factionalism, purges, rehabilitations, clientelism, corruption, succession maneuvers, and similar activities. 
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preferences of the citizens for private transfer than for public goods or projects of national 
interests” (p. 399).  
Certainly, neopatrimonialism, prebendalism,23 patronage, clientelist, and all other forms 
of unconventional governing systems are egregious tactics that corrode the confidence of citizens 
in the state and its institutions. It is therefore evident that the adoption of unconventional if 
polarizing tactics by the governments of multiethnic sub-Saharan states are triggers or 
accelerators of violent conflict. In an ethnically diverse society, a lack of trust for the state may 
be transferred to ethnic groups that dominate and support the government. Additionally, political 
polarization and a lack of trust in the national government constitute motivations for intense 
ethnic competition. Furthermore, multiethnic states characterized by the features itemized above 
are unlikely to enjoy sustainable political stability. Rather, such a state may exist on a precarious 
platform, and the attendant fragility can transform into violent conflict whenever the potential 
accelerators are triggered. 
In sum, from the foregoing exploration of the literature, three protuberant shortcomings 
are discernible. First, the prominent theories (institutional, resource-dependent, and 
environmental theories) focus only on the structural causes for analyzing and explaining violent 
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (Rugumamu 2002, 10). Second, because the mainstream theories 
overemphasize micro causes, they neglect the significance of the accelerating factors.24 Third, a 
remarkable body of the literature that emphasizes only structural factors also concentrate on 
large N analysis with subtle disregard for case studies. Understandably, extant literature seem to 
suggest that the state is a neutral actor. But to what extent can the state be an impartial arbiter in 
                                               
23 See Richard Joseph 1991 for an analysis of prebendal politics and its effects on a fragile state. 
24 An investigation of violent conflict in Africa ought to pay serious attention to the accelerating factors as the 
triggering factors tend to be as more ominous than the cultural factors. See Rugumamu (2002) “Structural causes, 
the imbalance of opportunity, or root causes, of conflict (p. 10) for a detailed analysis of the structural and 
accelerating factors.  
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Africa considering the parochial and peripheral nature of politics and the intense competition 
among the ethnic groups to dominate each other?  
Therefore, this research aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on the 
strategies for mitigating conflict in sub-Saharan Africa by seeking not only to analyze why but 
also how the accelerating factors contribute to violent conflict. The extent to which structural 
mechanisms can explicate what Rothchild and Olorunshola (1983) describe as the management 
of competing state and ethnic claims without cognizance for the accelerating factors is 
unfathomable. Thus, the protracted nature of violent conflicts and their endemic ramification in 
sub-Saharan Africa conflict mitigation can be a more viable option than the post-war resolution 
and reconstruction efforts. In other words, conflict prevention is less likely to be as costly and 
prolonged as peace negotiation, enforcement, and monitoring. Therefore, prevention of the 
accelerating factors from metastasizing into virulent magnitude will likely be more easily 
achievable than managing the causal factors.  
One of the reasons that has been attributed to the fragile nature of African states and their 
eventual capitulation to violence is the precarious foundation upon which they were created 
(Rothchild and Chazan, 2008). The constituent ethnic groups that were politically autonomous 
prior to the advent of colonization perceived themselves as sovereign entities upon independence 
and perceive the state as an umpire installed to coordinate a centripetal and centrifugal 
distribution of jointly owned resources. For instance, the geo-political regions in Nigeria 
negotiated a federal system under the auspices of the decolonization constitution which many 
political observers regarded as a geo-political compromise for the purpose of sustaining the 
colonial state. The federal system was also viewed as the most viable political strategy for 
harnessing the dividends of natural resources for the benefit of all citizens. Therefore, the state 
enjoys the support of the ethnic and civic groups inasmuch as it treats all of them impartially. 
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Thus, a positive view of the state ought to stimulate stabilizing relationships among ethnic 
groups. Conversely, when and if the relationships degenerate, the groups are likely to retreat 
each to its geo-political jurisdiction as evident under Samuel Doe’s regime in Liberia and 
elsewhere in SSA. The above further supports the assumption that under a polarized political 
system, each ethnic group views the state as well as the groups that maintain a genial relationship 
with it as potential enemies. Against the backdrop of the above, it is imperative to reiterate that 
certain questions have not been satisfactorily answered. First, what circumstances cause such a 
noxious and precarious relationships among the ethnic groups in resource-dependent states? Why 
and how do states degenerate from underlying suspicion and fear into violent conflicts? What 
efforts have been made to prevent this violence and how effective were they? Answering these 
questions have never been an easy task, as they require a full understanding of the structural and 
accelerating or triggering factors (Rugumamu 2002, 10)25 because of their separate but 
coordinate impacts. 
 
Ethnicity and Violent Conflict Nexus 
Ethnicity epitomizes accelerating factors of violent conflict, also known as triggering 
factors in multiethnic states. Accelerating factors consist of “political developments or events 
that bring latent underlying tensions to the forefront of interethnic power relations, and 
precipitate escalate. These may include new radical ideologies, repression of political groups, 
sharp economic shocks, changes in the ethnic composition central authority, introduction of 
ominous discriminatory policies” (Rugumamu 2002, 10). Accelerators of conflict are the factors 
that trigger violence and that is why they are also described as sufficient conditions26 for 
                                               
25 See Rugumamu (2002:10). For a full discussion on the nature, characteristics, and roles of structural and 
accelerating or triggering factors of violent conflict. 
26 See Van der Maat (2010) Structural causes of civil conflict: using fs/QCA to improve civil war prediction. 
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outbreak of war.  
The literature on ethnicity-conflict relationships shows three different theoretical variants. 
First, the constructivists contend that ethnicity is a fluid concept. Thus, its fluidity casts doubt on 
the arguments supporting its direct relationships with violent conflict. For instance, Chandra 
(2006) argues, “ethnicity either does not matter, or has not been shown to matter in explaining 
most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists” (p. 397). 
Therefore, it is a descent-based ascription that people adopt for different reasons (p. 422).27 
However, if Chandra’s argument holds sway, one of the most important attributes of sub-Saharan 
African states is relegated to the background. What implication does that have on the study of 
African politics? It seems evident that Chandra’s depiction of ethnicity does not acknowledge 
how the ethnic group members in African states perceive themselves and their history. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the solution to the problem of ethnicity in Chandra’s parlance 
can be likened to advocating for the elimination of tribal identities among the Native Americans. 
Interestingly, though, as unpopular as this constructivist perspective may seem, Chandra is not 
alone, as other prominent constructivists have endorsed the viewpoint that ethnicity is ambiguous 
if not irrelevant for explaining violent conflict in Africa. To be sure, Bates (1974) notes “… the 
ties that bind the members of ethnic groups are often material interests and not traditional 
obligations” (p. 459). What this suggests is that idea that a manacle of natural ties exists among 
the members of an ethnic group is a travesty. 
Secondly, rational choice, elite predation, and symbolic politics theories adopt 
                                               
27 Chandra’s perception relies on the definition of ethnicity as a categorization in which eligibility is based on 
descent-based attributes (2006: 400). Chandra also claims that “when the Yoruba was invented in Nigerian the 
nineteenth century, the parents of those categorized as Yoruba were not themselves classified as Yoruba because this 
category did not exist during their lifetimes.” This assertion lacks sufficient historical evidence.  
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instrumentalist approaches.28 Rational choice and elite predation theorists contend that ethnicity 
may cause violent conflict, but only in conjunction with other covariate factors. As pointed out 
by Kaufman, for instance, Rothchild and Lake (1996) have noted that the outbreak of ethnic war 
is the result of security dilemma in which information failure prevents competing groups from 
reaching compromise on divergent issues. So, if indeed information failure is the trigger for 
ethnic groups’ engagement in violent conflict, the solution then must involve a third-party 
negotiation of peace, and supervision of compliance by all parties involved in the conflict and 
resolution process.29 In a similar vein, De Figueiredo and Weingast (1999) assert that the 
instrumentalist motives of the predatory elite is the underlying cause of interethnic fear to 
instigate violence against rival ethnic groups in order to maintain power (Kaufman 2006, 46-47). 
However, if the elite predation theory’s proposition is accurate the solution has to begin with a 
leadership or systemic change. It is noteworthy that both security dilemma and elite predation 
theses of rational choice paradigms do not adequately explain how ethnic group members are 
motivated to accept the excuses or reasons provided by their leaders as justification for hostility 
toward other groups. 
Conversely, the symbolic politics theory opines that what causes ethnic war includes the 
existence and invocation of “group myths that justify fear of extinction, a symbolic politics of 
chauvinist mobilization, and hostility against enemy groups” (Kaufman 2006, 47). Hence, if the 
argument of symbolic politics theory is accurate, the resolution of violent conflict will require a 
broad-based change of sanctimonious orientation and the negative perception and historical 
justification for violence among ethnic groups. Yet in spite of the variations in the explanatory 
mechanisms of the three perspectives above, the recurrent theme among them is that ethnicity is 
                                               
28 For a comprehensive assessment of Rational Choice; Elite Predation; and Symbolic Myth Politics, please see 
Kaufman (2006) “Symbolic politics or rational choice? Testing Theories of extreme ethnic violence.” Internal 
Security 30, no. 4. 
29 See Kaufman (2006) Symbolic politics or rational choice? 
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a viable concept that deserves attention in the analysis of violent conflicts. Although each of the 
theories demonstrates different points of view, the explanatory mechanisms and resolution 
strategies they propose are somewhat interrelated. To be sure, each of these theories epitomizes 
the notion of ‘us’ against ‘them’ based on the prominence of each group’s distrust for the others 
and the uncertainties that are associated with finding mutually acceptable compromise.  
Meanwhile, one of the assumptions of this research is that the findings of qualitative and 
quantitative research on the role of ethnicity in violent conflict are conspicuously different. But 
why are the findings of the two approaches so different from each other? Some studies have 
asked similar questions regarding the mystifying disparities in the explanations for the 
phenomena of ethnicity and violent conflict in Africa. Bates (2008) notes “… Empirically 
minded social scientists have sought to capture the impact of ethnicity on economic performance 
of Africa’s states. Interestingly, however, they have found it difficult to uncover systematic 
evidence of the relationship between measures of ethnicity and the likelihood of political 
disorder” (p. 9).30 In contrast, however, other studies have found direct relationships between 
ethnicity, lack of trust for the state, and violent conflict in multiethnic countries. And in addition 
to the direct relationships between ethnicity and violent conflict, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 
(2013) find that the level of “trust and social capital in communities are linked with the past 
history and ethnic fractionalization” (p. 7). Accordingly, lack of trust in the state that pervades 
the ethnonationalist character of politics, emanated from past ethnic violence that renders the 
state vulnerable to another conflict (p. 9).  
Another facet of the debate is that democracy has thrived in some states where the 
governments consisted in non-democratic attributes. “Countries with a large ethnopolitical 
                                               
30 Like the other institutionalists, Bates (2008) “When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in late century Africa” 
laments that he found little evidence of systematic relationship between ethnicity and political disorder. He however 
states that ethnicity and violence are products of institutional failure (pp. 9-10).  
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groups that are divided into identifiable ethnopolitical subgroups have sprouted third wave 
democracies and sustained some of them at higher rates than other types of multiethnic societies” 
(p. 854). However, these authors deemphasize the dangerous relationship between 
coordination,31 and political violence. For Baker, Scarritt, and Mozaffar, large-divided-groups 
(LDG) states are the ethnically fractionalized countries in which the largest ethnic group exceeds 
40 percent of the total population and is further divided into nested subgroups (Baker, Scarritt, 
and Mozaffar 2016, 843). So, ethnicity can be viewed first as a political instrument. Second, it 
assumes that all large-divided-ethnic groups are divided internally into small nested groups. 
Additionally, there has to be unambiguous evidence that the power elites deploy and rely on 
predatory strategies for electoral mobilization and violence as the case may be.  
Logically, the above argument and its underlying principles leads to two assumptions. 
First, that small-group societies (SGS) lack the ability to organize. Second, large-undivided-
group (LUG) societies typically experience political dominance. There is a problem with these 
assumptions. Against the backdrop of the above, it is important to note that rather than asking if 
ethnicity causes violent conflict or not, the question ought to be: how can ethnically-induced 
conflict be prevented? This chapter examines why and how ethnic issues such as power and 
access to resources culminate in violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, how does 
ethnicity affect the ability of the state to serve as an impartial arbiter among competing groups? 
It is assumed that if for any reason(s) the state fails to discharge its responsibilities to all in an 
impartial way it can resort to using unorthodox means to maintain its hold onto power. These 
strategies include rewarding loyalists and punishing or weakening oppositions.  
Lending credence to the above, Azam (2001) notes, [that] “ethnic capital in Africa 
                                               
31 See Baker, Scarritt, and Mozaffar (2016:841) for the grouping of the 48 African states into four ethno-political 
demographic types: (1) Homogenous societies, (2) Only Small Groups societies, (3) Large Undivided Group 
Societies, and (4) large Divided Group Societies.  
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guarantees the provision of the services that a modern state has taken over in rich countries such 
as security and education” (p. 430). Interestingly, only a few African states can sufficiently 
provide, match, or surpass the level of services that ethnic groups provide to their members. 
Furthermore, states in sub-Saharan Africa seek to broadcast power32 across their territories but 
are either incapable or unwilling to achieve genuine integration of the disparate primordial 
groups. The question is, can be a calculated political strategy? But, how does that contribute to 
violent conflict? Lake and Rothchild (1996) succinctly explain that “intense ethnic conflict is 
often caused by collective fears of the future (stemming from information failure). The problem 
of commitment and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state 
weakens, and conflict becomes more likely” (p. 41).  
The security dilemma mechanism signifies that when the chain of communication 
between ethnic groups fails the sustaining trust vanishes. So, an ethnic group or a coalition of 
ethnic groups will likely act preemptively to gain relative advantage over the other. This type of 
approach is what has been referred to as offensive-defensive strategy. While the central aim of 
literature of violent conflict is to explain the causal factors and probable strategies for 
prevention, mitigation, or resolution, this chapter suggests that the leading theories have 
provided a plethora of explanations but overemphasized the structural factors and neglected the 
significance of triggering events for violent conflicts in ethnically diverse sub-Saharan African 
states. Therefore, this dissertation research examines the roles of the accelerating factors and the 
mitigating influence of civil society on violent conflicts in sub-Saharan African states.  
Another theoretical perspective worth consideration stipulates that community network 
plays an important role in mitigating conflict through the aggregation of trust which scholars 
describe as social capital. Social trust and social capital theory explain the role of trust in the 
                                               
32 See Herbst (2000). States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 
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relationships between the government and the governed especially in ethnically-divided states. 
According to scholars who have explored the prospects and problems of trust, social capital may 
bear positive impacts on the attitudes of citizens toward the political institutions. But how can 
people accumulate trust of the magnitude that can affect their collective interest and as a result 
the government? Scholars have investigated the connections between trust and government 
performance and find a significant relationship. For instance, in the concluding remarks of his 
book Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993) opines that there is a connection between 
building civic community and making democracy work (p. 185). The conclusion supports the 
finding that there is a symbiotic relationship between social capital and sustainability of 
democracy. Other scholars have supported the idea that social capital can enhance the 
performance of political institutions (Rothstein 2000).  
However, there is a dearth of literature on the potential impact of ethnicity or regional 
segregation on the process of building the type of social community and the consequences on 
attitude toward the government which may enhance political stability or lead to conflict. This 
viewpoint is supported by Kuenzi (2008) thus: “Until recently … the influence of ethnic identity 
has often been neglected in studies of social capital” (p. 2). It is important to note that Kuenzi’s 
observation is supported by other studies that have either found negative or no significant 
relationships between social capital and democracy (Fukuyama 1999; Newton 1999; Norris 
2000; Putnam 2000). Therefore, it can be deduced from the above that the relationships between 
social trust, generalized trust, political capital, and political trust is multidimensional. For 
instance, Kuenzi observed that ethnicity has significant effects on the dimensions of social 
capital and political trust …” (2008, 1). This dissertation research explores social capital and 
political trust to examine how the roles of ethnicity can shape civil society’s efforts and the 




The goal of this chapter is to review the existing literature of violent conflict in 
multiethnic states in general and sub-Sahara Africa in specific. In sum, this literature review 
shows that the extant theories of violent conflict explain the phenomenon as events rather than 
processes. These theories emphasize the causal factors and focus significantly on measuring the 
extent of their effects on the states cross-nationally. Another important observation is that the 
extant literature rejects the notion that the prevalence of ethnicity is a sufficient condition for 
violent conflict in multiethnic states. Interestingly, there are still ongoing debates about the 
effects of the causal factors that extant literature embraces in terms of their risk levels. Therefore, 
this literature review suggests that by emphasizing structural causal factors and explaining 
violent conflicts as episodes, the existing literature runs the risk of excluding the accelerators that 
tend to precipitate violence. To this end, in any analysis of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa 
it is imperative to acknowledge the totality of the potential causal factors along with the culpable 
accelerators. This is important because of two sets of factors, namely that latent structural factors 
are necessary but insufficient to ignite violent conflict without the contemporaneous influence of 
accelerating triggers. Hence, with specific reference to the analysis of violent conflict in sub-
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to show theoretically the causal mechanism of violence in a 
resource-rich and multiethnic state. This chapter describes the impacts of the relationships of 
political trust and political stability in a resource-rich multiethnic state. As mentioned in the 
previous chapters, scholars have proposed different factors as the causes of violent conflict but 
fail to explain how the factors cause conflict. The purpose of introducing the role of political 
trust is to analyze how the varying perceptions of the people from different ethnic regions in a 
resource-rich, multiethnic state about government policies and performances engender political 
stability or violence. It is also critical to note that by emphasizing the causal factors the 
conventional theories of conflict treat all cases as if they are the same. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, multiethnic states that are heavily dependent on resources-wealth also face the 
problem of ethnic grievances, and in some cases, rebellion. So, what are the explanations for the 
causal mechanisms of the degeneration of the relationships between disparate ethnic groups and 
the government? To understand the reasons for the breakdown in the relationships between some 
ethnic groups and the national government it is beneficial to understand how the ethnic groups 
perceive the potential impacts of government policies and implementation on their members. 
Therefore, this dissertation research adopts social capital theory to examine the relationship 
between the ethno-regional groups and the government in Nigeria. 
 
Political Trust 
Political trust refers to the evaluative orientation of citizens toward the government 
(Stokes 1962). The evaluation of political trust in a regime is often based on concerns and 
expectations of different groups or individual citizens (Miller 1974). These expectations and 
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concerns upon which people judge a regime may include ethical comportment, policies, and 
performances of the regime (Hetherington 1998). There is a plethora of support for the idea that 
political trust is connected with political stability (Levi and Stoker 2000; Mishler and Rose 
2001). There is empirical support in literature of democracy and political stability for the 
importance of trust in regimes and the important role of civil society (Ostrom 1990; Putnam 
1993; Fukuyama 1995). Some studies have debated whether the success or failure of a regime 
depends on the confidence that citizens have in the political institutions (Newton and Norris 
1999; Seligman 1997; Giddens 1990). Furthermore, Newton and Norris (1999) noted that “If 
social trust helps build social capital, and social capital, in turn, helps strengthen political 
institutions then governmental performance may improve, inspiring citizens’ confidence” (p.7-
8). 
In their study of race and political trust Howell and Fagan (1988) found that there is a 
direct relationship between how government treats different groups and in retrospect, the level of 
trust between different races. Scholars have reported that there is a steady decline in the level of 
political trust. The decline is evident in a low level of trust or diffused support for government. 
When a state experiences decline in political trust its legitimacy may be challenged 
(Hetherington 1998). However, some scholars have also argued that some level of distrust is 
necessary if the government must be held accountable (Barber 1983; Levi and Stoker 2000; 
Tarrow 2000). The idea behind the debate is that social capital is vital to institutional 
performance because it helps to build social trust and motivates political trust in the government 
institutions. As Putnam (1993) puts it, social capital refers to “features of social organization, 
such as trust, norms, and networks, tends to be self-reinforcing and cumulative (p.167).  
Given Putnam’s definition it seems that the absence of the virtues of civil community 
tends to pave the way to perpetrate distrust for political institutions. Against the backdrop of the 
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above, I examined the Nigerian political arena to understand how different ethnic regional 
groups relate with the government and the impact on violent conflict. Rothstein and Stolle (2002) 
argue that there are relationships between generalized trust and institutional performance (p. 2).33 
The rationale is that trust in government tends to facilitates political stability thus: “The 
impartiality and efficiency of these institutions influences citizens’ institutional trust and more 
specifically (1) how they experience feelings of safety and protection; (2) how citizens make 
inferences from the system and public officials to other citizens; (3) how citizens observe the 
behavior of fellow citizens; and (4) how they experience discrimination against themselves or 
others” (p. 27). In recognition of the potential role of social capital in maintaining political 
stability, it has been observed that “Dense network of voluntary associations and citizens’ 
organizations help to sustain civil society … trust and cooperation between citizens and a high 
level of civic engagement and therefore they create the condition for social integration, public 
awareness and action, and democratic stability” (Newton 2001, 201). It must be emphasized that 
in a symbiotic relationship, the behavior and performance of government tend to affect how 
ethnic groups behave. That is because as some scholars have observed, government policies are 
seldom viewed the same way by different ethnic groups.  
While some may view the policies as beneficial, other groups may perceive the policies 
as the sources of grievances. For example, Easterly (2001) finds that “Institutional factors 
interact with ethnic diversity. Good institutions lower the risk of wars and genocide that might 
otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization” (p. 703). Other studies have also corroborated 
Easterly’s viewpoint on how negative perception of government institutions can foster conflict. 
That exposition raises a significant question about the efficacy of political institutions and the 
                                               
33 Rothstein and Stolle’s (2002) “generalized theory” derive from Putnam (1993) “Theory of social capital.” 
Accordingly, social capital has been defined and measured as generalized trust, norms and reciprocity and network. 




implications for how they are perceived by different ethnic groups or geo-political regions in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This dissertation research assumes that the bedrock of political stability is 
the trust in political institutions, not the mere existence of the structures. Civil society can 
accumulate social capital to foster cooperation and buttress political trust. But if ethnic groups 
lack trust in the political institutions, they tend to perceive government policies and 
performances negatively, and such negative perceptions can precipitate rebellion.  
 
Social Capital  
What is social capital and where does it come from? Social capital comes from the civic 
community network of associational life through which the citizens support the government to 
develop and maintain political trust. Sullivan and Transue (1999) define social capital as 
“features of social organization such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 644). There is a debate about the 
strength of the association between social capital and political trust. In his study of five public 
institutions, Newton (2001a) finds that there are strong associations between social capital and 
four of the five government institutions, namely the police, “the legal system, the parliament, and 
civil service at the national level” (p.12). However, Newton differentiated between social trust 
among citizens and social trust for government institutions. Accordingly, social trust among 
citizens seldom influences political trust; what influences political trust is the social capital that 
develops from the aggregate of social trust from diverse members of the social network. In 
another study, Newton (2001b) noted that “social trust tends to be expressed by different kinds of 
people for different sorts of reasons” (p.204). Similarly, in absence of social capital, political 
trust may be expressed by different groups for different reasons.  
The distrust for institutions reflects the level of distrust among the ethnic groups. As 
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citizens across different socio-cultural cleavages develop mutual trust, it becomes challenging for 
political institutions to shield themselves from the wave of mutual trust that encapsulates the 
divergent ethnic groups. But how do ethnic groups develop tolerance for each other and political 
institutions? Indeed, the level of tolerance that the disparate ethnic groups demonstrate toward 
each other and political institutions depends on factors including the groups’ perception of threat 
and the amount of available negative information each group has about other groups (Sullivan 
and Transue 1999). Furthermore, there is the patent display of ethnocentrism by allowing the 
majority groups certain privileges that are not granted to the groups perceived by members of the 
majority ethnic group as extreme or unpopular political rivals (pp. 632 & 635).  
Regarding the mechanism of social capital development, Sullivan and Transue (1999, 
645) stipulate, “Horizontally organized associations build social capital. Vertically organized 
associations do not build social capital and may in fact undermine it” (Sullivan and Transue 
1999, 645).34 Nevertheless, despite what we now know about social trust, ethnic cooperation, and 
political stability, not all scholars agree with the notion that social and political capital are 
interrelated. For those scholars who express skepticism, “Social trust is expressed by people who 
feel that they are generally surrounded by trustworthy people, and political trust is expressed by 
people who feel that their political system and its politicians generally perform satisfactorily” 
(Sullivan and Transue 1999, 211). These scholars also mention Scandinavian countries as 
analytical references for political trust. By so doing, they neglect the role of economic status and 
ethnocentrism in SSA states and other developing countries. Such a viewpoint suggests that the 
state and people are disjointed. If that is the case, then it is logical to assume that the influence of 
social trust that permeates disparate ethnic groups and engenders cooperation rather than 
chauvinistic ethnocentrism does not amount to transformation of the behavior of the people who 
                                               
34 Horizontally organized associations refer to those associations in which members are recognized as equal 
participants, while vertical associations are those that ascribe hierarchical power to different categories of members. 
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run the affairs of the political institution. The same transformation process that influences social 
trust among divergent ethnic groups can also dissuade politicians from all the vices that cause 
distrust for political institutions.  
It is noteworthy that socially trusting and politically trusting are not necessarily the same, 
and that performance is the kernel of political trust. However, social trust creates social capital 
and political trust, which in turn stimulates confidence in political institutions (Kenneth and 
Norris 1999, 11-12). Thus, the argument that social trust does not translate into political trust is 
faulty because it relies on specious premises and seems to suggest that the associational life is 
alienated from political institutions. The assumption above seems to ignore the fact that social 
institutions and political institutions are entwined within the ambit of society. Moreover, political 
institutions’ legitimacy come from the same people who identify first and foremost as members 
of ethnic groups. Hence, the question for the critics is how can government perform satisfactorily 
if it is bogged down in ethnocentrism? The point to note here is that social trust is a foundation 
of political trust. Moreover, social capital is the offshoot of social trust which reduces uncertainty 
in socio-political relations and imbues political trust in all spectrums of the political arena. This 
implies that the reduction in uncertainty facilitates political stability and thus stimulates 
satisfactory performance in political institutions.  
The discussion of the positive impact of social capital on national cohesion and political 
stability has been recognized generally by social scientists and behaviorists alike. Trust is an 
essential precondition for political development because it tends to reduce the fear of uncertainty 
that affects the behavior of citizens and socio-political groups (Rothstein and Stolle 2002, 2). 
Why is the role of trust in reducing fear so important to analysis of conflict mechanism? Perhaps 
it is because a state that is confronted by political uncertainty tends to experience socio-economic 
and political problems relating to the constant threat of disintegration (Inglehart 1990). 
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Moreover, when citizens view the state as unreliable, they turn inward to their groups for 
protection from the potential effects of the state’s decadence. They do that by building social 
capital through participation and the gradual development and consolidation of trust across 
different groups (Rothstein and Stolle 2002, 15).  
However, it is important to point out that civil society does not always work toward 
supporting the government. In fact, part of the role of civil society is to hold political institutions 
accountable (Rothstein 2000). For instance, Harbeson, Rothchild, and Chazan (1994) note, 
“Grassroots movements have risen in nearly every sub-Saharan country to remove autocratic, 
repressive governments” (p. 1). Similarly, successful grassroots movements that led to the 
ousting of dictators in Egypt, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, 
and elsewhere in Africa show that civil society can indeed act as a conduit of peace in 
multiethnic societies. The question is how does civil society play this role? Ekeh (1992) noted 
that analysts must make attempts to understand first, the context from which they operate; 
second, the ends they seek to advance; and third, the resources and means they supply in their 
operations” (p. 201). Moreover, we must pay attention to the relationships between members’ 
interests, and the public interest, the nature of the political space. To this end, Kuenzi (2008) 
pointed out that there is a relationship between ethnic group size and involvement of the 
members in voluntary organizations (p.1). So, it is important to understand how different regions 
in Nigeria feel about participation in civil society and how that mitigates violent conflict. 
 
Civil Society  
Civil society connotes, “The space of uncoerced human association and/or the set of 
relational networks” (Walzer 1991, 1). By virtue of its nature, civil society is “the third or non-
profit sector consisting of all associations and networks between the family and the state” 
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(Edwards 2009, 20). It represents the network of associational life that facilitates civic culture 
and seeks to bridge the gap between the state and the people. In other words, civil society is an 
uncoerced association of citizens that permits free entry and exit. It acts as a “voluntary, 
independent sector representing the balance between the rights granted to individuals in ‘free 
society’ and the responsibilities required of citizens to maintain those rights” (O’Connell and 
Gardner 1999, 19-11). Furthermore, Almond and Verba (2003) noted, “If a citizen belongs to a 
voluntary organization, he is involved in a broader social world but is less dependent upon it and 
is less controlled by the political system” (pp. 173-174).  
Ekeh (1992) categorizes civil societies into two broad types, demystifying the nature and 
characteristics of political terrain they occupy (p. 203). These political spaces are the civic and 
primordial publics. The civic public is comprised of two main groups: civic public, such as 
political parties, trade unions, and religious associations; and the deviant civic associations, 
including traditional and ritualistic associations. The primordial public consists of tribal social 
associations, primordial public associations, and indigenous development associations. Ekeh’s 
description shows that civil society can be inward-focused or public-focused. However, the 
inevitability of collective agenda aims at achieving a unity of purpose tends to create a broad-
based and resilient civil society. As a network of associations that occupies the realm between 
the state and the family, it consists of different layers of organizations including community 
associations and broad-based civil groups whose interests and goals transcend ethno-communal 
interests and different categories of groups and associations operating at a variety of levels 
within the political arena. Some of the groups that constitute civil society networks include 
professional or commercial associations; cultural associations; development-oriented 
associations; informational, educational, or mobilization associations; issues-oriented 
associations; and civic-public organizations that monitor and pursue issues of national interest 
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(Diamond 1994; Nnoli 1978; Bratton 1989).  
However, Diamond (1994) pointed out that an excessive confrontation of the state by 
civil society could be counterproductive if the impact of its activities culminated in 
delegitimizing the state. Conversely, Ihonvbere (2002) offers a persuasive argument to 
demonstrate the civil society organizations have helped in shaping and or reforming Nigerian 
and African political systems. Accordingly, civil society helped resist colonial rule, run the 
various trade unions, professional associations, non-governmental organizations, student unions, 
community development associations, and other grassroots forces. They also helped with 
building the coalitions and networks that have sustained and supported the millions of brutalized 
and marginalized Africans, organized the pro-democracy movements, fought one-man or no-
party rule, opposed wicked military juntas … and changed the content of political discourse in 
Africa” (Ihonvbere 2002, 9).35  
Therefore, if the civil society network is well organized and committed to a nationalistic 
rather than particularistic goals, or ethno-regional agenda, it tends to serve as an agent of 
political trust and political stability. As a scholar observes, “Civil society constitutes an essential 
element in creating a more effective and accountable state” (Udogu 2007, 128). However, if the 
relationships are based on ethnic power dominance, the regime and political institutions tend to 
focus more on a chauvinistic agenda and less on issues that foster national cohesion, and 
purportedly disloyal ethnic groups are deemed as enemies of the state. Based on such a divisive 
perception, the policies emanating from political institutions will likely be skewed toward the 
interests of the majority ethnic group without consideration for the minority groups. Hence, some 
of the minority ethnic groups are likely to be marginalized. Even under an oppressive or 
ethnically biased government, civil society has the ability to foster political cooperation and 
                                               
35 The citation on Ihonvbere’s defense of the civil-society’s challenge to the state is derived from Udogu (2007).  
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trust, though the mere existence of civil society alone does not necessarily translate into political 
stability (Kew 2016, p. 263), because it can also foment violence if the members decide to use it 
to pursue ethnocentric goals. Despite the fact that civil society can play important conflict 
mitigation roles in Africa, it faces some challenges that sometimes hamper its ability to perform 
that responsibility. 
 
Challenges for Civil Society 
Certain factors such as lack of accountability and separation between the regional sectors 
of the civil society influence the donors on the agenda and modes of operations of the civil 
society. Moreover, ambiguities in the state civil society relations have impacted the activities and 
credibility of civil society (Jega 1997).36 It is indisputable that civil society faces copious 
challenges in the ongoing political debacles. For instance, some of the civil society organizations 
are weak because of their financial insolvency at the time when external interests in financial 
support is waning (Makumbe 1998, 315). Thus, they become vulnerable and pander to the 
sectional interests of their domestic financiers. It is conceivable that no matter how 
encompassing, some aggrieved ethnic groups will still not believe the neutrality of civil society. 
Yet in spite of the enormous challenges facing the civil society it remains the only entity that is 
trusted across different sections of the society as capable of mitigating conflict objectively just as 
it did in the popular struggle for democratization in Africa in the 1990s. 
Closely related to the ability of the civil society to perform its fundamental function is the 
problem of a Machiavellian state’s strategy of raison d’état that beset African elites. For 
instance, Ake (1991) noted that long after colonialism, and even after many African states 
claimed to have transformed into democratic republics, they continued to hang on tenaciously to 
                                               
36 See Udogu (2007, 130-142) for more on Jega and other analysts’ perspectives on the role of civil society in 
stabilizing the state and making the state accountable to the people.  
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the colonial idea of the might is right. Meanwhile, the overarching center is hotly contested, and 
the winner often claims ownership of the state power and control over its resources. Ake’s 
statement demonstrates the inherent danger of incompetence of the state coinciding with zero-
sum ethno-regional competition for dominance. Fundamentally, it is assumed that the composite 
ethnic groups in the resource-rich sub-Saharan states are apt to place group interests over 
national interests. To be sure, it has been observed that “many wars in Africa are related to the 
control of resource-riches including diamonds, oil, drugs…” (Hugon 2000, p. 4). Therefore, this 
research views the aggregate of the events that are involved in the struggle for access to power 
and resources as a panoramic precursor for violent conflict. Similarly, Young (1994) noted that 
the states in Africa seem to have adopted Machiavellian’s raison d’état inspired by the ultimate 
purpose of accumulating and maintaining power perpetually. As the state seeks to perpetrate its 
supremacy rather than legitimacy over the society through self-reproduction, it systematically 
circumscribed the civil society being an occupant in what has been described as the state’s 
territorial grid of the state (pp. 16-18). Under the domain of the state, the civil society is often 
subjected to exploitation and constriction by the ethnically-dominated government. 
Although a fragile state may seek to curtail its activities37 civil society still occupies an 
influential realm in the political arena. And as long as civil society maintains its influential 
position within the political arena, its role as a mitigating agent remains significant. Furthermore, 
civil society remains salient in the conflict mitigation process because when the state, its political 
parties, and sectionalist interest groups fail and are rejected by the grassroots organizations, 
attention will be shifted to the social movements because of their people-centric characteristics 
that have earned them popular support and trust (Jesse and Williams 2010, p. 41). So, while the 
role of civil society in conflict mitigation is still controversial, the space it occupies remains of 
                                               
37 See Osaghae (2007) “Fragile states.” Development in Practice17, for the conditions under which the post-colonial 
sub-Saharan states are categorized as fragile.   
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significant interest in the analysis of conflict. In fact, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argue that the 
more the citizens in multiethnic states embrace a sense of communal solidarity, the higher the 
likelihood of intensified ethnic competition (p. 66).  
 
Perception Variants and Propensity for Violent Conflict 
The degeneration of state-ethnic groups relationship comes from a deficit of trust, which 
has the most adverse effect on a political system. Both the dominant and minority ethnic group(s) 
have expected incentives in supporting civil society’s mitigating influence, as opposed to 
incendiary and unending zero-sum competition for power. However, given the precarious 
nature38 of the state stemming from information scarcity, fear of annihilation, and the potential 
benefits of seizing the state’s power, it seems logical that any ethnic groups would seek to 
achieve dominance to avoid being vanquished by the others. This theory perceives the state, 
dominant ethnic groups, and domestic or foreign conflict mitigating agents (civil society) as 
actors whose relationships with each other can lead to a negative or positive outcome. As 
mentioned above, social trust and social capital constitute significant ingredients for creating and 
maintaining a sustainable political order. Hence, it is expedient to attempt a brief discussion on 
the meaning of the concept of social trust and social capital and their contributions to political 
order in the state.  
Rose, Munro, and Mishler (2004) noted that “economic satisfaction and low expectation 
of political change together encourages ‘resigned acceptance’ of an imperfectly democratic 
regime” (2004, 197). Hence, when a state is biased in favor of some ethnic groups, it is likely to 
become a vehicle of power dominance for those ethnic groups. Moreover, if political institutions 
in a multiethnic state become a mechanism for perpetration of ethnic dominance, it tends to lose 
                                               
38 See Rothchild, Donald S., and Naomi H. Chazan, eds. The Precarious Balance: state and society in Africa. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 
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legitimacy and weaken. However, whether it is the impact of political capital39 that political 
institutions have accumulated or the buildup of social capital40 that the civil society successfully 
inculcated into the state, or lack of formidable challenge to the regime, a weak state that is not 
beholden to any ethnic group or region may not experience violence. In some cases, some ethnic 
groups will cooperate with civil society in its agitation for democratic reform in the political 
arena. For instance, Kuenzi (2008) pointed out that “Ethnicity has significant effects on the 
dimensions of social capital and political trust in Nigeria” (p.1). 
The degeneration of political institutions provides the opportunity for a belligerent ethnic 
group to seize control of the political arena, restructure the power distribution, and establish firm 
control over resources and public goods distribution. So, a powerful41 strategic domination under 
this political environment is when the most powerful among the ethnic groups seeks to dominate 
the political arena. The goal is to alter the strategic alignment and calculate withdrawal from 
bilateral cooperation with civil society. The ultimate goal of the most powerful ethnic group is to 
take control of the state. The most powerful ethnic group will likely change the pattern of 
communication. Subsequently, a new system of triangulated relational pattern will replace the 
existing bilateral relationship between the ethnic groups and civil society. As the influence of the 
majority ethnic group grows, the state institutions are weakened. Upon capturing the power of 
the state, the majority ethnic group tends to modify the socio-economic and political landscapes 
                                               
39 Political capital is the legitimacy and performance of a regime and its institutions. Political capital comes from 
accumulated trust the expression of confidence in the political institutions by citizens. The said confidence could be 
directed to the entire regime or specific institutions. For more on the concepts of political trust and political capital 
see Mishler and Rose (2001) “What is the origin of political trust? Testing institutional, and cultural theories in post-
communist societies.” 
40 Social capital is the positive impact of the social network of civic association on the socio-economic and political 
spheres of a society. It is derived from deep-rooted and extensive social trust that permeates all socio-cultural 
cleavages in the society. For more on the conception of social capital see Putnam (2002) Democracies in Flux: The 
evolution of the social capital in contemporary society. Putnam (1993) Making democracy work: civic tradition in 
modern Italy. 
41 The powerful ethnic group does not necessarily equate the majority because in some instances a small ethnic 
group may be stronger than larger ethnic groups and possess the needed resources to assert its influence over them. 
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of the country. That transformation could result in portentous structural deficiencies. As 
mentioned in the previous chapters, structural issues tend to foster underlying grievances among 
excluded minority group(s). 
Consequently, the injection of radical and discriminatory policies may trigger the 
accelerators of violence. As the ethnically motivated government continues to consolidate its 
power, it is likely the government will ignore the grievances of minorities, there will be growing 
petitions for a change and increasing tensions among the ethnic groups across different geo-
political regions. But an analysis of conflict in the SSA shows that the states are not bystanders 
in the ethno-political conflicts. Because of their weaknesses and lackluster attitudes toward the 
civil society, the African states are culpable in the events that stimulate ethnic wars (Bratton 
1989, 10). In many cases SSA states aggravate rather than mitigate interethnic conflicts. More 
often than not, the situation is exacerbated by the reluctance of the states to see the civil society 
as partner in progress.  
Indeed, ethnic groups that strive for power domination in the political space can be 
delayed or halted by a formidable challenge that comes from the civil society. This can be 
achieved only if the civil society has enough social capital to win the public trust across all 
ethno-religious cleavages. With that ability civil society will eventually restore the state to ideal 
spatial equilibria through an innocuous campaign and the infusion of political capital into 
national political institutions. Therefore, suffice it to say that if well-organized and resourceful, it 
can proactively launch preventative counter-measures to abate the propensity for the onset of 
violence. To achieve that goal, the civil society must be able to conduct itself as a trustworthy 
umpire among the ethnic groups, and between the state and the ethnic groups. Plus, there is an 
incentive for the state and the ethnic groups’ cooperation with the civil society because conflict 
prevention costs a lot less than conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction.  
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In sum, the essential ingredients of conflict mitigation and collaboration are social capital 
and political trust.42 They are important because of their role in developing and sustaining the 
relationships that foster cooperation. For Simmel (1950), “Social trust is one of the most 
important synthetic forces within the society” (p. 326). This suggests that social trust infuses 
positive thoughts and stimulates cooperation among groups. Therefore, on one hand states with 
effervescent civil societies have a reservoir of trust and tend to enjoy political stability and peace. 
On the other hand, states without vibrant civil societies are likely to experience more incidences 
of violent conflict. The underlying assumption here is that in a state where social and political 
trusts are ingrained, political institutions tend to enjoy popular support and legitimacy both 
internally and externally.  
States that are ethnically heterogeneous, highly polarized, and bedeviled by considerable 
income inequality among the ethnic groups will likely experience less social trust (Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Fukuyama 1999; Delhey and Newton 2003). How does interethnic power relations 
degenerate into violence? According to Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010), states where a 
horizontal power relationship exists experience political stability, while states where ethnic 
groups relate vertically or hierarchically are prone to civil war. The question that follows is, how 
does social trust affect the dynamics of relationships among the ethnic groups in the political 
arena?  
In a society where the competing ethnic groups perceive each other as dangerous enemies 
cannot accomplish a sustainable national integration? Similarly, is it plausible that wherever 
there is disintegration, the polity can only at best experience tentative and precarious peace? 
Social trust theory has generated tremendous literature. Further review of other theories of social 
trust indicate that social trust derives from the perceptions that people know about social and 
                                               
42 The concepts of social and political trust are sometimes referred to as generalize trust. Thus, this dissertation 
research uses social, political, or generalized trust as deemed appropriate throughout the rest of the analyses. 
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political institutions based on their experiences from the social environment. Accordingly, the 
factors that determine social trust includes “societal conditions of conflict and safety; people who 
feel membership of informal social network; and success or well-being” (Delhey and Newton 
2003, 112-113). So, one can safely interpret Delhey and Newton’s perspective as follows: First, a 
group that perceives the state as being under an anarchic condition tends to have low social trust 
in the state and other ethnic groups because of fear that the state is unable to resolve conflict and 
vice versa. Second, people in an informal social network tend to have more trust in their 
association and any other groups that their association is affiliated with. Third, a group whose 
members perceive the political economy as favorable to them will likely have a higher degree of 
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Chapter 4: Data and Methodology 
 
Goals and Purpose of Research  
This chapter explains the methodological framework I employed in conducting the 
research on why and how the latent and accelerating factors cause violence on one hand, and 
how civil society mitigates violence on the other hand. It is instructive to reiterate in this chapter 
that the extant conflict literature emphasizes the latent factors that motivate and enable ethnic 
groups’ insurrection (Öberg 2002, 9).43 These quantitative approaches, namely objectivity and 
measurability, constitute some impediments to in-depth analysis of the role of ethnicity on 
violent conflict in SSA (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004).  
Thus, this research adopts a mixed-method approach including quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The quantitative method utilized is chi-square analysis. The chi-square (𝑥2) 
method is used to test the existence of statistical relationships between two variables. This 
method is appropriate for analyzing the nature and focus of the research questions that are 
addressed in the study. Therefore, rather than being embedded in measuring the factors or 
predicting the outcomes, this mixed-method research aims at analyzing the causal process by 
focusing on the question: why and how latent factors motivate ethnic war in multiethnic 
societies. In other words, it seeks to explain the connection between the causal factors and the 
outcomes given the assumption that while the causal factors are relevant, they are insufficient for 
explaining the degeneration of inter-ethnic relationship into violent conflict. It also seeks to 
explain why and how civil society is being considered as a probable agent of conflict mitigation 
that can facilitate sustainable peace in multiethnic states. This chapter consists of research 
                                               
43 The analysis, of ethnic violent conflict from the premises of the motivational and enabling factors has been 
documented in prominent studies including: Tilly 1978; Brown 1997; Gurr 2000; Sambanis 2001.  
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context, conceptual clarification, and an operational definition of concepts.  
Further, this research adopts a holistic multiple-case design analytical method (Yin 2014, 
50). The focus of this dissertation research allows the inclusion of the causal factors that the 
qualitative scholars emphasize and the proximate accelerators that trigger civil war. There are 
two rationales for this strategy. First, this dissertation research recognizes the fact that the causal 
factors emphasized in the extant literature of conflict are relevant to the analysis of ethnic violent 
conflict (Brown 1997; Rothchild 1997; Zartman 1989). In addition, it observes that there is not 
yet any evidence that any or a combination of these factors can cause conflict without an 
interplay of ethnocentric accelerator(s).  
 
Research Setting/Context  
I selected Nigeria for this dissertation research. In selecting this case for my research 
analysis, the most important determining factor are the questions this dissertation research seeks 
to answer. Based on the types of questions posed, it is important to consider factors such as the 
nature and characteristics of the ethnic configuration of the state; the extent of resource-
dependence; and nature, characteristics, and performance of the civil society in this state.  
 
The Variables  
Dependent Variables:  
The dependent variables are Nigerians’ perceptions of government institutions, government 
performance, and issues related to national integration and Nigerian’s civic participation. More 
specifically, this study uses Afrobarometer data and the data collected during in-depth face-to-
face interviews to examine citizens’ evaluations of government performance in areas related to 
the management of conflict, corruption, natural resources, and elections as well as their level of 
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trust in a range of government institutions. My interviews also examine the perceptions of the 
role of civil society by exploring the views of citizens from the three regions about the mitigating 
influence of civil society, and the likelihood that they would participate in civic community 
activities, protests, and demonstrations. (Please see Appendix A for a list of the Afrobarometer 
questions used in this study and the questions asked in the qualitative interviews.) 
Independent Variables: The independent variables of interest are the regional affiliations of the 
Nigerians interviewed. This is very important because it is assumed that the perceptions of 
citizens about government in resource-rich multiethnic states tend to be influenced by their 
ethno-regional affiliations. There are three regions, the North, South-Eastern, and South-
Western. 
On that note, it is relevant to ask how different ethnic groups and state institutions are 
persuaded to cooperate in order to prevent violent conflict. In other words, what mechanisms 
should be deployed to mitigate violence, and by who? To address that question, I argue that the 
active involvement of a vibrant civil society in conflict mitigation tends to minimize the 
transformation of latent factors of ethnic discontent into full-blown large-scale war. This 
argument receives credence from many African political scholars who have argued for the role of 
civil society in engendering an inclusive, stable, and accountable political system (Bratton 1989; 
Diamond 1994; Ihonvbere 2002; Ikelegbe 2001a; 2001b; Nnoli 1978; Osaghae1998). 
 
Research Questions 
First, how do the perceptions of citizens about government policies influence causal 
mechanism of violent conflict in ethnically diverse, resource-rich sub-Saharan African states?  
Second, how does social capital influence citizens’ perceptions of government 




H1: Ethnic groups whose region benefit more from the national government than others 
are more likely to trust and support the national government than those whose regions do not.  
H2 Ethnic groups from regions with high participation in civil society are more likely to 
hold national government accountable than those from regions with low participation.  
Based on the above, this dissertation research argues that when the government policy 
changes, different ethnic groups react based on the consequent impacts of the policy changes. 
Thus, while the groups that believe the changes will create positive impacts tend to embrace it, 
those that feel otherwise are likely to perceive it as a form of discriminatory or exclusionary 
tactics and are likely to rebel. However, if the civil society is vibrant it tends to reduce the risk of 
violence even when the government embarks on policy change. 
 
Data Collection  
For this dissertation research, I collected data from primary and secondary sources (Mills 
2014, 258). Supplemental data came from archival search gathered during my fieldwork in 
Nigeria. The interview process includes structured and unstructured methods. These methods of 
interview allow a combination of direct answers and oral history form of responses in which an 
interviewee can respond to questions posed by the interviewer (Warren and Karner 2005, 115-
116). I began my archival search at the Lied Library of the University of Nevada Las Vegas 
where I gathered materials (books and journal articles). The field ethnographic research44 was 
carried out in relevant institutions and archival sources, specifically in Nigeria. The method of 
data collection includes observations of ethnic and civil society groups’ meetings, interview of 
groups leaders, and collection of archival materials. Throughout the process, I took notes of the 
                                               
44 See Warren and Karner (2005, 49-50) Discovering Qualitative Methods: Field Research, Interviews and Analysis, 
for detail explanation on ethnographic research. 
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cogent information with the permission of the groups’ leaders.  
My fieldwork for this dissertation research was carried out in Nigeria. The institutions I 
visited include the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in Lagos, Nigeria and the 
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) in Ibadan, Nigeria, where I 
gathered relevant archival materials and interviewed a few senior public officials. Then I visited 
six states and interviewed eighteen people from different backgrounds. These interviews took 
places in Abuja (FCT), Benue state (North-Central), Delta State (South-South), Enugu State 
(South-East), Kaduna State (North-West), Lagos and Oyo States (South-West), and Taraba State 
(North-East). The ethnic group leaders interviewed come from activist organizations including 
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC); the Mdzough U Tiv (MUT); Idoma National Forum (INF); the 
Omi Ny’ Igede (NY); Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); 
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP); the Arewa People’s Congress; the 
Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN); Committee for the Defence 
of Human Rights; Green House Resource Center; and Campaign for Democracy.  
The information accessed covers a wide array of issues including latent factors and 
triggering accelerators, development of civil society response to government behavior and 
performances, and citizens perceptions about government’s policies and performance. 
Additionally, the interviews also explored the views and roles of the groups on the causes of 
conflict, workable mitigation, and resolution strategies. Subsequently, I compared the data 
obtained from the fieldwork with that which I obtained from Afrobarometer 2017. Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) data was analyzed to show the different 




Method of Analysis 
 
Chi-square 
Data from the Afrobarometer 2017 project in Nigeria are analyzed using chi-square 
statistics. These ordinal level data are measured using the Likert scale (Pevalin and Pevalin 
2009). The ACLED data was explored to show the different incidences of conflict in Nigeria 
between 1997-2018. The interview data are analyzed using descriptive tables and Afrobarometer 
data are analyzed using the chi-square test of statistical relationship method. Chi-square statistics 
(𝑥2) test the statistical relationship between two variables (Acock 2014). 
To reiterate, the purpose of this research is to explain causal mechanism processes of 
violent conflict and the mitigating influence of civil society. Causal processes ought to be the 
pivotal point of social research (Mahoney 2003, 134). This heuristic approach is presumed to 
allow descriptive analysis of the connections between the putative causal factors, intervening 
events, and the outcomes. The cascading trends in the development of conflict emanated from 
interactions among the ethnic groups, civil society, and state. According to the mainstream 
literature of conflict, these issues represent factors for negative relationships among the disparate 
ethnic groups that inhabit a state (Laitin and Fearon 2003). It is noteworthy that though the latent 
structural factors are necessary for the onset of conflict, such conflicts are usually non-violent in 
nature.  
Historical narrative focuses on analyzing the histories and perspectives of the actors 
within the case context or comparing the histories, sequences, and outcome of events from 
different contexts to ascertain why there are variations or similarities in the sequences and 
outcomes from these disparate contexts. This approach is more amenable to research contexts 
where there are limitations of observable events. For instance, Büthe (2002) stipulates, 
“Historical narrative approach is appropriate for presenting information about the causal 
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processes because it contextualizes the steps in ways that make the entire process visible rather 
than leaving it fragmented into analytical stages.” (p. 486). However, analysts must pay close 
attention to and avoid the potential pitfalls of historical narratives. First, analysts must allow 
narratives to impose a beginning and end onto historical record. Second, it is important to set a 
time limit for the independent (but not dependent) variables. Third, analysts must be guided 
about the hermeneutics of narrative. Thus, rather than claiming that points in a narrative are right 
or true, analysts should use words such as plausible, persuasive, and compelling. Fourth, 
researchers must endeavor to search for alternative explanations before drawing conclusions (pp-
487-489). In essence, there is hardly any temporal phenomena that has not been previously 
observed.  
 
Ethical Consideration  
In this research there are two areas of ethical concern. First is the ethical consideration for 
data collection and handling of confidential information collected during the field work. I am 
committed to ensuring that the identities and personal information of the individuals willing to 
respond to my questions45 are treated with utmost confidentiality. I also ensure that information 
collected during the field work is only used for this dissertation research only.  
 
Potential Bias 
As a researcher with a natural connection to a major ethnic group from one of the 
countries under study (Nigeria), I must be conscious of my potential bias. When conducting a 
field study in Nigeria, I must be objective-minded and refrain from interjecting my personal 
experience or feelings into the data analysis for this dissertation research. Moreover, I understand 
                                               
45 See Merriam (2009) for the unstructured and informal interview which allows interviewing to narrate his or her 
story in detail  
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that African states have a myriad of cultural differences. I will work with the domestic contacts 
to ensure that I understand and abide by the basic transactional cultures and values that guarantee 
the success of my field work in those countries. Hence, I will allow the rules of fieldwork 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005) to guide the conduct of this research.  
 
Limitation 
This mixed-method research derives its data from primary and secondary sources 
including interview, Afrobarometer dataset, and archival materials, and adopts the chi-square 
statistical for analyzing the data. Field research that incorporates interviews and observations are 
desirable, but unfortunately, they are often difficult to accomplish because of several constraints. 
Chiefly among the constraints is the long and difficult negotiations with foreign entities for 
assistance arranging the fieldwork. Aside from the huddles associated with fieldwork, this 
research strives to achieve internal and external validity. Given this observation, scholars must 
be careful about generalizing the findings of this research indiscriminately. Before the findings 
can be applied beyond sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to conduct more single and multiple 
case studies because it will be inappropriate to make any sorts of generalization from the 
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Findings 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I analyze the field interview and Afrobarometer survey data on violent 
conflicts in Nigeria. This analysis adopts Nigeria as its analytical referent because of its 
multiethnic characteristics and availability of abundant resources. The goal is to determine 
whether the causal mechanisms of violent conflict in the country corroborate or refute the 
hypotheses of my research. Thus, it seeks to find on one hand how the interactions between the 
variables — resources and ethnic discrimination without the interaction of the civil society — 
contribute to violence.46 On the other hand, it examines how the involvement of civil society 
mitigates violent conflict. The two hypotheses tested in this chapter are:  
H1: Ethnic groups whose region benefit more from the national government than others 
are more likely to trust and support the national government than those whose regions do not.  
H2 Ethnic groups from regions with high participation in civil society are more likely to 
hold national government accountable than those from regions with low participation.  
To determine the causal process of violence, this research analyzes the attitudes of 
Nigerians toward the government and its handling of issues that revolve around the discourse of 
national integration.47 The debates on national integration in Nigeria focus on issues such as geo-
structural imbalance, oil revenue allocation, and power-sharing. These issues are captured by the 
interview questions in alignment with the explanatory variables. Other related questions were 
                                               
46 For a detailed discussion on ethnic domination, see Montalvo, José García, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2002). Why 
ethnic fractionalization? Polarization, ethnic conflict and growth; Collier (2000). Economic causes of civil conflict 
and their implications for policy.  
47 The questions center around how the constituent ethnic groups can integrate as a nation. The most controversial 
aspect of the national questions revolves around matters of national character of the country. The questions are: 
First, should the country remain a federal state with a strong center? Second, should the country adopt a confederal 
system with a weak center? Three, should the country disintegrate along regional lines so that each sovereign region 
can then determine its future relationships with the others.  
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asked to get a broader understanding of the feelings of the different ethnic groups on how 
government is handling certain salient issues by region. 
It is well documented that the country now known as Nigeria is an amalgam of many 
nations brought together by Britain in 1914 (Ezera 1964, Coleman 1963). Previously, the north 
had been organized under the Sokoto Caliphate after the success of Uthman dan Foldio’s jihad 
that brought the Karmen Borno empire and all the native (pagan) Hausa states under the 
harmonized Islamic religio-political dictatorship. The centralized caliphate system made the 
indirect rule-colonial policy of the British colonial administration easily achievable. The Yoruba 
land, on the other hand, consisted of many kingdoms that made this indirect rule-colonial policy 
challenging for the colonialists in the Western region. The Ibo of the eastern part of Nigeria were 
scattered all over the area between the Delta River and Southern Cameroon because of their 
acephalous Village Republics system (Post 1973, Ola 1996).  
The geographical imbalance created by the 1946 partitioning of the country into three 
asymmetrical regions was the first hurdle against national integration. This observation is 
consistent with the finding of Ezera (1964). Since independence there have been several episodes 
of ethnic disputes over the geo-political structure, power sharing, and the revenue allocation 
formula. This research seeks to analyze the role of resource-dependence in the conflicts and the 
conflict mitigation influence of the civil society. To achieve the goal of this chapter, the analysis 
is divided into three components based on the three geo-regional structures (Northern, Western, 




Comparative Cross-Regional Analysis of Nigeria and the Relationship between Conflict,  
 
Resources, and Civil Society 
The in-depth interviews I conducted for this research targeted respondents from the three 
regions of Nigeria (See Figure 5.1). The participants were public officials from the three ethno-
geographic48 regions of the country (Akinola 1996). Overall, 42 people were contacted for the 
interview but only 30 agreed to participate. The interview adopted both closed-ended and open-
ended questions that sought to examine the views and feelings of the respondents on many issues 
relating to the focus of the research. The questions are divided into four segments, namely 
conflict and causal mechanism, trust in government, ethnic dominance, and the mitigating 
influence of civil society and national integration). It is noteworthy that the sample was 
determined by availability of time and resources needed to cover the three regions. The results of 
the interviews are comprised of two components. The closed-ended questions capture the views 
of the interviewees on specific salient issues, while the second part consists of the respondents’ 
narrative that reflects the rationales for their views on the questions posed by the interviewer.49 
The questions focus on whether there are regional differences or unanimity among the Nigerians 
on the causal mechanisms of violent conflicts and the mitigating influence of civil society.  
 
                                               
48 See Akinola presents for a detailed explanation on the development of geo-political regions and zones in Nigeria. 
49 For demographic distribution of respondents, please see Appendix A for the list of the questions posed to the 
respondents by the interviewer. 
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Figure 5.1: Nigerian Map Showing the Three Regions of Analysis.50 
 
Source: http://www.waado.org/nigerian scholars/archive/pubs/wilberimap1.html 
 
The issues raised in the interview questions include the types of conflicts that concern 
Nigerians; their assumptions about the causal factors or processes of conflict; their feelings about 
government performance; their feelings about ethnic power relations, resource allocation, and 
justice; their aspirations about the future of national integration; and their views about the 
conflict mitigation role of civil society.  
 
Violent Conflicts and Roles of Civil Society in Nigeria 
 
Table 5.1. Incidences of Conflict in Nigeria 1997-2018 
 
 
Source: https://www.acleddata.com/data/  
                                               
50 The date Nigeria was divided into three regions remains controversial because analysts disagree on whether to 
adopt 1946, the date the constitution which created the region was passed or 1954, the date the law went into effect. 
PROTEST BOKO HARAM UNIDENTIFIED FULANI ETHNIC POLICE VIGILANTE PARTY COMMUNAL CULTISM GOVERNMENT TOTAL
4403 3117 2230 921 665 617 293 219 156 37 5 12663
34.77 24.62 17.61 7.27 5.25 4.87 2.31 1.73 1.23 0.29 0.04 100.00
Incidences of conflicts in Nigeria 1997-2018
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According to Table 5.1, there were approximately 12,663 incidences of conflict in 
Nigeria between 1997 and 2018. The types of the conflict are determined by the actors or 
perpetrators. As shown above, aside from unidentified conflicts, Protest =24.62% is the largest 
type documented, followed by Boko Haram terrorism =24.62%, Fulani herdsmen violence 
against farmers and villagers = 7.27%, and ethnic violence = 5.25%. Others are less than 5% 
(See Table 5.1). It must be noted that the unidentified being so high in proportion may have 
changed the above distribution significantly were the actors and the contexts of the conflict 
categorized as unidentified available. However, the table demonstrate that the types of conflict 
with the highest percentages are the most significant. Protest reflects the reactions of civil society 
to government policies and institutional behavior or performances, and Boko Haram, Fulani 
herdsmen, and ethnic violence according to ACLED, are the most troubling for Nigeria. 
The history of violent conflict in Nigeria can be traced to struggle for power among the 
major ethnic groups dating back to the pre-independence period (Walter 1972; Tidy and 
Leeming 1981; Nwabueze 1982; Ezera 1964).51 Because of frustrations that stem from above 
problems, Awolowo (1968) observed that “Nigeria is not a nation, but a mere geographical 
expression” (pp-47-48). Awolowo’s expression about the artificiality of Nigeria has been shared 
by Balewa that “since 1914 Nigeria has existed as one country only in the paper” (Coleman 
1958; Roberts 1998). The gathering political storm was further exacerbated by the western 
region crisis, Balewa’s intervention and politicization of the military. Dissatisfied with the 
political development, civil society groups including the labor unions, farmers’ cooperative 
association, youth movement organizations, students, age-grade, and a few professional 
associations protested against the federal government. The protest became violent, roads and 
bridges were blocked, and government properties were destroyed. Hence, the first week of 
                                               
51 For a robust discussion on the nature and impacts of ethnicity on Nigerian political development, see Awolowo 
(1947) Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber & Faber. 
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January 1966 was a precarious period because while the northern region continued give its 
unalloyed support, the southern regions openly resented the national government (Sklar 1963; 
Ezera 1964; Nwabueze 1982).  
The grievances of the south east and south west regions against the successive 
administrations in Nigeria revolve around the issue of geographical imbalance and its effects on 
ethno-regional power relations and resources revenue allocation. Because the northern region has 
over Seventy-percent of the geographical landmass, it has more seats in the federal legislature. 
Subsequently, since Obasanjo increased the number of states from twelve created by Gowon to 
nineteen, the north recaptured its dominance not only in the federal legislature but also in the 
election of president. Similarly, because of the number of states in its jurisdiction, the northern 
region benefited more from the national resources’-revenue sharing formula than the south 
western region where the oil wells are located, and the south west through which crude oil is 
shipped abroad. Thus, the south east region maintains that it produces the wealth of Nigeria yet 
suffers from the injustices of the sharing formula. One common concern of both the south east 
and south west regions is the seeming systematic plan by the northern Nigeria to dominate power 
perpetually and control resources allocation as well (Okoli 1980). 
Some scholars have pointed out that, because of the vacuum that the renegade officers 
created as a result of violent coup d’état in January 15, 1966, General Ironsi, the GOC of the 
Nigerian Army assumed power as the Head of State and changed the government from federal to 
a unitary system. Consequently, in what has been described as a revenge for perceived ethnicized 
coup perpetrated against Hausa-Fulani leaders, the northern officers overthrew Aguiyi Ironsi in a 
more violent coup d’état assassinating him along with many Igbo politicians, most senior Ibo and 
a few Yoruba military officers. However, to mitigate the fear of the northern Hausa-Fulani ethnic 
groups would take to perpetrate its hegemony, Hausa-Fulani hegemony, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon 
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A minority Ngas ethnic from the Middle-Belt Nigerian took over as the military head of state 
(Post and Vickers 1973; Potholm 1988). When Gowon was deposed in a bloodless military coup 
in February 1975, General Murtala stated that the most significant reasons for toppling Gowon 
was his administration’s failure to implement the nine-point six-years program that was designed 
to return Nigeria to a civilian rule in October 1976. Unfortunately, Murtala was assassinated in 
February 1976 by some aggrieved middle-belt military officers, namely Lieutenant Colonel Buka 
Suka Dimka and Brigadier Illya Bisalla, who alleged that Murtala had planned to perpetrate 
Hausa-Fulani hegemonic agenda during the transition.52  
Murtala’s successor, General Obasanjo, managed the transition that ended in the 
inauguration of Shehu Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria as the second democratically 
elected president of Nigeria on October 1, 1979. It must be mentioned that the pro-democracy 
movements led by the Nigerian Bar Association mobilized the trader’s union, teachers’ union, 
national union of road transport workers union, and higher institution students in the south west 
and south east mounted pressure from 1976 until 1979 for an immediate transfer of power to the 
democratically elected government. The south-west region soon became disenchanted with the 
administration of President Shehu Shagari, a Fulani from the Sokoto state northern region, and 
descendant of Usman dan Foldio, from Sokoto northern Nigeria. The prelude to the 1983 
elections indicated that Nigerian elites would stop at nothing to win the election (Joseph 1991). It 
is arguable that the purpose of the arbitrary schedule change was to weaken the morale of the 
opposition parties. Such argument is plausible given the assumption that if the small political 
parties lost the presidential election, they tended to lose interest in mobilizing their supporters for 
subsequent elections. The challenges for the government started immediately after the election of 
1979 when the southern politicians and some at the leadership cadre of the labor union openly 
                                               
52 See Sunday Champion, April 30, 2006. 
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criticized Shehu Shagari’s administration as illegitimate due to the allegations of massive 
electoral fraud (Osaghae 1999). Rather than addressing the concerns of the citizens, the 
administration deployed Anti-riot Mobile Police Force to suppress widespread anti-government 
protests and some violent riots in the south eastern and south western regions. In addition, 
government institutions were alleged to have engaged in asymmetrical treatment of the three 
regions in its policy of public goods distribution and exclusion from power. The elites from the 
south west regions gradually withdrew their support and loyalties to the administration. The 
retreat to ethno-regional enclave and open contentment for Shagari administration gave impetus 
to a new wave of protests leading to precariousness.53 
Some scholars believe that the booming oil revenue was a bane of national integration 
and political stability in Nigeria. As it has been observed, the northern region allegedly coveted 
oil revenue to perpetrate neopatrimonialism. The NPN states received disproportionally high 
financial support from the fund allocated for development by the federal government. In contrast, 
the non-NPN only received statutory allocation based on austerity measures. The state governors 
and local government officials of NPN states were not held accountable. Unlike the broad 
coalition of civil society groups that protested against military occupation and fought for 
democratic transition in the mid 1970s, the civil movements were divided in its response to 
allegations of ineptness, wanton systematic merger of party and government perpetration of 
partisanship, and neopatrimonialism against Shagari administrations’.54 That period marked the 
lowest point for civil society because of flagrant ethnicization of the groups that had hitherto 
fought in unity to hold the government accountable (Joseph 1991). Notable members of 
professional associations and leaders of various civic community groups in the northern region 
were recruited to the Kaduna Mafia. Those who were not coopted were embraced by the political 
                                               
53 See Daily Times, July 23, 2001. 
54 See Jibril Aminu (2000). “Who wants a true federalism.”  
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parties. This type of embeddedness weakened civil society in northern Nigeria. The case was 
different in the south.55  
Nigerians again clamored openly for the military to overthrow a democratically elected 
government because of its purported institutional degeneration. In December 1983 when it 
seemed that Nigeria was at the brink of disaster similar to the last quarter of 1965, the military 
struck once again, terminating the elected civilian government of Shehu Shagari. General 
Muhammadu Buhari, another northern Fulani man from Katsina, became the military head of 
state. The Buhari military administration promulgated some draconian decrees, such as decree 
‘2’ that permits arrest without due process; decree ‘4,’ prohibition of fundamental human rights, 
freedom of the press, and decrees ‘5 and 22,’ the death penalty for illegal drug possession or 
trafficking, and oil bunkering offences. The Buhari/Idiagbon regime clamped down on the 
associations that constitute civil society so severely that they all went underground (Amuwo 
1992). The despair allegedly suffered by Nigerians led to another bloodless coup d’état on 
August 27, 1985 that brought General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida to power. After several 
years of inconsistencies, Babangida allowed Nigerians to vote in a general election June 12, 
1993, but annulled the result of the election that unofficial results indicated that Abiola, a 
Southerner from Ogun state, won overwhelmingly.56 Even though Babangida eventually ‘stepped 
aside’ from power under intense pressure and handed over to the Interim National Government 
(ING) headed by Earnest Shonekan from Ogun state, south west region, that substitution failed to 
placate the south western Yorubas. To the utter surprise of the anxious citizens, especially 
southerners, General Abacha (Chief of Defense staff of the ING) overthrew the ING.  
Aside from its totalitarian governing style, the Abacha regime’s anti-south policies 
reinvigorated civil society coalitions in the south west and south east regions while the 
                                               
55 See The Guardian, June 8, 1994. 
56 See appendix for the result of the unofficial result of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election. 
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administration was viewed favorably in the northern Nigeria. Furious about the increasing 
activities of groups including pan-Yoruba in the south west, pan-Ibo in the south east, and 
several other movements of Niger-Delta areas, the administration unleashed its State Secret 
Service (SSS) operatives to arrest and detain members of civil society groups without due 
process. Some were even assassinated.57 The affected groups were the National Democratic 
Coalition (NADECO) and other pro-democracy and human rights groups such as the campaign 
for Democracy (CD); Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR); and Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP); and numerous other networks. Because of the 
maltreatment of the pro-democracy civic network, militant groups from south east and south 
west regions took it upon themselves to challenge the government’s use of brute force to 
suppress civil associations. The first notable militant group was the Oodua People’s Republic 
(OPC), a pan-Yoruba group that sought to defend the interest of the Yorubas even if it required 
violence.58 Other groups include the Niger Delta and Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and 
Arewa Consultative Forum/Arewa Peoples’ Congress. 
After ruling Nigeria with an iron first for about five years Abacha died on June 8, 1998. 
General Abdulsalami Abubakar succeeded Abacha and served as a transitional head of state for 
one year before handing over to the democratically elected government in May 1999.59 
The pro-democracy advocate groups including NADECO, CDHR, and CD mass 
mobilization efforts aimed at involving as many as possible civic community associations across 
Nigeria against military dictatorship was impeded by two factors. First, the clandestine campaign 
by Abacha’s administration was aimed at neutralizing the effectiveness of the groups’ strategy. 
                                               
57 See The Guardian, November 6, 2015. 
58  See National Concord, February 16, 2010. 
59 See National Concord, September 22, 2000. 
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Second, Arewa Consultative Forum’s aggressive campaign in the northern region on behalf of 
the Abacha regime, and the militant wing of the Arewa People’s Congress allegedly worked 
earnestly to sabotage the pro-democracy network. In reaction the militant wings of the southern 
groups intensified violent tactics demanding that the winner of the June 12, 1993 election be 
installed as the legitimate president. When General Abdulsalam Abubakar took over as head of 
state after Abacha’s death he understood that the southern militant groups would not relent in 
their efforts to get justice. In less than one year the transition was completed and handed over to 
a duly elected president of the Republic in May of 1999.60 
The election of Obasanjo a Yoruba from South West region triggered a backlash from the 
core Hausa Fulani states in northern Nigeria. Zamfara’s state governor led the crusade for the 
extension of Sharia law from civil matters to criminal offences starting in January 2000. The 
Zamfara model was immediately adopted by more states in the northern region including Kano, 
Kebbi, Sokoto, Niger, Katsina, Jigawa, Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Kaduna, and Gombe. That 
decision provoked violent reactions from the militant groups in the southern region some of 
which have been awaiting opportunity to perpetrate violence. The country therefore descended 
into a protracted ethno-regional conflict. The phenomena of unseemly religious sectarianism in 
the north and unsettling ethnic vigilantism in the south opened a new wave of aberrant 
parochialism. In sum, it seems as if Nigeria was a failing state. 
As Howard (2014) succinctly noted: “There is an insidious pattern of deprivation within 
the failing and failed states that drives ordinary citizens to support use of political violence, and 
in several specific cases, terrorism against the state” (p. 17). Since May 1999 when the Nigeria 
returned to democratic rule, intraethnic, interethnic, conflicts and terrorism have increased 
significantly. Meanwhile, the civic associations having accomplished its goal of seeing the 
                                               
60 See Saturday Tribune, October 13, 2001. 
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country returned to democracy, have retreated to the background springing up sporadically when 
necessary. The militant groups that remain visible and active in its space have all become 
ethnocentric and violent. The reasons for the surge in ethnic or communal militant violence 
includes marginalization, discrimination, exclusion, inequity in resources management, 
environmental pollution. For Boko Haram, it is the evils of modernization and contemporary 
government system. Archival records show hundreds of violent clashes between the government 
and militants from south east and south west Nigeria.61 
 
The Ibo (Biafra) Movements of the Ibo South East 
Since 1989, contemporary Ibo ethnic resistance groups such as the Movement for the 
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Biafra Independent Movement 
(BIM), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and the Biafra Zionist Federation (BZF)62 have 
demanded independence for the south east and south-south people. Their request for 
renegotiation has not attracted much interest until around late 2013 when they escalated their 
protests.63 The grievances of the Ibo people include what they describe as deliberate neglect, 
unfair allocation of resources revenue northern domination of power and marginalization. The 
Ohaneze Ndigbo is therefore demanding dialog with the federal government to address the 
problems mentioned above. The frustration of the Igbo has been expressed in different tones. 
Moreover, they believe that since Nigeria has successfully taken control of their natural 
resources (oil) and balkanized the Biafra people, it does not care about the economic and 
environmental effects of oil exploitation on the people of eastern region. The grievances of the 
Ibos are against the northern region and the federal government, while violent reactions of the 
                                               
61 See This Day, October 3, 2004. 
62 See Nigerian Tribune (September 29, 2015, 32) for more on the different movements for actualizing the demand 
of the south-east people for independence from Nigeria. 
63 See Vanguard December 7, 2015, 15; Tribune December 10, 2015; Vanguard November 7, 2015, 11. 
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eastern region’s militant groups were directed toward the government. After so many protests, 
riots, and some instances of violence against the government and expatriate oil companies’ 
installations, on December 2015 the federal government finally held a meeting with the Ohaneze 
Ndigbo in Enugu where the two parties agreed to ease the tension rather than continue in violent 
confrontation. The agreement was however not implemented by the federal government.64 
Therefore, the Ibos remain skeptical of the federal government and are seriously considering the 
best strategy to secede from Nigeria. The tactics of the south east region militants include 
launching attacks against government and foreign company installations, organizing mass 
protests, and in some cases violent riots against the government.65 
 
The Oodua People Congress (OPC) of Yoruba in South West 
The indigenous Yoruba people formed a grand cultural alliance named the Oodua People 
Republic (OPC) after General Babangida annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election that 
was won by Moshood Abiola — a Yoruba man — from the Ogun state south west. The 
grievance of the Yorubas are the annulment of the 1993 the election, targeted arrest, unlawful 
detention, and assassination of many Yoruba leaders and democracy activists, and perpetration of 
Hausa-Fulani agenda in Nigeria.66 Thus, it is safe to say that the Yoruba’s were brutally punished 
for rallying against Abacha regime which is tantamount to attempting to wrestling power from 
what the Yoruba’s called the northern oligarchy. However, after Obasanjo was elected president 
in 1999, the Arewa People Congress positioned itself as the vigilante against potential overreach 
of the administration.67 In retaliation, the OPC vowed to continue its vigilante activities in the 
Yoruba land. Though the OPC’s grievances were against the Hausa-Fulani elites that are 
                                               
64 See Guardian, February 23, 2016, 10. 
65 See Guardian, November 15, 2015, 20 & October 25, 2015, 60; Guardian December 9, 2015, 17 
66 See The Nation, September 23, 2012. 
67 See Nigerian Tribune, April 27, 2004. 
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believed to have perpetrated a northern military oligarchy which has been used to suppress 
southerners for many decades, it was not the intention of the group to attack a group or entity 
that has no affiliation with the federal government. Unfortunately, however, evidence shows to 
the contrary that there were several incidences of violent clashes between the OPC and Arewa 
People Congress militants in the south west region.68 Overall, the government considered the 
OPC to be a very violent militant group with a record of thousands of violent clashes with the 
Nigerian security forces. Surprisingly, no administration has deemed it worthy to categorize APC 
as a violent ethnic militant group in spite of its numerous violent clashes with OPC. Its activities 
went down after the election of Obasanjo, but the organization remains active and is prepared to 
launch attack whenever it is provoked.69 It is worthy of note that while the ethnic militant groups 
were embroiled in violent conflicts, the civic community groups including NADECO, Afenifere, 
CD, and CDHR, with the financial support from international agencies like Human Rights 
International, United Nations, and United States Aid Agency, successfully organized numerous 
conflict mitigation training seminars. Through that intervention, they were able to train many 
groups and community leaders the strategies of mitigation and mediation among the members of 
different ethnic and communal groups within their villages and towns. 
 
Movements for the Emancipation of Niger Delta & the Survival of Ogoni People (MEND) 
Oil wells are in the south-south region of Nigeria, known as the Niger Delta. Since the 
first crude oil production in the region in 1957, the natives of Oloibiri and Ogoni have 
complained about the adverse effects of the crude oil production on their lands and rivers, but to 
no avail.70 After four decades of neglect, the youths of the Niger-Delta area formed different 
                                               
68 The violent clashes between the OPC and APC in the south west especially in Lagos during the 1990s through 
early 2000s were reported to have been provoked by the groups suspicion for each other. 
69 See National Concord, September 22, 2000. 
70 See National Tribune, November 30, 1995. 
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militant organizations to defend their lands from the foreign oil companies and the Nigerian 
federal government. The militant groups included the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Creek Warriors, the Niger Delta Avengers, the Ijaw youths, 
the Egbesu Boys, Delta Marine Force, and several others.71 Their initial goal was to secure some 
compensation from the government and the foreign oil companies for the adverse environmental 
effects of oil exploration in their lands. The complaint against the effect of oil exploration dates 
back to January 1966 when a militant group by Army Major Isaac Adaka Boro, Samuel 
Timinipre Owonaru, and others formed a guerrilla group that declared independence for the 
Niger-Delta area and held the country hostage for 12 days paralyzing the oil business during that 
short revolutionary period. Many decades after Boro’s revolution, the problems are not only 
persistent, they are worse.72 The Niger-Delta militant groups sometimes turn against each other; 
hence, intracommunal clashes account for substantial part of the violence that have embroiled the 
area for many decades after the discovery of oil. Unfortunately, except for Yaradua 
administration, the approaches adopted by all other administrations only embolden the militants 
and their leaders to perpetrate more violence.73 However, after the expiration of the deal signed 
with the militia which guaranteed employment, and financial compensation expired, many other 
groups sprang up. The Niger Delta area remains the second most violent place in Nigeria because 
of the increase in violence against expatriate companies and federal government personnel and 
equipment. 
 
The Boko Haram Violence  
                                               
71 See The Punch, January 25, 1996. 
72  See The Vanguard July 24, 2007.   
73 See The Punch, November 17, 1995. 
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The original goal of Boko Haram was to carry out a jihad in Nigeria because of the 
disdain of the terrorist group for western education and modern lifestyle. Boko Haram started as 
Sahaba group in 1995 from the orthodox teaching of fundamentalist groups like the Al-Qaida, 
Taliban, and Muslim Brotherhood. By 2002, Boko Haram warned Nigerians to disavow western 
lifestyle or face its wrath.74 Like Jama’at Islamiyyat in Egypt, Indonesia, Algeria, Mauritanian, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan, Boko Haram was determined to terrorize anyone or 
any groups in Nigeria that refused to accept and practice Islam in their own fashion. Facing a 
reprisal attack from the Nigerian Forces, Boko Haram fled from its Sambisa forest and embarked 
on a full-scale guerrilla warfare against Christians, government installations, and educational 
institutions.75 It is astounding that most of the menacing guerrilla attacks that Boko Haram 
waged against the secular democratic government and its western paraphernalia even during the 
administration of southern Christian presidents Obasanjo and Goodluck were confined to 
Maiduguri, Bauchi, Yobe, Kano, and Katsina. Muslim scholars from different Islamic sects have 
concluded that going by its murderous activities, the Boko Haram group is not an Islamic but 
simply a terrorist organization.76 However, since the Buhari administration came to power, Boko 
Haram has intensified its operation and vows to bring the country down.77 Furthermore, Boko 
Haram is strengthened by the free entry and exit treaty between west African countries that 
makes it possible for the group to spread and move freely under the radar. Moreover, the rise in 
global terrorism and the support received from organizations such as ISIS and other Wahhabist 
groups that provide financial and material support emboldens Boko Haram.78 In spite of the 
                                               
74 See This Day August 31, 2011, 55; The Guardian August 1, 2009, 3. 
75 See Nigerian Tribune January 5, 2017, 13; Vanguard May 22, 2017, 5. 
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government’s military pressure, Boko Haram is still able to bomb strategic targets in the north 
east area. 
 
The Fulani Herdsmen Violence  
Like Boko Haram, the Fulani herders have been terrorizing Nigerians since 1999. 
However, since 2015 the group seems to have become more brazen in the way it invades private 
and public properties with impunity. As the incidences of Fulani herders’ encroachment into 
arable farms escalates, the government’s response has been weak and ineffective.79 The herders 
violence, which entails indiscriminate killing and destruction of properties, has been described as 
ethnic violence by the northern elite against the south western and south eastern region because 
unlike Boko Haram, Fulani herders’ attacks are concentrated on the middle-belt states of Plateau, 
Adamawa, Benue and the south west, south east and mid-west states as a Fulani-sponsored 
campaign of terror.80 Another account stipulates that some elements of the northern elites are 
exploiting the Fulani herders’ violence to instigate another military intervention which 
historically has been spearheaded by and benefited the northern region. It has also been pointed 
out by the south east and south west that the ongoing Fulani violence is part of a broader plan in 
the 1989 Abuja Declaration about the Hausa-Fulani goal of Islamizing Nigeria. As the debates 
continue, the lackluster attitude of the Buhari Administration in addressing the menace of the 
Fulani herdsmen seems as a passive endorsement of the virulent attacks they are unleashing 
against the southerners.81 In defense of the Fulani herdsmen the Miyetti Allah and the National 
Council of Fulani-Kawtal Fulbe82 explained that the marauders disguising as Fulani herders may 
                                               
79 See the Punch May 7, 2016, pg. 14. 
80 See the Guardian December 2, 2016, pg. 15. Guardian, January 30, 2016. 50. 
81 See This Day, October 26, 2015. 
82 See the Guardian July 6, 2017, pg. 1 for the perspective of the Kawtal-Fulbe-Nigeria on the national discourse on 
the herdsmen-farmer violence. 
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be Boko Haram militants who escaped from the Sambisa forest and want to continue to kill 
Nigerians under the guise of herdsmen.83  
 
Civil Society and Conflict  
To explain the role of the civil society in conflict mitigation it is important to explain the 
nature of civil society in Nigeria. Civil society that originated in the early history of the Africans 
“concerns the non-monopolistic society, and the non-private political organizations that operate 
in it” (Ekeh 1992, 190). The oldest form of civil society in Nigeria was the traditional 
associations that acted as the watchdogs against the excesses of the traditional and religious 
rulers.84 However, the modern form of civil society combines primordial values with 
contemporary goals. It must be emphasized that the composition of civil society that forced the 
military back to the barracks in the 1990s consists in a nexus of pro-democracy, human rights, 
socio-cultural, religious, and professional associations. How did civil society force the military to 
hand over power? The network of civil society demonstrated its relevance in the 1990s when it 
responded spontaneously to the deepening crisis in Nigeria by mobilizing numerous groups in 
the 1990s that can organize itself and play its mitigation role whenever the clarion calls even if it 
must have sought resources internationally to pursue its goals (Guyer 1994, 217).  
On the issue of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election, the northern region 
supported the annulment, but the south east and south west condemned the annulment. Having 
been invigorated by the incessant military oppression topped by the annulment, the groups 
distributed leaflets throughout the country, and took out media advertisements advising workers 
of all categories (public and private) to boycott work indefinitely. The state governors and local 
                                               
83 See Punch, May 17, 2016 pg. 23. Daily Champion June 29, 2011. 
84 See Ekeh 1992 (189) “The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics.” In Caron, Bernard, Alex 




government administrators across the country reported crippling effects of the boycott within the 
first 24 hours. Capitalizing on the initial success, the civil society network heightened the 
strategies of civil disobedience. Gradually different categories of civil society joined the 
movement calling for the military to hand over power to the winner of the presidential election.85 
The failure to honor the demand of the civil society network led to intensification of its civil 
disobedience and boycott of work which brought the Nigerian economy to a standstill and united 
the southern region against the military and northern elites. For a short period of time there was a 
looming fear of a north-south war.86 
Remarkably, the government was weakened, and it succumbed partially after several 
weeks of communication, transportation, trade, education, business, manufacturing, and 
government institutions’ standstill. In light of intensified civil society pressure, General 
Babangida ceremoniously announced that he was stepping aside and handing over power to an 
Interim National Government (ING) on August 27, 1993. The ING had a southerner Earnest 
Shonekan as the head of government, and Abacha as the parallel military head, being the chief of 
national defense council (Diamond and Kirk-Greene 1997). Then on November 17, 1993 the 
military struck one more time by overthrowing the ING. When General Sani Abacha took over 
as the new military head of state his justification was the crippling effects of the civil unrest on 
the economy and the inability of the ING to guarantee security of life and property.  
Nevertheless, rather than retreating, the civil society adopted a shift in strategy. The 
effects of Abacha’s totalitarianism were felt mostly in the southern regions. On May 15, 1994 the 
National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) mobilized the rest of the civil society network and 
demanded that General Sani Abacha step down and hand over power to MKO Abiola, the winner 
of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election. In reaction, Abacha arrested most of the 
                                               
85 See This Day, July 8, 2016. 
86 See Daily champion, August 29, 2011. 
108 
 
members of the known civil society groups, Abiola, retired General Musa Yaradua, and General 
Obasanjo and their sympathizes became ‘persona non-grata’ in their own country. With the 
steady support of Amnesty International and other international supporters, civil society 
intensified its civil disobedience campaign. What is remarkable is that the administration spent 
most of its time fighting the civil society groups rather than governing. 87 
The data presented in the following tables (5.1-5.14) compare the divergent perspectives 
of citizens on a wide range of issues by region. These variations are significant indicators that 
tend to illuminate the causal processes and the dynamics of conflict onset and transformation in 
Nigeria. The next section of this chapter analyzes the data on the northerners’ responses and 
explanations for the causal process of conflict, as well as the mitigating role of civil society. 
Section two analyzes the responses of the (South) eastern respondents. The third section entails 
the analysis of the views of the participants from the (South) western region.  
 
Analysis I: The Northern Region (Hausa-Fulani) 
The northern region is a conglomerate of a diverse group of people (Akinsanya 2005). In 
contrast to the common description of the northern Nigeria as the Hausa-Fulani north,88 the 
northern region consists of several other ethnic groups including Idoma, Yauri, Kwanchi, Ngas, 
Tiv, Zarma, Yungur, Teshena, Shuwa, Bachama, Baya, Gwa, Dakarkari, Gade, Banda, Jukun, 
Kafanchan, Charma, Kwanchi, Birom, Nupe, Gwari, Kanuri, Angas, and several others 
(Akinyemi, Cole, and Ofonagoro 1979, p. 207).  
While it may be difficult to determine the exact number of ethnic groups in northern 
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88 It is noteworthy that though the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are the largest in the northern region, many other 
ethnic groups are in the northern hemisphere of the country. Besides, the ethnic groups in the middle belt do not 




Nigeria it is fair to stipulate that there are one hundred ethnic groups spread across the northern 
region of Nigeria. Among these ethnic groups the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups forged an 
alliance through Islamic religious affiliation creating a dominant mélange named Hausa-Fulani 
(Akinyemi, Cole, and Ofonagoro 1979, 190-212).  
 
Table 5.2: Demographic Distribution of Survey Interview Respondents 
 
 
Among the thirty people interviewed for this research eleven, or 37 percent, of them are 
northerners. Of the eleven respondents from the northern region there are two females and nine 
males (See Table 5.2). The difference in the numbers of male and female northern participants 
seems to reflect the patriarchal nature of northern Nigeria. It is understandable that the 
ambivalence of the northern female population of political issues are related to Islamic religion, 
culture, and tradition that relegates females, the majority of whom are uneducated, to the 
background while men, whether educated or otherwise, represent the community’s political 
interests and views. Furthermore, it is clear from Table 5.2 that there are more Muslim 
participants than Christians and people of other religious backgrounds in the northern region.  
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 9 5 6 3 8 0 11 37














On the question regarding the types of conflicts that citizens are most afraid of, 45 
percent of the northerners share the fear that an outbreak of another civil war as the most 
concerning (See Table 5.3). Subsequently, 27 percent of the northerners surveyed identified 
violent protest and the military counter-offensive against Boko Haram as next on their list of 
potentially debilitating conflicts before the growing menace of Boko Haram and the Fulani 
(Fulbe-Miyeti Allah) Herdsmen against the Christian farmers in the north and the entire southern 
part of the country (See Table 5.3).89 Interestingly, only northerners perceive intra-ethnic 
disputes and civil disobedience as violence that threaten the political stability in the country (See 
Table 5.3). The northern participants do not consider the surging wave of armed robbery, 
kidnaping, and the police and security operatives’ brutality against civilians as a cause of conflict 
(See Table 5.3).  
  
                                               
89 See (Weeraratne 2017) for in-depth discussion on the menace of Boko Haram  
Types of conflicts
Female Male H S Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Intraethnic conflict 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 9
Civil disobedience 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 9
Armed robbery and kidnapping 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Police and security forces brutality 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Violent protests 1 2 2 2 1 2 0 3 27
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram 1 1 1 1 0 3 0 3 27
Islamic Fundamentalism Bokko Harram / Herdsmen 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 18
Ethnic Militants Violence 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 9
Civil war 2 3 21 4 3 2 0 5 45
Gender Education  Religious Affiliation Total
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Table 5.4: Salient Conflict Inducing Factors Reported by the Respondents  
 
 
Then I asked participants to name the causal factors of violent conflict in the country. The 
most concerning factors identified, as shown in Table 5.4, reflect the unique challenges that the 
northern people face. This is glaring because more than 70 percent of the northern respondents 
believe that a climatic problem (drought) or desertification is the leading cause of violence (See 
Table 5.4). Similarly, 63 percent of northern respondents named water scarcity as an underlying 
cause of conflict (See Table 5.4). Subsequently, northerners ranked poverty, housing, 
unemployment, and electoral malpractices as very urgent problems that tend to accelerate 
violence. Each of these factors are emphasized by 45 percent of the northern respondents (See 
Table 5.4). Other factors on the list, including religious sectarianism, power sharing, resource 
distribution, corruption, government institution weakness, and ethnic discrimination, received 
less than 40 percent attention from the northern respondents (See Table 5.4). Next, I posed 
questions to the respondents on each of the issues that are salient and sufficient causal factors of 
conflict, and how well the government is working toward addressing these issues. The first set of 
 Factors
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Democracy 1 2 2 1 0 3 0 3 27
Modernization 0 3 2 1 0 3 0 3 27
Civil society 1 6 3 4 1 6 0 7 64
Governement weakness 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 9
Land 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 9
Housing 2 3 1 4 3 2 0 5 45
Poor or lack of infrastructure 2 1 0 3 1 2 0 3 27
Climatic issues-Drought 2 6 4 4 3 5 0 8 73
Military rule 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 9
Illiteracy 2 1 3 0 2 1 0 3 27
Poverty 2 3 1 4 2 3 0 5 45
Unemployment 0 5 2 3 3 2 0 5 45
Water 2 5 3 4 3 4 0 7 64
Environmental pollution 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 9
Fear of Islamization / Jihad 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 18
Electoral malpractices 1 4 3 2 3 2 0 5 45
Power Sharing 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 2 18
Corruption 2 2 3 1 3 1 0 4 36
Ethnic discrimination 1 2 0 3 3 0 0 3 27
Resources revenue allocation 1 3 2 2 3 1 0 4 36
Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation
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questions related to the level of confidence or trust in the ability of the central or national 
government to discharge its responsibilities efficiently. The indexes for measuring citizens’ view 
on performance of government and its impacts on the diverse ethnic groups include 
government’s handling of the economy, corruption, elections, and violence (See Tables 5.5, 5.6, 
5.7, and 5.8).  
 
Table 5.5: Government Management of the Economy 
 
 
On the management of economy, interviewees were asked to indicate their level of 
satisfaction with government’s handling of the economy. In response, 73 percent of the 
northerners were satisfied with the way the government was managing the economy. Only 18 
percent were dissatisfied, and 9 percent were unsure. Furthermore, the northern participants 
argued that the Buhari administration was the best among the post 1999 administrations. It is 
interesting that the northerners would rather focus on four administrations since 1999 rather than 
all the post-independence administration. Their argument rested on the impacts of the 
government economic policy on the common people. Some of the reasons for the norther 
participants favorable view toward the government included price control, increase and timely 
payment of government workers’ salaries, subsidies for farm supplies, and many others. Given 
these points of reference, it is not surprising that the northern respondents showed favorable 
views to the government’s handling of the economy, because they enjoyed more economic 
reliefs under the Buhari administration than the four preceding administrations. But how did the 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 4 3 3 2 4 0 6 55
0 2 1 1 0 2 0 2 18
0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 18





Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation Region of Origin
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other regions react to the questions?  
 
Table 5.6: Government Management of Corruption 
 
 
The next questions explored citizens’ level of confidence in the ability of government to 
manage corruption in its institutions and agencies. The northern respondents showed confidence 
in the government at the same level as the management of the economy. The participants 
explained that the government’s campaign against corruption was going in the right direction 
amidst the criticism from the other regions that the war against corruption was prejudiced against 
the opposition parties and ethnic groups, most of which are based in the south. Based on the 
above, it is not surprising that the implementation of the government’s economic and anti-
corruption programs tends to have significant impacts on the equilibrium of the relationships 
between the government and the ethno-regional groups. That supposition seems consistent with 
Olukoshi’s (2000) argument that corruption has become institutionalized in Nigeria. If it is true 
that the anti-corruption program is implemented in a tribalized manner the outcome may 
perpetuate divisiveness rather than rekindle collective trust in the government. 
 
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 6 3 4 2 5 0 7 64
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 9
0 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 18





TotalResponses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation
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Table 5.7: Ability of the Government to Conduct Free and Fair Elections 
 
 
One of the most divisive issues in Nigeria is the difficulty of conducting free and fair 
elections amidst the ethno-regional nature of politicking. Therefore, I asked the participants to 
rate their confidence in the ability of government to conduct free and fair elections. The 
respondents showed a positive view of government’s ability. Eighty-two percent of the 
respondents said they had confidence in the government. Nine percent did not have confidence, 
and 9 percent said they were unsure (See Table 5.7). Explaining the reasons for their confidence, 
the participants contended that the northern elites have worked earnestly to keep Nigeria united 
and secure, but the southern elites have done everything to thwart that efforts. So, the reluctance 
to support the Buhari administration is based on the ethnocentric nature of Nigerian politics. The 
northerners have certain advantages over the rest of the country. Hence, it is not surprising that 
they have confidence in the government. In contrast, those who did not have confidence in the 
government explained that elections in Nigeria have become mere symbolism because the 
winners are often pre-determined. It seems plausible that unless the country develops a system 
that allows minorities to participate equally, the government will continue to struggle with 





Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 6 2 5 1 6 0 7 64
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 18
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 9
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 9











To address the concern of citizens on the issue of equal treatment of ethnic groups I asked 
the interviewees about their level of confidence in the ability of government institutions to 
protect citizens and distribute justice among the ethnic groups equitably. Their responses showed 
that the northerners agreed with the way the government handles distribution of justice despite 
the grievances that citizens from other regions harbored against the government on the same 
matter. To be sure, 82 percent were confident that the federal government could protect citizens 
equitably despite their ethnic affiliation and region of origin. Eighteen percent disagreed. 
Moreover, those who had confidence in the government’s ability defended their opinion by 
asserting that those who complained against the government were not patriots. The argument is 
supported with the example of southern and middle-belt state’s opposition to the federal 
government’s grazing route and reserve bill that was designed to mitigate the herders versus 
farmers’ violence. Besides, they stipulated that the problem of the antagonists of the bill was 
their lack of compromise.  
  
Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percentage
Highly confident 1 5 2 4 1 5 0 6 55
Somewhat confident 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 3 27
Not confident 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 18




Table 5.9: Government Handling of Boko Haram and Herders and Farmers Conflicts 
 
 
Concerning the spate of violence in the country, the interviewees were asked to rate their 
approval of government’s handling of the violence unleashed by the Boko Haram group. The 
northern interviewees support the Buhari government’s reliance on military counter-offensives 
against the group, which successfully displaced the terrorist organization from the Sambisa 
forest. They also support the Buhari government’s grazing routes and reserve settlements across 
the country.90 Their rationale is that the longtime droughts and loss of grazing fields in the 
northern hemisphere of the country naturally demand that the federal government should 
intervene so that the Fulani herdsmen can travel to other parts of Nigeria safely through the 
routes to the reservation where they can live a normal life instead of nomadism. How would the 
rest of Nigerians in the southern regions receive this plan? That question is still unanswered at 
this juncture. Therefore, rather than uniting the military onslaught against Boko Haram in the 
north, the National Grazing Route and Reserve (NGRR) bill appears to be tearing the citizens 
apart because of the adverse effects on different regions. This tends to have negative impacts on 
interethnic relationships.  
  
                                               
90 See HB.11.10.13 (2011). “The National Grazing Route and Reserve Act.” This bill was introduced in the House 
of Representatives in response to the emergence of the violence that the Herders perpetrated predominantly against 
the Christian among the minority ethnic groups starting from the northern region, and later concentrated on the 
different ethnic groups in the middle-belt zone, and the southern regions in Nigeria.  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
0 6 3 3 1 5 0 6 55
1 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 18
1 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 18
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 9







Table 5.10: Government’s Management of Natural Resources  
 
 
Revenue sharing formula is one of the most divisive issues in the so-called national 
integration debate. I asked the northern participants to rate their level of satisfaction with 
government’s management of natural resources as it affects interethnic relationships. Sixty-three 
percent were satisfied with government’s cabinet appointments, but 27 percent were unsatisfied. 
Only 9 percent indicated that they were unsure (See Table 5.10). Furthermore, the northerners 
contend that because Nigeria is a federal republic, the federal government possesses a monopoly 
of control over the natural resources endowed to the country, irrespective of where they are 
located. Therefore, in their view, the resource-revenue allocation ought to be controlled by the 
federal government and shared based on the needs of each region. It is important to note that the 
northern region, which covers more than 50 percent of the state, supports the revenue-sharing 
formula that is amenable to their region even if it is detrimental to the interests of other regions. 
Apparently, based on the perspective of the northerners, the federal government distribution 
formula is justifiable. The question is what impacts does the purportedly asymmetric revenue 
sharing formula have on the equilibrium of relationships among the constituent groups in the 
Nigerian political arena that benefits the north more than the rest of the country? Evidently, 
revenue sharing formula has been at the center of every national debate in Nigeria and continues 
to dominate the discourse on the causes of ethnic dominance, discrimination, and violence that 
threaten national integration in the country.  
 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percentage
1 4 2 3 1 4 0 5 45
1 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 18
0 3 0 3 2 1 0 3 27
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 9








Table 5.11: Ability of Government to Protect and Treat All Ethnic Groups Equally 
 
 
The northern participants were also asked about their level of confidence in the ability of 
the government to protect all ethnic groups equally. On this issue, 82 percent indicated they had 
confidence in the government while 18 percent showed they were not confident. Only 9 percent 
stated they were unsure. Responding to a probing question, the northerners explained that the 
types of conflict that threaten the unity of the federation are different from sectarian violence that 
religious zealots like Boko Haram foisted against citizens of any ethnic background. Instead, 
they emphasized that it is the baseless complaints by some power-zealot minority groups that 
tend to destabilize the economic and political fabrics of the country. Remarkably, it is notable 
that most of the key positions under Buhari administration are held by people of Hausa-Fulani 
and Kanuri descents. Therefore, it is not surprising that most of the northerners have favorable 
views of the government.  
 
Table 5.12: Government Power Sharing and Inclusion  
 
 
Since independence, interethnic power relations have been and continued to be a focal 
issue that shapes the dynamics of political stability in the country. When the northern 
Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percentage
Highly confident 1 5 2 4 1 5 0 6 55
Somewhat confident 1 2 1 2 1 2 0 3 27
Not confident 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 18
Not sure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 5 3 3 0 6 0 6 55
1 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 18
0 2 1 1 2 0 0 2 18
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 9







participants were asked to rate their levels of satisfaction with government’s power sharing and 
inclusion, 73 percent said they were satisfied, and 18 percent indicated they were dissatisfied. 
But 9 percent were not sure. Based on the high satisfaction rate the northerners accorded the 
government on the issue, it is important to examine the basis for the northern support. In 
response to a probing question, those who expressed satisfaction argued that the government had 
organized a series of national constitutional conferences and constituent assemblies to address 
the purported grievances of the minorities dubbed ‘the minority questions’.91 Consequently, 
several measures have been adopted including a quota system and region and state creations. 
Moreover, the main political parties have adopted the compromising principles of zoning and 
rotational presidency to ensure that minorities can have a fair share of power. In contrast, those 
who expressed dissatisfaction argued that the idea of one north, one people is a mere appellation 
adopted by the Hausa and Fulani coalition to deny minority groups across the country and non-
Muslims the access to power and resource control.  
Furthermore, considering that the northern region has three of the six geo-political zones, 
the Hausa-Fulani Muslims continue to dominate power in Nigeria. And whenever the presidency 
falls to the northern Hausa-Fulani groups, all the principal cabinets positions are reserved for the 
core Hausa-Fulani states. However, southern presidents are known to have assigned cabinet 
positions fairly among Still, the north has enjoyed more than its fair share of access to power 
under every administration, whether headed by a northerner or a southerner; thus the feelings of 
northerners on the government is generally favorable. This observation is consistent with 
Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2013) finding that the feeling of diverse groups of people in a 
country about inclusion and exclusion depend heavily on the history of how they have been 
treated by the government.  
                                               
91 See Akindele (1997) for detail analysis of the role of constituent assembly in Nigerian constitutionalism, its 
successes, and failures, and impacts on the federal character and national questions of Nigeria. 
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Table 5.13: Confidence in Conflict-Mitigation Role of Civil Society 
 
 
One of the arguments of this research is that the mitigating influence of civil society 
tends to reduce the risk of violence in multiethnic resource-rich states. Therefore, the participants 
were asked to rate their levels of confidence in the ability of civil society to mitigate violence in 
Nigeria. On that issue, only 45 percent of northern participants were confident. Surprisingly, 36 
percent were not confident, and eighteen percent were unsure (See Table 5.13). It is noteworthy 
that the 45 percent positive response for the role of civil society in conflict mitigation is the 
smallest compared to the responses for all the indicators analyzed. Considering the 54 percent 
combination of those who lacked confidence and those who were unsure, it is logical to infer that 
most of northern Nigerians do not appreciate the vital role of civil society in conflict mitigation. 
It is also important to note that most of the northern respondents who expressed lack of 
confidence in the conflict-mitigating role of civil society are Muslims. According to the 
narratives of the northern participants who expressed lack of confidence in civil society the 
participants explained that the northern Muslims understanding of civil society is different from 
the southerners and non-Muslim citizens.  
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 2 2 1 1 2 0 3 27
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 18
0 4 2 2 0 4 0 4 36
0 2 0 2 1 1 0 2 18Not sure






Table 5.14: Civil Society Membership  
 
 
The strength of civil society lies in its ability to operate effectively across the entire 
spectrum of the political arena. Therefore, following the views of the northern participants on the 
role of civil society, I asked them about the level of their involvement in community or voluntary 
associations’ activities. Their responses reflected a similar pattern to their opinions about the role 
of civil society. Forty-five percent of the respondents indicated that they belonged to some form 
of civil society and community associations. Among this group 27 percent were actively 
involved, while 18 percent were somewhat involved (See Table 5.14). It is also intriguing that a 
whopping 36 percent of northerners did not belong to any community or civil society 
associations (See Table 5.14). And the same number of northerners did not believe civil society 
can mitigate conflict among Nigerian ethnic groups, while 18 percent were unsure of the 
potential significance of civil society in the conflict mitigation process (See Tables 5.13 and 
5.14). It is noteworthy that the number of the people from this region who were unsure, whether 
they held membership either in a community or civil society group, was consistent with the 
percentage of those who were unsure of the conflict mitigation role of civil society.  
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 2 1 2 2 1 0 3 27
0 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 18
1 3 2 2 0 4 0 4 36
0 2 1 1 0 2 0 2 18







Table 5.15: Interethnic Coalition for National Integration 
 
 
At the center of all the questions addressed above is the implication for the country’s 
national integration. The question is, what do the diverse opinions of the interviewees show 
about the feelings of the citizens on the issues relating to national unity? I asked the participants 
how much confidence they had in the prospects for interethnic integration. In response, 74 
percent of northern interviewees believed unwaveringly in the unity of Nigeria. It is important to 
note that those who expressed confidence in the prospects of national integration did so 
unequivocally. However, 9 percent of the respondents indicated that they did not have 
confidence in the prospects of national integration, while 18 percent of the northern participants 
were unsure whether the composite ethnic groups in Nigeria could accomplish a successful 
interethnic compromise to attain national integration (See Table 14). Nevertheless, the 
distribution of the responses by the northern participants seems to suggest that most of the 
northern respondents were optimistic about the preservation of the multiethnic state and the 
prospects for national cohesion. This assertion is consistent with the findings of previous studies 
(Horowitz 1985; Omotoso 2018). 
 
Discussion of the Findings of Analysis I-The Northern Region 
In sum, it is conceivable that the northern participants trust the government and are 
satisfied by its performances on various issues. Moreover, they approved of the government’s 
management of the economy, fighting corruption, and handling the violence perpetrated by Boko 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 7 3 5 2 6 0 8 73
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 9





Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation Total
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Haram and the Herders (See Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.8). It is noteworthy that the northern approval 
ratings for the government may be higher than the national average for each of these indicators. 
And, considering such positive feedback on government performance, it is not arbitrary to 
suggest that a high level of trust in the government implies that northerners are also more likely 
to support the government’s policies. In this African context, a symbiotic positive relationship 
would be expected between the state and the northern region. Additionally, based on the fact that 
the distribution of responses on the role of civil society reflects their involvement in community 
and civil society activities, it seems plausible that the northern respondents are almost evenly 
polarized on the mitigating influence of civil society in conflict. The observations above tend to 
guide further analysis on the relationships between the northern region and the other regions. 
Drawing on the trends in the responses of the northerners (See Tables 5.11-5.14), it is notable 
that there are dissimilarities between the perceptions of the Muslims — who form the majority 
Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups — and the Christians, who are predominantly northern minority 
ethnic groups. Northern women seldom participate publicly in political events. The few who 
participate are more likely to support their spouses. Consequently, for everyone Christian or 
female supporter of the government policies there are likely to be three Muslim male supporters.  
 
Analysis II: The (South) Eastern Region 
There are many groups in the (south) eastern region of Nigeria, which consists of Ibos and non-
Ibo ethnic groups. It is important to note that while the Ibos have demonstrated formidable 
solidarity on issues that affect them as a collective, they are not a monolithic ethnic group. The 
Ibos are indeed multiethnic. Prominent among the Ibo groups are the Wawa, Ngbo, Ohaozara, 
Ehugbo (Afikpo), Abakaliki, Nsukka, Ezillo, Izzi, Ijekebe, Ntezi, and Ohofia. The non-Ibo ethnic 
groups in the eastern region include Efik, Ijaw, Ibibio, and many others (Ibeanu and Onu 
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2001).92 However, within the context of intraregional politics, unlike the other ethnic groups, the 
Ibos are not acquiescent to a centralized political system such as state, kingdom, empire, or 
sultanate (Keller 2014, 54; Suberu 1996; Smock 1971; Horowitz 1985).  
Interestingly, the perception of the Ibo ethnic groups by outsiders is seldom consistent 
with how Ibo ethnic groups characterize the relationships among themselves. However, there are 
issues of common interests to all easterners that serve to explain the misconceptions, not only of 
the Ibos but all easterners as a monolithic group. For instance, recently the Ohaneze Ndigbo and 
other civil movement groups in the south-eastern region have been extremely critical of the 
Nigerian federal government.93 Moreover, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign 
State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) have renewed the call 
for the secession of the eastern region from Nigeria, while the Movement for the Survival of 
Ogoni people (MOSOP) emphasizes the need to return to derivative principles as a way of 
preventing disintegration.94 The questions is, why does the eastern region continue to agitate for 
secession almost five decades after the end of the civil (Biafran) war? Against this background, a 
valid question to ask is what the responses of the eastern region’s interviewees (See Tables 5.15-
5.28) show about their feelings toward the Nigerian government, the causal mechanisms that 
facilitate violent conflicts, and the future of the state. 
  
                                               
92 It is pertinent to note that the two words Ibo and Ibo are synonymous and are used interchangeably throughout this 
analysis. 
93 The Ohaneze Ndigbo refers to the Pan-Ibo nationalist leadership coalition that was formed to harmonize the 
divergent interests of the Ibos groups. Because of the recent call for secession, the IPOB, MASSOB, and other pro-
Ibo movement factions seems to be undermining the role of Ohaneze Ndigbo as the intermediary between the state 
and the Ibo groups. 
94 See Iyana (2018), and Ademoyega (1981) for a robust analysis of socio-economic, and political issues that 
culminated in the incessant agitations for secession by the eastern region.  
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Table 5.16: Demographic Distribution of Survey Interview Respondents  
 
 
According to the demographic distribution table of the eastern participants (Table 5.16), 
40 percent of the respondents are from the eastern region, 75 percent are college educated, and 
58 percent are Christians. On the gender distribution, it is noteworthy that among the eastern 
region respondents, 67 percent are female, and 33 percent are male (See Table 5.16). It has been 
observed that while males from the eastern region dominate representation and hold more offices 
than females, when it comes to political debate or discourse generally the females are more 
visible and outspoken than their male counterparts. Moreover, college educated Ibos are more 
likely to participate in politics than non-college educated Ibos. And as Christianity is the 
dominant religious affiliation in the eastern region, it is understandable that there are more 
Christian participants than Muslims and people of other religious backgrounds. 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
8 4 3 9 7 3 2 12 40
67 33 25 75 58 25 17 100
Total
Percent









The first question posed to the participants was to identify the types of conflicts that 
Nigerians were most afraid of an outbreak. The responses demonstrate that despite the existence 
of common pivotal issues, there were instances in which people of the eastern region had 
different concerns. Hence, the participants reacted differently to each of the conflict types. In 
fact, it is surprising that not a single one type of conflict attracted the interest of 50 percent of the 
eastern interviewees. Even civil war, which garnered the highest attention, only received 42 
percent. The next on the order of concern was Islamic sectarian violence that is fomented by 
Boko Haram, and the Fulbe cattle Herdsmen. On that note, 33 percent believed the fear of 
Islamic sectarian violence was a significant threat to political stability. Moreover, 17 percent 
indicated they were worried mostly about police and security force brutality and military 
offensives against Boko Haram. Only 8 percent of the respondents emphasized ethnic militant 
violence, armed robbery, and kidnapping, and violent protest as types of violence that frightened 
them the most. The concern about police crackdown echoes the fear of the IPOB, MASSOB, and 
MOSOP movement protesters (The Guardian, April 10; 17, 2016). 
  
Types of conflicts
Female Male H S Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Intraethnic conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Civil disobedience 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Armed robbery and kidnapping 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 8
Police and security forces brutality 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 17
Violent protests 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 8
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 17
Islamic Fundamentalism Bokko Harram / Herdsmen 2 2 1 3 3 0 1 4 33
Ethnic Militants Violence 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 8
Civil war 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 5 42
Gender Education  Religious Affiliation Total
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Table 5.18: Salient Conflict Inducing Factors Reported by the Respondents  
 
 
Subsequently, the participants were asked about the factors they believed were the causes 
of violent conflict. Evidently, the ethnic groups in Nigeria have diverse opinions about the causes 
of conflict. One hundred percent of the eastern region participants believed that power sharing, 
ethnic discrimination, and resource revenue allocation were the three most debilitating conflict-
inducing factors. In addition, 83 percent believed that corruption was a major causal factor of 
conflict, and 75 percent opined that environmental pollution was a major trigger of violence. 
Furthermore, 58 percent indicated that fear of Islamization / jihad and electoral malpractice were 
risk factors. However, less than 40 percent of the participants viewed government weakness, 
land, housing, poor or lack of infrastructures, climatic issues/drought, military rule, illiteracy, 
poverty, and water as significant causes (See Table 5.18). As expected, the eastern participants 
did not believe that democracy, modernization, and civil society contributed to violence in 
Nigeria. Given the above, it is not surprising that the five conflict-inducing factors the eastern 
participants considered as the leading threats to political stability were related to power 
Factors
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Democracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Modernization 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Civil society 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Governement weakness 3 1 0 2 1 1 1 3 25
Land 0 2 3 1 2 1 1 4 33
Housing 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 17
Poor or lack of infrastructure 1 3 2 2 3 1 0 4 33
Climatic issues-Drought 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 3 25
Military rule 2 1 1 2 2 0 1 3 25
Illiteracy 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 25
Poverty 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 4 33
Water 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 33
Environmental pollution 5 4 3 6 6 1 2 9 75
Fear of Islamization / Jihad 3 4 3 4 5 0 2 7 58
Electoral malpractices 4 3 2 5 4 2 1 7 58
Power Sharing 8 4 3 9 7 3 2 12 100
Corruption 6 4 2 8 7 1 2 10 83
Ethnic discrimination 8 4 3 9 7 3 2 12 100
Resources revenue allocation 8 4 3 9 7 3 2 12 100
TotalGender Educational  Religious Affiliation
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dominance and resources.95 
Furthermore, most of the eastern participants (including the Ibos and non-Ibos) who 
emphasized power sharing, ethnic discrimination, resource revenue allocation, and 
environmental pollution as the most perilous conflict inducing factors also indicated that their 
main concerns were the survival and justice for their ethnic groups. For the Ibos, the national 
question discourses have been myopic because they often treated the eastern region’s interests 
and grievances as secondary and relegated to the background. The discontent with the lackluster 
approaches of successive administrations have been widely reported.96 Furthermore, as members 
of the Nigerian oil producing states, the easterners believed that the factors they emphasized 
were the most detrimental and that the northern dominated government has deliberately ignored 
them for too long. Therefore, the renewed clamoring for secession stemmed from the 
excruciating effects of oil exploration policy and the neglect of the adverse effects on the oil 
producing areas like the Ogoni and numerous Niger Delta areas, which are further exacerbated 
by the stringent revenue-sharing principle that replaced derivation with need-based principle. 
The discontent expressed by the participants is consistent with the finding by Omitola (2005).97 
Regarding government performance on various issues such as management of the economy, 
corruption, election, justice, and security, the eastern region participants demonstrated mixed 
reactions (See Tables 5.18; 5.19; 5.20; 5.21; 5.22).  
To understand the feelings of the eastern region’s respondents on the divisive issues that 
often trigger and/or accelerate violent conflicts in Nigeria, I introduced questions on indicators 
such as management of the handling of violence, power sharing, resource management, equal 
                                               
95 See Guardian (February 23, 2016) for the explanation of some instances in which the oil producing states of 
eastern region are united in their views against the federal government. 
96 See Source (November 23, 2015) for the grievances of the Ibo people and the reactions of the government to the 
approaches that are adopted by the easterners. 




treatment of all ethnic groups, and power sharing among Nigerians from diverse ethnic groups 
(See Tables 5.23; 5.24; 5.25). It is surprising that a total of 42 percent of eastern respondents 
indicated they were satisfied with the way that government was managing natural resources. This 
group includes 25 percent who were highly satisfied and seventeen percent who showed they 
were somewhat satisfied. However, 50 percent of the eastern region interviewees said they were 
dissatisfied, while 8 percent were unsure (See Table 5.23).  
 
Table 5.19: Government Management of the Economy 
 
 
The economy is the hallmark of state-society and interethnic relationships. The 
participants were asked to show how satisfied they were with government’s management of the 
economy. Astoundingly, only 17 percent of (south) eastern participants were satisfied, 75 percent 
were not satisfied, and 8 percent were unsure (See Table 5.19). Although it was expected that the 
eastern participants would not extol the government’s management of the economy, it is 
shocking that less than 20 percent of the (south) easterners believed that the government’s 
management of the economy was going in the right direction. Moreover, 75 percent non-
satisfactory rating is the highest negative score for the government so far. The eastern region has 
consistently alleged that the government distribution of revenue creates rapidly growing 
economic disparity among the regions. According to the participants, the presidents prior to 1999 
and since 2015 focused more on resources revenue transfer from the oil-producing states of the 
south to develop the northern region. Furthermore, while the south (eastern) participants were 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 2 1 1 0 2 17
6 3 2 7 6 2 1 9 75





Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation Total
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not indiscriminately opposed to some types of wealth transfer, they argued that it should not be 
done perpetually to the detriment of the resource-producing states which is the current trend in 
the management of the economy.  
 
Table 5.20: Government Management of Corruption 
 
 
Despite Nigeria’s enormous wealth the country remains impoverished as a direct 
consequence of endemic corruption that pervades all spheres of politics and economy. So, to 
understand the opinions of the participants I asked them to rate their confidence in the ability of 
the government to manage corruption in its institutions and agencies. The responses were much 
more diverse than expected based on the negative feelings of the easterners toward the 
government on many other issues. Forty-two percent were confident, 33 percent were not 
confident, and 25 percent were unsure (See Table 5.20). It is surprising that the responses of 
eastern region participants on the management of corruption is significantly different from their 
feelings toward the government on the management of the economy. As shown in Table 5.20 the 
high number of those who were unsure makes the number of the those who were confident and 
those who were not confident seem awfully close. It is plausible that the divergent opinions of 
the south-eastern participants on this issue are reactions to how the current Buhari administration 
is combating corruption.  
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total percent
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 17
2 1 1 2 2 0 1 3 25
4 0 1 3 3 1 0 4 33
1 2 0 3 1 1 1 3 25








Table 5.21: Ability of the Government to Conduct Free and Fair Elections 
 
 
Despite the vast population gaps among the regions, south-eastern Nigerans believe it is 
untenable for the northern region to dominate power indefinitely because of its population 
advantage. To learn more about the feelings of the south easterners on this issue, I asked the 
participants to rate their confidence in the ability of the government to conduct free and fair 
elections. Forty-one percent were confident that the government is capable of conducting free 
and fair elections. Among this group 33 percent expressed high confidence, while 8 percent were 
somewhat confident. However, 42 percent of the eastern region participants expressed lack of 
confidence in the government’s ability to conduct free and fair elections. At the same time, 17 
percent of the respondents were unable to specify whether they had confidence in the 
government’s ability to conduct free and fair elections or not. Hence, it is appropriate to ask why 
the eastern respondents are sharply divided. Could this outcome have stemmed from the Ibos’ 
mixed feelings about the current (Buhari) administration, or a cumulation of retrospective 
experiences from previous administrations?  
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 2 1 3 2 1 1 4 33
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 8
4 1 2 3 3 1 1 5 42
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On the issue of national security and political stability the successive post-independent 
administrations have tried and failed. I asked the respondents to rate their confidence in the 
ability of the government to protect citizens and distribute justice equitably. Only 25 percent of 
the eastern interviewees had confidence in the abilities of the government institutions to protect 
Nigerian citizens and distribute justice equitably. Sixty-seven percent did not have confidence, 
and 8 percent were not sure whether government institutions could protect them or distribute 
justice equitably (See Table 5.22). Further, I asked the participants to explain the reasons for 
their opinions. The rationale for the mixed reactions derived from the failure of the constitutional 
assemblies and national constitutional conferences that have been empaneled by successive 
administrations with the mandate to produce comprehensive recommendations that address 
federal character and national integration questions (Adesote and Falowo 2016). Remarkably, 
these organized efforts to the tenacious security problems have consistently produced stop-gap 
measures which have proven insufficient. The implication of lack of confidence in the ability of 
government to protect all ethnic groups equally is that certain ethnic groups may turn inward to 
find protection from their primordial affiliates. 
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 8
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 17
5 3 1 7 5 2 1 8 67
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Table 5.23: Government Handling of Boko Haram and Herders and Farmers Conflicts 
 
 
Continuing with the above, I asked the participants to rate their approval of the 
government’s handling of Boko Haram and Herders versus farmers violence. The majority of 
eastern region participants — 75 percent — disapproved of how the government has handled the 
precariousness created by the menaces of Boko Haram terrorism and Fulani (Fulbe) Herdsmen’s 
rampages. Hence, only 25 percent (17 percent strongly and 8 percent somewhat) approved 
government performance on handling violent extremism and mitigating the disproportionate 
killing of minority ethnic groups and Christians in the north, and indiscriminate killings in the 
south. Accordingly, the virulent behavior of Boko Haram and the Fulbe Herders (Miyetti Allah) 
culminated in northern Hausa/Fulani killings while the government has been either indecisive or 
foot-dragging. The eastern participants faulted the government for weak or inappropriate 
responses that seemed to be emboldening the Boko Haram crusaders and marauding herders. 
This is one of the few indicators in which the citizens expressed their views unequivocally 
(Tables 5.23 and 5.24). Although the south-eastern region has not been affected directly by Boko 
Haram violence, the entire country — especially the south — is enduring the brunt of the 
herders’ rampage. The impacts of the herders’ violence and the federal government response 
have led the south-eastern people to lose confidence in the government. The overall impression 
is that the federal government is more interested in appeasing the Fulani herders than applying 
the force of justice to deter the perpetrators of violence. Hence, the majority of south-eastern 
citizens believe that their region has reasonable justifications to secede from Nigeria.  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 17
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 8
6 3 3 6 6 2 1 9 75
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Table 5.24: Government’s Management of Natural Resources  
 
 
Among all the issues that strained interethnic relationships in Nigeria, the most 
incendiary for the south-eastern people was the government’s management of natural resources. 
To capture their feeling on this issue, I asked the participants to rate their level of satisfaction. In 
response, 42 percent of the participants had confidence, 50 percent did not have confidence, and 
8 percent were unsure. Given that result, it is clear that most of the eastern region respondents 
were not satisfied with the government’s management of natural resources. Moreover, in 
response to further probing, the respondents explained that the injustices surrounding the issue of 
the revenue-sharing formula was one of the most important reasons why they could never trust 
any administration headed by a northerner of Hausa/Fulani origin98. In their opinion, the northern 
elites captured power with the intentions of controlling resources and entrenching a revenue-
sharing formula that placates the greed of the northern elites and their loyal ethnic groups. 
Interestingly, analysts have observed that one of the most controversial issues in the 1995 
transition constitution initiated under the Abacha military administration was the elimination of 
the derivation principle that gives a portion of the accrued mining revenue back to the resource-
producing states on the basis of the proportion of derivation, and the imposition of the principle 
of equality (Phillips and Nyemutu 1998).99  
  
                                               
98 See The Punch (January 25, 1996), Guardian (September 13, 1998), and National Concord (October 2, 1998) for 
detailed discussion on the plights of the eastern region oil producing areas, and how the grievances further led to 
alienation which triggered the onset of violence of different magnitudes.  
99 See Omitola (2005) for more on the dynamics of revenue allocation debates in Nigeria. 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 1 1 2 2 0 1 3 25
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 17
4 2 1 5 4 1 1 6 50
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Table 5.25: Ability of Government to Protect and Treat All Ethnic Groups Equally 
 
 
Table 5.25 shows the divergent views of the south-eastern region on equal treatment of 
divergent ethnic groups. The participants were asked to rate their confidence in the ability of the 
government to protect and treat all ethnic groups equally. Responding to the question, 16 percent 
said they were confident — including those who were highly confident and those who were 
somewhat confident. In contrast, 75 percent of the participants indicated unambiguously that 
they had no confidence in the government’s ability to protect and treat all ethnic groups equally. 
However, 8 percent were unsure whether or not the government could protect and treat all ethnic 
groups equally. Given the fact that most participants had no confidence in the government, the 
criticism coming from the south-eastern region is understandable. Those who expressed 
unequivocal lack of confidence in the government explain that the Nigerian state is a captive of 
the northern Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups and their southern collaborators. Based on that notion, 
they argue that the government is either incapable of protecting and treating all ethnic groups 
equally or is deliberately allowing the status-quo because it is consistent with its political 
calculus designed to entrench Hausa/Fulani power dominance.100 It follows that the messages the 
government sends through its actions and inactions tend to have long-lasting impact on the 
behavior of the various ethnic groups and regions. 
  
                                               
100 See The Vanguard August 12, 3013 and This Day October 26, 2015. 
Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others East Percent
Highly confident 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 8
Somewhat confident 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 8
Not confident 6 3 2 7 6 2 1 9 75




Table 5.26: Government Power Sharing and Inclusion  
 
 
On the issue of power sharing and inclusion, the participants were asked about their level 
of satisfaction with government power sharing and inclusion. Fifty-eight percent of the 
respondents expressed dissatisfaction. Only 25 percent were satisfied, and 17 percent indicated 
they were not sure (See Table 5.26). How does the composition of government cabinet affect the 
views of the Ibos and other ethnic groups in the eastern region? As expected, those who were not 
satisfied with the government’s power-sharing formula argue that the successful Nigerian 
governments, except Obasanjo, Yaradua, and Goodluck administrations, have deliberately 
marginalized the easterners.101 Apparently, the reasons for the ostensible rancor between the 
Hausa-Fulani and the Ibos dates back to the events of the pre-colonial era. It is fair to suggest 
that the incessant marginalization of the Ibo people is reminiscent of events such as the indelible 
coup d’état of January 1966 that was master-minded by the eastern army officers, and the utter 
disregard by the northern-dominated government for the adverse effects of oil extraction in the 
eastern region on the citizens.102 Overall, not only do the south easterners resent the dominance 
of the northern region, but they also despise their own alienation from power. 
  
                                               
101 See The Nation November 15, 2015 and Nigerian Tribune June 6, 2016. 
102 See The Guardian (April 10, 2016) for the debate on “The Ibo question: What Ndigbo want in Nigeria.” 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 17
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 8
5 2 1 6 6 0 1 7 58
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Table 5.27: Confidence in Conflict-Mitigation Role of Civil Society 
 
 
The persistent threat of civil war in Nigeria lends credence to the need for an impartial 
mitigating arbiter. Thus far, the government approaches and efforts to mitigate violence have 
exacerbated rather than reduced conflict. So, turning to the mitigating role of civil society, two 
questions were asked. The questions were whether the participants were confident that civil 
society could mitigate violence, and if they were active participants in community and civil 
society activities (See Tables 5.27 and 5.28). To a great extent, the eastern participants 
demonstrated confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society. Nevertheless, the type of 
organizations that constitute civil society in the eastern region are a mixture of pan-Ibo 
movements and militant groups sharing similar goals but different approaches.103 It is clear that 
the main reason why most of the south-eastern citizens are actively engaged in community and 
voluntary associations is because of their grievances against the federal government for being 
neglected. The problem of many of the south-eastern regional associations is that after several 
years of frustration with the government’s highhandedness they have resorted to an incessant 
demand for secession. Because neither party is showing the political will to compromise, the 
brewing tension tends to inspire violence which could trigger another civil war.  
  
                                               
103 While the elder forum and the title holders among the Ohaneze Ndigbo rely on peaceful approaches including 
petition and negotiation to address the grievances of the south-eastern region, the youth forum prefers 
confrontational approach and seeks to secede from the country rather than negotiating with the federal government. 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
3 2 1 4 3 1 1 5 42
3 1 1 2 3 0 1 4 33
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 17
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Table 5.28: Civil Society Membership  
 
 
As for membership of civil society, I asked the participants to rate their levels of 
involvement in community or voluntary organizations. Interestingly, 66 percent of south-eastern 
participants were involved in some form of community and voluntary organizations’ activities. 
These include 3 percent who were very actively involved, and 33 percent were somewhat active. 
Those who indicated they were not involved in either community or civil society group 
activities, and those who were not sure whether they are involved or not were each 17 percent 
(See Table 5.28). However, while most of the eastern region citizens tend to have more 
confidence in civil society than the central government for conflict-mitigation, their active 
participation in civil society activities beyond the enclave of their communities has been 
hampered by the unorthodox crackdown by the government.104 For instance, while acting under 
the auspices of the chieftain organization component of civil society, “Chiefs have been shot and 
killed, as when the police attacked a village in Imo State that tried to protest the neglect of its 
needs by the oil companies” (Guyer 1994, 220).105 It can be deduced from the above that the 
reason why the south-eastern region has been unsuccessful in the agitation for compensation and 
some control of the resources revenue is because of the sectionalist approaches adopted by the 
                                               
104 See Guardian (October 25, 2015). While the South-East Governors’ Forum (SEGF) caution the various pro-Ibo 
movements against violent confrontation against Nigerian government, they agree unequivocally with the groups 
that the despite the no victor no vanquished declaration at the end of the 30 months civil war in 1970, and various 
constitutional conferences and constituent assemblies, the successive governments had continued to deliberately 
marginalize the eastern region. 
105 See African Concord (1990) for detail explanation for the scenarios under which the government coopted some 
groups and coerced others into submission. 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 2 1 3 2 1 1 4 33
3 1 0 4 2 1 1 4 33
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 17
2 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 17







groups championing the fight for resolution of their grievances.  
 
Table 5.29: Interethnic Coalition for National Integration  
 
 
Pertaining to the question of the prospect for interethnic integration, the eastern 
participants were equally divided.106 Only 25 percent indicated they were very confident. 
Seventeen percent were confident. However, 50 percent signified they were not confident that 
the ethnic groups could integrate. The responses to the probing question that followed shows that 
the 50 percent who expressed lack of confidence in the possibility for interethnic identified 
themselves as Ibos. That is understandable given the fact that the Ibos have consistently agitated 
for secession from Nigeria. Consequently, among the ethnic groups (including in the south-
eastern region) the Ibos are the most alienated ethnic groups in Nigeria. It must be mentioned 
that the reason the Ibos continue to experience greater marginalization than any other ethnic 
group in Nigeria is their inability to forge alliance with other ethnic groups, though other ethnic 
groups in the south-eastern region have not shown willingness to embrace the Ibos secession 
plan. Hence, if all the ethnic groups in the south-eastern region cannot unite because of the fear 
of Ibo domination, it is difficult to expect the rest of the country (especially Hausa-Fulani 
groups) to form a cohesive alliance with the Ibo ethnic groups without reservation. 
                                               
106 See Vanguard (November 7, 2015) Source (November 9, 2015) for the divisions among the Ibo elites on how to 
the elites, Ojukwu, Kanu-Nwazuruike, Ezeife, and Okorocha, factions of IPOB and MASSOB perceive the 
grievances of the Ibos and whether the solution lies in the demand for revival and secession of the defunct Biafra 
from Nigeria.  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 1 1 2 2 0 1 3 25
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 17
4 2 1 5 5 1 0 6 50
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 8








Discussion of the Findings of Analysis II-the (South) Eastern Region 
In light of the above, it is not surprising that most of the eastern region interviewees were 
not concerned about the negative impacts of intraethnic violence and civil disobedience because 
of their adaptation to an inherently acephalous political system (See Table 5.16). A myriad of 
possible events may account for the inconsistent views of the eastern region participants on some 
issues even though they agree on the salient issues. It is important to note that not all the ethnic 
groups in the eastern region support the current clamoring for secession from Nigeria. Perhaps 
one reason for that lack of consensus among the eastern ethnic groups can be traced to the 
argument that even though the name for the proposed country comes from the bight of Biafra or 
Bonny, the Kalabaris, Ijaws, Ogonis, and Ikwere/Etchie have different interests and preferences 
for the process of achieving them.107  
It follows from the above analysis that the interviewees from the south-eastern region 
disapprove of the ways that the government is handling a wide variety of issues. Notable among 
the areas of disagreement are management of the economy, protection of citizens and distribution 
of justice equitably, handling Boko Haram and Herders violence, management of natural 
resources, power-sharing and inclusion.108 Among all of these, the two that affects the easterners 
directly the most are the management of resources and power-sharing and inclusion. The 
majority of the ethnic groups in the eastern region contend that while the government derives 
approximately 90 percent of its foreign earnings from the region, the government neglects the 
negative impacts of oil exploration process on their environment, economy, and quality of life. 
The above can be explained partially by the assertion that “Since economic goals compete with 
                                               
107 See The Guardian (April 10; 17, 2016) for the arguments on the differences between the Ibos and the riverine 
people’s question, and why the Ibos are viewed as detached from their eastern compatriots. This is important 
because of the inconsistencies that inundated the multidimensional framing and reactions to issues relating to 
national question and federal character by the ethnic groups in the eastern region.  
108 See The Guardian (December 2, 2016) for the Ibos’ views on the Islamists’ ferocious attacks and the 
government’s performance on the responsibility to protect.  
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other ones like fair distribution or ethnic balance in most … there can be no optimal set of 
institutions, but only institutions that tend to favor one set of goods over other” (Fukuyama 2004, 
24). Although Fukuyama’s description of African states captures the above phenomena, it seems 
to downplay the enormity of the lopsided nature of Nigerian government policies.  
The question is, why would a government neglect the plight of some of its citizens? That 
question will be addressed in the subsequent sections of this analysis. Nevertheless, it is logical 
to assume that the negative views of the eastern region participants about the government are 
fraught with historical antecedents of interethnic relationships that are laden with what Kaufman 
(2006) describes as symbolic politics. As the interviewees indicated, the asymmetrical treatment 
of ethnic groups which affect the eastern region negatively are rooted in the ethno-regional issues 
such as the events that shaped the decolonization politics, the coup d’états of January and July 
1966, and the civil war (1967-1970) that ended in the defeat of the Biafra Republic.109 Despite 
the famous declaration by the military head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, that in the end 
‘there was no victor no vanquished,’ the easterners believe that they continue to suffer from the 
aggregate of the above events, especially the excruciating defeat (Osaghae 2002). In sum, the 
eastern region citizens harbor many grievances against the Nigerian government.  
 
Analysis III: The (South) Western Region 
The south-western region consists of several ethnic groups, though most see themselves 
as Yorubas or descendants of Oduduwa as there are Yoruba affiliates and non-Yoruba minority 
ethnic groups in the region. As for the Yorubas, it is noteworthy that aside from the various 
distinguishing tribal marks and localized dialects that delineate them, the Yorubas can be aptly 
construed as a monolithic ethnic group, including the Awori, Egba, Ekiti, Ijebu, Remo, Yewa, 
                                               
109 See Osaghae (1992) for detail discussion on ethnic domination and challenges of associated dispersal of power 
under democratic transition. 
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Egbado, Egun, Oyo, Ondo. The affiliated and non-Yoruba ethnic groups are Ijaw, Isoko, Ikwere, 
Edo, Esan, Owan, Ebira, Etsako, Ika, Mumuye, Emai and many others. Important to note, these 
ethnic groups practice different political systems. When it comes to the variants in the political 
systems of Yoruba ethnic groups, Lloyd (1966) writes that, “One could … write a textbook on 
comparative political systems, drawing almost all the examples from the Yoruba” (pp. 549). 
Moreover, literature of Yoruba development is replete with findings on the ability to separate 
economic entrepreneurship and political power in Yoruba land. This reinforces the argument that 
wealth and power are not intricately linked in the Yoruba land. For instance, while the cash crop 
farmers and traders dominated the economy throughout the Yoruba land, the traditional fraternal 
order members including the Ogboni, Osugbo, Oloro, Alawo, Olorisha, and traditional chiefs 
were influential in establishing rules for accession to power, checks and balances, and the 
judicial system. It is noteworthy that the members of these highly influential secret society 
organizations are in most cases relatively poor in the society. 
 
Table 5.30: Demographic Distribution of Survey Interview Respondents  
 
 
According to the demographic distribution of the respondents, participants from the 
south-western region constitute only 23 percent of the interviewees for this dissertation research. 
Among that group 43 percent are female and 57 percent are male. Moreover, 86 percent hold 
college degrees, but the highest educational qualification of the remaining 14 percent is a high 
school certificate. The religious background data showed that 57 percent are Christians, 29 
percent are Muslims, and 14 percent of people of other faiths or non-faith south westerners 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others
3 4 1 6 4 2 1 7 23





Western region Gender Education
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participated in the interview (See Table-5.29). Apparently, the gender gap among the people of 
south-western region is not drastically wide. However, education is a significant determinant of 
political participation among the people of the south-west region. The religious backgrounds of 
the participants seem to accurately reflect the distribution of the south-western region’s 
population. 
 




Table 5.31: presents the views of respondents on the types of conflict that citizens are 
most afraid of an outbreak and the salient conflict-inducing factors. The interviewees were asked 
to point out the types of conflicts which they believed Nigerians were most afraid of an outbreak. 
Based on the responses shown above (See Table 5. 30), it is safe to say that the people of south-
western region did not believe that the outbreak of intra-ethnic conflict, civil disobedience, and 
even violent protests made them less safe. Perhaps their responses are reflections of the extent to 
which the Yoruba-dominated south-western region is largely unaffected by the ramifications of 
violent conflict in the country. However, 29 percent indicated they were concerned of an 
outbreak of civil war, Islamic fundamentalism, Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen violence, and 
police and security force brutality. Moreover, 14 percent of the south-western participants 
Types of Violence
Female Male H S Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Intraethnic conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Civil disobedience 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Armed robbery and kidnapping 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 14.286
Police and security forces brutality 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 28.571
Violent protests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 14.286
Islamic Fundamentalism Bokko Harram / Herdsmen 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 28.571
Ethnic Militants Violence 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 14.286
Civil war 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 28.571
Gender Education Religious Affiliation Total
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indicated they were afraid of the outbreak of armed robbery and kidnapping, ethnic militant 
violence, and a military offensive against Boko Haram. It is noteworthy that throughout this 
research only Muslim respondents mentioned military offensive against terrorism as 
disconcerting, while Christian respondents focused on conflicts they believed had ramifications 
for all citizens irrespective of their social, cultural, or religious backgrounds. Also noteworthy, 
none of the respondents, irrespective of their religious affiliation, were concerned about violent 
protest. Given the above, it seems appropriate to ask why only 25 percent or less were concerned 
about virtually each type of conflict among the south-western participants.  
 
Table 5.32: Salient Conflict Inducing Factors Reported by the Respondents  
 
 
Albeit the south-western people demonstrated that they were not so passionate about an 
outbreak of any particular type of conflict (See Table 5.30), they did have strong opinions about 
the salient causes of violence. Interestingly, all of them (100 percent) stated that resources, 
 Factors
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Democracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Modernization 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 14
Civil society 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Governement weakness 1 2 1 2 2 0 1 3 43
Land 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 29
Housing 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
Poor or lack of infrastructure 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
Climatic issues-Drought 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 14
Military rule 2 4 1 3 3 1 1 5 71
Illiteracy 3 3 1 5 3 2 1 6 86
Poverty 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 43
Unemployment 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 4 57
Water 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 43
Environmental pollution 2 3 1 4 3 1 1 5 71
Fear of Islamization / Jihad 2 4 1 5 4 1 1 6 86
Electoral malpractices 3 4 1 6 4 2 1 7 100
Power Sharing 2 4 1 5 4 1 1 6 86
Corruption 3 4 1 6 5 1 1 7 100
Ethnic discrimination 3 4 1 6 4 2 1 7 100
Resources revenue allocation 3 4 1 6 4 2 1 7 100
TotalGender Educational  Religious Affiliation
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revenue allocation, ethnic discrimination, corruption, and electoral malpractices were the leading 
causes of violence in Nigeria. Moreover, 86 percent indicated that power sharing, Islamization or 
jihad, and illiteracy posed significant threats for violence. And 71 percent believed that military 
rule and environmental pollution caused violent conflict in Nigeria. Further, 57 percent identified 
unemployment, while 43 percent indicated that government weakness, poverty, and water were 
likely causes of violence in Nigeria. Less than 30 percent agreed that modernization, land, 
housing, poor or lack of infrastructure, and climate posed risks to peace and political stability in 
Nigeria. However, none of the people in this group identified democracy as a veritable cause of 
violence in Nigeria. The above table shows that the south-west may not have been affected by 
violence like the other regions. Furthermore, the south-western region participants explained that 
while all the factors are observable, some are mild and incapable of triggering nationwide 
violence. However, they are concerned about the endless contention between the north and the 
south-east because of the potential consequences.  
 
Table 5.33: Government Management of the Economy 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.33, only 43 percent of the participants were satisfied with how the 
government was managing the economy. This number included 29 percent highly satisfied and 
14 percent somewhat satisfied. Moreover, 29 percent were not satisfied, and 29 percent were 
unsure. In sum, there were more south-western respondents who were satisfied by with the 
government’s management of the economy (43) than those who were unsatisfied (29). It is worth 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 29
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 14
1 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 29
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 29
Unsatisfactory
Not sure
Religious Affiliation Total 
Highly Satisfactory
Somewhat Satisfactory
Responses Gender Educational  
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noting that the variation in the responses reflects the diversity of opinion based on gender, 
religious background, and sub-ethnic groups. Furthermore, the participants explained that while 
they understand the connection between the regional and national economy, they also understand 
that the strength of the south-west region economy does not depend on natural resource revenues 
(Post and Vickers 1973). To be sure, they argue that while the impoverished national economy 
relies heavily on oil exportation, the southwest economy relies on non-oil sectors. 
 
Table 5.34: Government Management of Corruption in its Institutions and Agencies 
 
 
On the government’s management of corruption, I asked the participants to rate their 
confidence on government performance. Interestingly, the majority (58 percent) of south-west 
respondents showed confidence in the government’s management of corruption. That includes 29 
percent who were highly confident and another 29 percent who were somewhat confident, while 
only 29 percent had no confidence in the government’s management of corruption. Accordingly, 
as the anti-corruption agencies continue in their efforts at dismantling the structure of systemic 
corruption, the perpetrators have simply devised more surreptitious tactics that are difficult to 
detect. Moreover, the anti-corruption agencies have also come under scrutiny for adopting 
double-standard approaches in dealing with loyalists and antagonists of the administration.110 
                                               
110 It has been alleged that under the People Democratic Party (PDP) led administrations of presidents Obasanjo, 
Yaradua, and Goodluck the anti-corruption selectively agencies targeted all culprits except for the notable members 
of PDP. Since, Buhari assumed power in 2015, the tide of discriminatory war on corruption has shifted against 
suspects but those that are loyalists of All Progressive Party (APP). 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 29
0 2 0 1 2 0 0 2 29




Religious Affiliation Region of Origin
Highly confident
Responses Gender Educational  
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Above all, an irrefutable fact is that despite its deficiencies the government is showing more 
political will to combat corruption.  
 
Table 5.35: Ability of the Government to Conduct Free and Fair Elections 
 
 
As the outcome of elections is pivotal to state-society relationships, I asked the 
participants to rate their confidence in the ability of the government to conduct free and fair 
elections. Table 5.35 shows that most of the south-western participants had significant trust in 
the government. Accordingly, 71 percent were highly confident, and 14 percent were somewhat 
confident that the government has the ability to conduct free and fair elections. In sum, only 14 
percent disagreed. Remarkably, the south-west participants demonstrated their confidence in the 
government’s ability to conduct free and fair elections despite challenges with the outcomes of 
virtually all the post-independent elections prior to 1999. Historically, the north dominated the 
national government for a period spanning 1960-1966, while the south-western and south-eastern 
regions were relegated to mere junior partners or insignificant back-benchers. Exacerbating the 
relationship further was the Hausa-Fulani cabal efforts at consolidating its monopolization of 
power between 1960-1975 and 1983-1999. Thus, it is important to note that out of nearly six 
decades of self-rule (1960-2019), the southerners — east and west — have been presidents or 
military heads of state for a period of sixteen years and three months (West, General Obasanjo, 
1976-1979; Interim National Chairman Ernest Shonekan, August 27-November 17, 1993; and 
President Obasanjo, 1999-2007. East, General Aguiyi Ironsi, January-July 1966, and Jonathan 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 4 1 4 3 1 1 5 71
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 14
1 5 0 1 1 0 0 1 14





Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation Total
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Goodluck, 2010-2015). However, the northerners have dominated power for over forty-two 
years. Paradoxically, while the south-eastern region shows frustration with the electoral system 
and processes that often guarantee northern dominance, the south-west seems unconcerned.  
 




When asked about the confidence of the participants in the ability of the government’s 
institutions to protect citizens and distribute justice equitably, their reactions showed that most 
south westerners had no confidence in the government on this issue. As illustrated in Table 5.35, 
only 28 percent of the interviewees had confidence in the government institutions’ ability to 
protect citizens and distribute justice equitably. Among those who trusted the government’s 
institutions only 14 percent indicated high trust while the remaining 14 percent somewhat trusted 
the government. Similarly, 43 percent did not have confidence in the government’s institutions, 
and 29 percent were neutral. Given that the justice system is one of the institutions of 
government that remains deeply infested with corruption and favoritism, a vast majority of 
citizens do not have confidence in the justice system.  
  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 14
1 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 14
1 1 0 2 1 0 1 3 43
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 29
Religious Affiliation Region of Origin
Highly  confident
Somewhat confident





Table 5.37: Government Handling of Boko Haram and Herders and Farmers Conflicts 
 
 
On the government’s handling of Boko Haram and the Herders violence, a majority of 
the participants disapproved. Responding to the question on how they would rate the 
government’s handling of the violence, 57 percent signified that they disapproved, 14 percent 
were not sure, and only 29 percent approved (See Table 5.37). Despite that both Christianity and 
Islam are popular religions among the south-west region population, most citizens wanted 
government to curtail the violence. Unfortunately, the problem seems to be growing stronger as 
the country endures increased violence. For instance, it has been noted that both Obasanjo’s and 
Goodluck’s administrations were able to curtail the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) and the 
Niger Delta militants, but it seems as if the Buhari administration has failed in the handling of 
the ferocious Herders’ violence that discriminately targets southerners.111 The Buhari 
administration’s responses to different crises shows its priorities. For instance, while the 
government relocated many military garrisons and anti-riot police battalions to the troubled 
north-eastern and north-western zones to combat Boko Haram, its bizarre response to 
Fulbe/Miyetti Allah herders’ violence in the south was the introduction of the National Grazing 
                                               
111 See The Guardian (March 5, 2006), This Day (May 8, 2001), and Comet (May 20, 2001). Accordingly, Obasanjo 
Administration displayed primacy of national interest over regional interests by arresting the southern militant 
groups including Fredrik Fasehun and Gani Adams of OPC; Mujaheed Dokubo-Asari of the Niger Delta Peoples’ 
volunteer Force; and Ralph Uwazurike of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB). Contrarily, when many serving and retired military officers of northern ancestry founded the Arewa 
People Congress (APC)  as the militant wing of the Northern People Consultative Forum, the southern region was 
terrified, but the government has never taken any action against the fear of the south about that powerful ethno-
religious military buildup. Similarly, there was never any attempt to reign in on the Sharia Army. These are some of 
the reasons why ethnic groups do not trust the state to act as an impartial coordinator.  
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 3 0 4 2 1 1 4 57
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 14







Reserve bill that disposes southerners of their lands and reward the assailants, the Fulani 
herdsmen, with fortified and well-equipped grazing reservations and routes exclusively 
preserved for them.  
The plight of the southerners who have been suffering at the behest of Miyetti Allah has 
yet to rise to a national emergency, but the shortage of forage for individual northern Fulani 
cattle herders was classified by the government as a national emergency. In sum, the south-
western participants believe that the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups are strategically plotting to 
create what has been dubbed Fulani cow colonies in all states of the federation. The implication 
is that Hausa-Fulanis will claim hegemony in all states as with the case of the Ilorin Kwara state 
where the Hausa-Fulani hired warriors turned sojourners to overthrow Afonja and set up an 
emirate system in Ilorin (O’Hear 1997). Considering the Ilorin example, the fear of the citizens 
of the southern regions about the likelihood of a violent conquest and annexation of their towns, 
cities, and states by the Fulani Herders is legitimate. Furthermore, the mixed messages from the 
government seem consistent with an ethnicized or selective approach by the government that 
incentivizes a lack of confidence and trust among the people. 
 
Table 5.38: Government’s Management of Natural Resources  
 
 
Then I asked the participants to rate their satisfaction with the government’s management 
of natural resources. Surprisingly, the south-western participants’ views on the management of 
natural resources show that the majority (58 percent) were satisfied. Twenty-nine percent were 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percentage
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 29
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 14










highly satisfied, 29 percent were somewhat satisfied, and 29 percent were neutral. Overall, only 
14 percent of the participants were dissatisfied (See Table 5.38). As a follow-up, I asked the 
participants to explain the reasons behind their opinions. The respondents explained that 
constitutionally, the control and management of natural resources is the exclusive responsibility 
of the federal government.  
So, in their view the states and regions that challenge the legitimacy of government 
control of the natural resources are violating the constitution of the federation. Furthermore, they 
asserted that overreliance on resource revenue was the origin of the protracted civil war (1967-
1970) that devastated the south-eastern region. In the opinion of those who responded that they 
were unsure, both the north and south-eastern region must look elsewhere for economic 
development. The participants who were unsatisfied pointed out that though the dependence on 
oil revenue as the only source of sustenance is dangerous for the south-eastern region, the federal 
government has been unfair in the way it addresses the grievances of the environmental crises 
that are destroying the south-eastern region as a result of oil drilling activities. It is imperative to 
note that the south-west regional economy has always been driven by internally generated 
revenue (IGR) rather than resource-revenue share.  
 
Table 5.39: Ability of Government to Protect and Treat All Ethnic Groups Equally 
 
 
Like the question on Boko Haram and herders’ violence, the south-western region 
participants were asked to rate their confidence in the ability of government to protect and treat 
Responses Gender Educational  Religious Affiliation Region of Origin
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
Highly confident 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 14
Somewhat confident 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
Not confident 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 29
Not sure 0 2 0 2 1 1 0 2 29
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all ethnic groups equally. It is striking that only 43 percent of the south-west interviewees were 
confident the government had the ability to protect and treat all ethnic groups equally. However, 
29 percent said they were not confident, and 29 percent were neutral (See Table 5.39). Follow-up 
discussions with these participants showed a nearly-equal split of opinions among them reflects a 
deep-rooted division among the people from the south-west that stemmed from the issue of 
political alliance with the northern region during the first republic era.112 Those who were 
confident that the government could protect and treat ethnic group equally argued that although 
each of the successive administrations have demonstrated some level of ethnocentrism, at the 
same time they have made concerted efforts to protect all ethnic groups. Those who did not have 
confidence argued that a government cannot be ethnocentric and at the same time protect and 
treat all ethnic groups equally. Evidently, ethnocentrism is an inherent attribute of every 
administration. The question is, can a government be biased and yet protect all ethnic groups 
equally? Apparently, more than 40 percent of the participants believe that it is possible.  
 
Table 5.40: Government Power Sharing and Inclusion  
 
 
One of the leading grievances against the government in multiethnic states is the extent to 
which the government includes or excludes different ethnic groups. So, I asked the participants 
to rate their levels of satisfaction with the government’s power sharing and inclusion. 
                                               
112 See Daily Champion (November 1, 2005) Accordingly, the reason there continues to be an increase in the 
number of ethnic militias is that the different ethnic groups have different feelings about the capability and 
intentions of the national police force. The ethnic groups of the southern region opted for self-determination and 
thus the emergence of OPC, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, and others. 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
2 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
0 2 0 2 1 1 0 2 29
1 1 0 2 2 0 0 2 29










Surprisingly, 58 percent of the south-west participants responded that they were satisfied. 
Twenty-nine percent were not satisfied, and 14 percent were unsure (See Table 5.40). 
Considering the favorable views of the majority of the participants, it is important to find out if 
the people of the south-western region are satisfied with the proportion of power sharing and 
inclusion as it affects them under all post-independence administrations or just the Obasanjo, 
Yaradua, and Buhari administrations. What can be gleaned from the above is that the south-
western participants may have been influenced by their experiences under administrations that 
are affiliated with pro-southwest political parties.  
 
Table 5.41: Confidence in the Conflict-Mitigation Role of Civil Society 
 
 
To understand the feelings of the participants on the importance of civil society, I asked 
them to rate their confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society. The responses to this 
question are by far the most outstanding as 86 percent of the participants unequivocally answered 
that they had confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society. Only 14 percent said they 
were not confident and there was no neutral response. The positive feedback on this issue reflects 
the experiences of the people of the south-western region stemming from the role that civil 
society played in numerous conflicts that have beset the region since 1960. That viewpoint has 
been corroborated by the participants’ responses to the follow-up question. It was civil society 
that confronted the iron-fist rule of the colonialists. The same civil society pressured the various 
military administrations to relinquish power and reinstate democratic rule. Therefore, civil 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 3 0 4 2 1 1 4 57
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 29
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 14
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Religious Affiliation Region of Origin
Highly confident
Somewhat confident





society has demonstrated credibility and capability to use both confrontation and facilitate 
cooperation among competing or warring factions by holding each party accountable to 
negotiated compromises.  
However, the success of civil society depends on its ability to extend its purview beyond 
the terrain of a section of the political arena. That accounts partially for the relative success of 
prodemocracy groups in their efforts at engendering peaceful transition from military 
dictatorship to democratic rule in 1999 and many national reconciliation efforts that followed. It 
is important to note that most of the associations that eventually formed the civil society 
coalition that accomplished the above-mentioned successes evolved from the grassroots 
community and voluntary associations from the south-west region. The question that follows is, 
does the confidence in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society translate into participation or 
support for civil society activities? 
 
Table 5.42: Civil Society Membership  
 
 
Table 5.42 reflects the participant responses to the question of civil society membership. I 
asked the participants to rate their involvement in any community or voluntary organization’s 
activities. The responses of the participants from the south-west corroborate their positive 
perception about the conflict-mitigation role of civil society (See Table 5.40). Seventy-two 
percent of the participants indicated that they were actively involved in different community 
groups’ activities. In contrast, 14 percent did not participate in community or voluntary 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 43
1 1 0 2 2 0 0 2 29
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 14
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 14
Religious Affiliation Region of Origin
Very active
Somewhat active





association’s activities, and 14 percent were neutral (See Table 5.42). Therefore, it is clear that 
the confidence the south-west participants have in the conflict-mitigation role of civil society is 
corroborated with their level of being engaged in civil society activities. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the south-west region is relatively the most peaceful among the three regions in Nigeria, 
save for the recent incursion of the Fulani/Fulbe into the southern regions to perpetrate what 
many suspected to be an attempt to implement the final phase of Hausa-Fulani domination 
through Islamic jihad.  
 
Table 5.43: Interethnic Coalition for National Integration  
 
 
The most crucial question the participants were asked centers around the prospects for 
interethnic coalition for national integration and preservation of peaceful coexistence. The goal is 
to examine the confidence of the south-west region in the willingness and determination of 
Nigerians to coalesce toward achieving formidable national integration. Asked to rate their 
confidence in interethnic coalition for national integration, the south-west participants were 
surprisingly not as optimistic about the prospect for national integration in Nigeria as expected. 
Only 43 percent of the participants were confident. Twenty-nine percent lacked confidence, and 
29 percent did not indicate whether they had confidence or not (See Table 5.43). Overall, the 
participants were not optimally confident that the disparate but composite ethnic groups in 
Nigeria are capable of national integration. Remarkably, if more than half of the participants 
cannot unequivocally assert their confidence in the prospects for national integration despite their 
Female Male High School Degree Christianity Islam Others Total Percent
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 14
1 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 29
1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 29




Religious Affiliation Region of Origin
Very confident
Responses Gender Educational  
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moderate support for the government on many other issues, what does that tell us about how the 
region might react to another civil war in the country? As evident from Table 5.43, 58 percent 
were not confident that the ethnic groups in Nigeria could develop cohesive national integration. 
Given this finding it is essential to explore why the participants’ confidence on this issue is low. 
Therefore, I asked the respondents to explain why they were not optimistic that the ethnic groups 
could coalesce for national integration. The group’s explanations showed that the crux of 
interethnic contention in Nigeria is power dominance and resource control. Interestingly, despite 
the adoption of a rotational presidency compromise, the contention between Hausa-Fulani and 
the ethnic groups from the oil-producing states continues unabated.  
 
Discussion of the Findings of Analysis III-the South (Western) Region 
From the above analysis of the western region, certain deductions are conceivable. To 
start with, gender and religion have no significant impact one way or the other on the viewpoints 
of the participants. The responses and narratives of the south-west participants suggest that the 
region is moderate in all its approaches. For instance, their responses to the interview questions 
show that they do not take sides with either the Hausa-Fulani dominated government or the 
south-east region. This is evident in their expression of confidence and satisfaction for the 
government’s performance on some issues and negative feedback on others. The issues on which 
they are confident or satisfied with the government’s performance include the management of 
the economy, handling of corruption, ability to conduct free and fair elections, management of 
natural resources, and power sharing and inclusion (See Tables 5.33; 5.34; 5.37 and 5.39). 
Conversely, the participants expressed a lack of confidence or satisfaction with the government 
on issues such as ability to protect citizens and distribute justice equitably, protection and 
treatment of all ethnic groups equally, and handling of Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen 
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violence in the country. Nor are they optimistic about the prospects for interethnic integration 
(See Tables 5.32; 5.35; 5.36; 5.38; 5.42). Evidently, these issues are tenacious impediments that 
are likely to accelerate any outbreak of violence.  
Based on the participants’ narratives, the south-west occupies a middle space in the 
Nigerian political arena for two reasons. First, most south-western elites rely on the dictates of 
the constitution regarding the pursuance of social, economic, and political equity. Thus, for 
south-western citizens, access to resources and power must be based on the working principles of 
the union. So, they encourage their fellow citizens to respect the federal principles and laws of 
the country. In fact, in many of the instances of dispute with the government the south-west 
adopted non-confrontational means of resolving those issues with the federal government. This 
accounts partly for the reason the participants showed mixed reactions to the vigilante tactics of 
the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), but overwhelmingly showed support for civil society 
groups including associations like Campaign for Democracy (CD), the National Democratic 
Coalition (NADECO), and other grassroots associations.113  
In sum, based on the participants’ explanations, it was the mitigating role of civil society 
that has kept the country from descending into another civil war. It is the view of the south-west 
participants that the current administration is ineffective in handling the issues that trigger or 
accelerate violence, and civil society is the intervening factor that has thus far protected the 
country from conflict outbreak.  
 
                                               
113 See Nigerian Tribune (July 13, 2000), Comet (May 20, 2001), and The Guardian (March 5, 2006). Accordingly, 
the Oodua People’s Congress was formed on August 29, 1994 as the militant wings of the pan Yoruba to defend, 
protect, and promote socio-cultural interest of the Yorubas. The formation came as a reaction to ethnically-inspired 
police force brutality perpetrated against the civil society and community groups that were protesting the annulment 
of the June 12, 1993 presidential election and Abacha’s fascist rule.  
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Analysis IV: Bivariate/Descriptive Statistics 
In support of the fieldwork interviews, I analyzed twelve questions contained in the 
Afrobarometer dataset 2017 on Nigeria. In the analysis I used bivariate statistics (chi-square) to 
test the relationships between regions and the responses of participants to the selected questions. 
The responses are defined and coded in stata using the exact coding that are available in the 
Afrobarometer codebook.114 The purpose of this quantitative analysis is to further examine the 
feelings and opinions of Nigerians about their government by region. The goal of this 
quantitative analysis is to support or refute the initial findings and narratives derived from the 
fieldwork interviews on the relationships between changes in government policies, performance, 
and violence.  
The Afrobarometer respondents are Nigerians from the three regions — namely the 
north, south-east, and south-west — and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Of 1600 total 
respondents, 760 are from the north, 472 are from the south-east, 352 are from the south-west 
region, and 16 are from the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), also known as Abuja.  
  
                                               
114 See Appendix A, section D for the definition of variables and codes used for the chi-square analysis. 
159 
 
Table 5.44: Participation in Community Activities 
 
 
It has been observed that civil society was the vanguard of good governance in Nigeria 
(Ihonvebere 2002). Their activities entailed participation in community activities and resistance 
against any form of misrule (Mongrue 2016). Table 5.44 above shows the results of the chi-
square test for whether there is a statistical relationship between the participants’ region and their 
opinion on participation in community activities. Based on this result the association between the 
two phenomenon is statistically significant, c2 (15, N = 1600) = 81.05, p < 0.000.115 This 
analysis examines the null hypotheses (H0) that there is no association between region and level 
of involvement in community meeting. Because the c2 81.05 exceeds critical value (24.996) and 
the p value < 0.05 I rejected the HO. This implies that there is an association between region and 
opinion of citizens about participation in community meetings, Creamér’s V = 0.129. Looking at 
the percentages, the first column shows that 42.69 percent of the northerners surveyed said they 
would not participate in community meeting, but only 20.95 percent of the south-easterners and 
                                               
115 See Acock (2014, 131) A Gentle Introduction to Stata (Fourth Edition) for detail explanation on percentages and 
measure of association.  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
108               
42.69
53           
20.95
87            
34.39
5                 
1.98
253         
100.00
239               
49.28
117          
24.12
121          
24.95
8                
1.65
485           
100.00
124               
47.33
77           
29.39
60              
22.9
1                  
0.38
262         
100.00
153                     
43.71
145           
41.43
50            
14.29
2                
0.57
350         
100.00
134                        
54.03
80             
32.26
34            
13.71
0            
0.00
248         
100.00
2                       
100.00
0                
0.00
0                 
0.00
0                 
0.00
2             
100.00
760           
47.50
47           
29.50
352            
22.00
16               
1.00






                 Regions of Participants' Origin 
Response Options
No,  would never do this
No, but would if I had the chance 
Yes , once or twice
How frequently do citizens participate in community meetings?
 Pearson chi2 (15)  =  81.0550     Pr  =   0.000 
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36.94 percent of the south westerners shared similar view.  
 
Table 5.45: Participation in Demonstrations and Protests 
 
 
In Table 5.45 I tested the null hypothesis (H0) that there is no association between region 
and levels of involvement in demonstrations and protests against the government’s ineptitude. 
The table of the chi-square analysis result shows that the c2 (15, N = 1600) = 46.52, p < 0.001 is 
statistically significant. The c2 46.52 is greater than the critical value (24.996), so I rejected the 
null hypothesis. Given the fact that p value < 0.05, the relationship between region and 
participation in demonstrations and protests is statistically significant. 40.57 percent of the 
northerners, 28.68 percent of the south-easterners, and 29.20 percent of the south-westerners 
indicated that they do not participate in demonstrations and protests. Paradoxically, the 
percentages also show that the northern region is more likely to participate in protests and 
demonstrations than the south-eastern and the south-western region.  
  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
157          
40.57
111            
28.68
113          
29.20
6                 
1.55
387         
100.00
339           
45.50
235                   
31.54
166           
22.28
5             
0.67
745              
100.00
109              
51.90
59             
28.10
41             
19.52
1                     
0.48
210               
100.00
86             
57.33
42             
28.00
18             
12.00
4                
2.67
150            
100.00
68             
64.15
24              
22.64
14                                       
13.21
0     
0.00
106          
100.00
1           
50.00
1                
50.00
0             
0.00
0                
0.00
2               
100.00
760           
47.50
472            
29.50
352            
32.00
16               
1.00





                         Regions of Participants' Origin 
Response Options
No,  would never do this
No, but would if I had the chance 
Yes , once or twice
Yes, several times
How frequently do citizens participation in demonstration and protests?
 Pearson chi2 (15)  =  46.5258    Pr  =   0.000 
161 
 
Table 5.46: How Free and Fair was the Last General (2015) Election 
 
 
The opinions of participants about the conduct of the 2015 general election provides a 
veritable opportunity for understanding the variations. So, this research examined the null 
hypothesis that there is no association between region and perception about the freeness and 
fairness of the general election. The results are c2 (12, N = 1600) = 295.48, p < 0.001 (See Table 
5.46). Moreover, the c2 295.48 exceeds the critical value (21.026). So, I rejected the null 
hypothesis. Interestingly, among those who believed the election was neither free nor fair, 69.68 
percent are from south east, 20.21 percent are northerners, and 9.57 percent are south westerners. 
However, 59. 75 percent of northerners, 8.66 percent of south easterners, and 31.59 percent of 
south westerners believe that the general election of 2015 was completely free and fair.  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
38                    
20.21
131        
69.68                   
18          
9.57
1             
0.53
188          
100.00
383                    
45.76
283        
33.81
156          
18.64
15          
1.79
837          
100.00
331        
59.75
48           
8.66
175        
31.59 
0              
0.00
554          
100.00 
0             
0.00
2          
100.00
0             
0.00
0             
0.00
2           
100.00
8            
42.11
8             
42.11 
3          
15.79
0              
0.00
19          
100.00
760      
47.50
472          
29.50
352         
22.00
16          
1.00
1,600        
100.00
                              Regions of Participants' Origin 
Response Options
Not free and fair
Free and fair with minor problems
Completely free and fair
Do not understand question
Don't know
Total
How free and fair was the last general (2015) election
 Pearson chi2 (12)  =   295.4823     Pr  =   0.000 
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Table 5.47: Trust in the President 
 
 
Table 5.47 presents the results of the chi-square analysis that tests the association 
between the levels of trust in the president and region. The null hypothesis for the test is that 
there is no association between region and trust in the president. The results indicate a statistical 
significance, c2 (12, N = 1599) = 459.03, p < 0.001. The c2 value exceeds the critical value 
(21.02), thus, the null will be rejected. The fourth column of the chi-square results shows that 
80.87 percent of northerners, 6.74 percent of south easterners, and 11.74 percent of south 
westerners reported that they have a lot of trust in the president. Conversely, the first column 
shows that only 16.95 percent of northerners indicated that they have no trust in the president 
compared to 56.07 percent of the south easterners and 25.94 percent of south westerners. It 
follows from the above chi-square results that the northerners support the president even though 
the rest of the country does not. Therefore, it is likely that the northern region’s support is 
influenced by ethno-regional preferences.  
  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
81                     
16.95
268         
56.07
124          
25.94 
5              
1.05 
478           
100.00
160          
39.60
124        
30.69
116          
28.71
4              
0.99
404          
100.00
146          
58.40
47         
18.80
53           
21.20
4              
1.60
250          
100.00
372       
80.87
31          
6.74
54          
11.74
3            
0.65
460           
100.00
1           
14.29
2            
28.57
4            
57.14
0            
0.00
7              
100.00
760          
47.53
472          
29.52
351           
21.95
16              
1.00
1,599        
100.00
Just a little







Ho much do you trust the President ?
 Pearson chi2 (12)  =   459.0322     Pr  =   0.000 
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Table 5.48: Trust in the National Assembly 
 
 
The chi-square table above (Table 5.48) shows the results of the tests of the relationship 
between region of origin and citizens’ views about the national assembly. The null hypothesis 
(H0) is that there is no association between region of origin and citizens’ levels of trust in the 
national assembly. The c2 (12, N = 1599) = 205.64, p < 0.001 is less than 0.05. The c2 value 
exceeds the critical value (21.02), thus, the HO will be rejected. Reviewing the first column for 
those who have “no trust at all” in the national assembly it seems that there is no statistical 
significance between the regions and participants’ levels of trusts for national assembly (the 
south eastern 35.45 percent, northern 30.12 percent, and south western 33.29 percent). However, 
based on the fourth column that shows the proportions for “a lot of trust” in national assembly 
the comparison of south easterners 19.17 percent, northerners 72.50 percent, and south 
westerners 7.50 percent, shows that the northerners have more trust in the national assembly than 
the south-eastern and the south-western regions combined, which supports the assumption that 
the views of the citizens are influenced by their ethno-regional bias. 
  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
209          
30.12
246                 
35.45
231          
33.29
8              
1.15
694           
100.00
267          
52.98
159          
31.55
74            
14.68
4                   
0.79
504                  
100.00
189          
71.32
42          
15.85
31          
11.70
3                
1.13
265            
100.00
87           
72.50
23          
19.17
9              
7.50
1              
0.83
120          
100.00
8            
50.00
2            
12.50
6            
37.50
0             
0.00
16           
100.00
760          
47.53
472          
29.52
351          
21.95
16           
1.00
1,599            
100.00








 Pearson chi2 (12)  =   205.6428     Pr  =   0.000 
How much do you trust the National Assembly
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Table 5.49: Trust in the Police 
 
 
A chi-square test for the probability of an association between region and citizens’ trust 
was found to be statistically significant, c2 (12, N = 1600) =330.64, p < .05 (See Table 5.49). 
The c2 =330.64 exceeds the critical value (21.026), so the null hypothesis is rejected. It is 
glaring from the first column that among those who have “no trust at all” in the police 40.16 
percent are south easterners, 33.12 percent are south westerners, and only 25.68 percent are 
northerners. In contrast, the fourth column shows that among those who have “a lot of trust” in 
the police, 70.86 percent are northerners compared with 19.87 percent south easterners and 9.27 
percent south westerners. The apparent polarization of the northern and southern regions along ‘a 
lot of trust’ and ‘no trust’ indicates citizens are indisputably influenced by differences in their 
relationships and experiences with the ‘national’ police. Therefore, irrespective of whether the 
police performance is efficient or not, it is not arbitrary to infer that the northerners are likely to 
trust the police more than the southerners.  
  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
197       
25.68
308         
40.16
254           
33.12
8              
1.04
767       
100.00
233          
58.40
108            
27.07
55           
13.78
3              
0.75
399         
100.00
218              
80.15
23              
8.46
26                
9.56
5                 
1.84
272         
100.00
107             
70.86
30           
19.87
14             
9.27
00                     
0.00
151          
100.00
5             
45.45
3               
27.27
3               
27.27
0              
0.00
11             
100.00
760                   
47.50
472           
29.50
352             
22.00
16              
1.00








                         Regions of Participants' Origin 
Response Options
How much do you trust the Nigerian Police?
 Pearson chi2 (12)  =   330.6458     Pr  =   0.000 
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Table 5.50: Trust in the Court 
 
 
To learn whether citizens’ trust in the court is contingent upon region of origin or not, I 
applied a chi-square test. The null hypothesis is that there is no association between region of 
citizens and how much they trust the courts. The test results as shown in Table 5.50 are c2 (12, N 
= 1600) = 237.27, p < 0.05. Furthermore, the c2 =237.27 exceeds the critical value (21.026), so 
the null hypothesis is rejected. The first row shows the south-west region has the highest distrust 
for the courts at 38.96 percent followed by the south-eastern region with 37.97 percent, and only 
21.78 percent for the northern region. Among those that said they trust the court a lot, the 
northern region has the highest trust in the courts with 67.12 percent.  
  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
88            
21.84
153            
37.97
157                 
38.96
5                
1.24
403           
100.00
234              
42.94
190            
34.86
115            
21.10
6              
1.10
545         
100.00
278             
67.48
73                     
17.72
57             
13.83
4             
0.97
412          
100.00
149                         
67.12
52             
23.42
20             
9.01 1           0.45
222         
100.00
0              
0.00
0             
0.00
1                  
100.00
0              
0.00
1                  
100.00
11           
64.71
4              
23.53
2          
11.76
0               
0.00
17          
100.00
760         
47.50
472             
29.50
352         
22.00
16            
1.00











How much trust do you have in the court?
 Pearson chi2 (15)  =   237.2778     Pr  =   0.000 
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Table 5.51: Government Handling of the Economy 
 
 
Management of the economy is one of the most crucial issues in multiethnic states 
because of the asymmetrical impact it bears on diverse groups. Because of the prevailing 
arguments that economic policies benefit the regions unequally, I used chi-square analysis to test 
the null hypothesis that there is no association between region and approval of government 
management of the economy. The chi-square test results show that the relationship is statistically 
significant, c2 (12, N = 1600) = 265.82, p < 0.001. The c2 = 265.82 exceeds the critical value 
(21.026), so the null hypothesis is rejected. The first column of the table shows the proportion of 
citizens per region who rate the government performance as ‘very bad.’ The south-east tops the 
list with 43.22 percent. However, the fourth column shows that for those who say that 
government management of the economy is going ‘very well’ the northern region gives the 
highest approval with 83.17 percent. In contrast, only 8.91 percent of south-eastern respondents 
and 7.92 percent of south-western respondents believe the same.  
  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
191            
28.17
293        
43.22
187            
27.58
7              
1.03
678         
100.00
176         
45.24          
111            
28.53
97            
24.94
5             
1.29
389           
100.00
299            
79.19
57            
13.57
60         
14.29
4                 
0.95
420           
100.00
84            
83.17
9            
8.91
8             
7.92
0                  
0.00
101           
100.00
10           
90.91
1              
9.09
0            
0.00
0             
0.00
11       
100.00 
760       
47.53
471            
29.46
352             
22.01
16            
1.00
1,599       
100.00Total
How well or badly is the government handling of the economy?
Don’t  know






 Pearson chi2 (12)  =   265.8240     Pr  =   0.000 
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Table 5.52: Government Management of Corruption  
 
 
In Table 5.52 chi-square statistics were calculated to examine if there is a relationship 
between the regions of citizens and their opinion about the government’s management of 
corruption in Nigeria. The chi-square statistics test the null hypothesis that there is no association 
between region and opinion of citizens about government management of corruption. The test 
result shows statistical significance in the association between region and diverse opinions about 
government management of corruption, c2 (12, N = 1600) =163.84, p < .05. To be sure, c2 = 
163.84 exceeds the critical value (21.026), df = 12, p < .05. Hence, we reject the H0. The results 
table (first column) shows that those citizens who view government handling of corruption as 
‘very badly’ are 24.93 percent northerners, 52.75 percent south-easterners, and 21.74 percent 
south-westerners. However, the fourth column shows that among those who view management 
of corruption as going “very well,” 64.56 percent are northerners, 16.77 percent are south 
easterners, and 18.75 percent are south westerners.  
  
North South-East South-West FCT Total
86               
24.93
182         
52.75
75                                                              
21.74




133       
42.61
93            
30.49
78                  
25.57
1            
0.33
305             
100.00
331              
52.96
141                    
22.56
143                 
22.88
10          
1.60
625                
100.00
204          
64.56
53           
16.77
56                 
17.72
3                
0.95
316            
100.00
6                   
66.67
3                                            
33.33
0        
0.00
0             
0.00
9              
100.00
760                                                           
47.50




16            
1.00
1,600       
100.00
 Pearson chi2 (12)  =   163.8419     Pr  =   0.000 











Table 5.53: Government Handling of Violence 
 
 
Because of the widespread nature of violence, its ferocious impacts, and implications for 
interethnic relationships, I examined the opinions of citizens by region using chi-square statistics. 
The null hypothesis for the test is that there is no association between regions of citizens and 
their views about the government’s handling of violence in Nigeria. The results show statistical 
significance, c2 (12, N = 1600) =156.86, p < .05. Also, the c2 exceeds the critical value 
(21.026), so we rejected the null hypothesis. The first column of the chi-square results table 
shows the percentages for those who believe that government handling of violence is going “very 
badly.” The distributions of this group are 48.94 percent south-eastern, 29.91 percent northern, 
and 20.54 percent south-western citizens. That implies that the eastern region disapproves of the 
government’s handling of violence much more than the north and south-western regions. On the 
other hand, the fourth column provides proportions by region for those who believe that 
government is handling prevention and resolution of violent conflicts “very well.” This column 
shows that 68.02 percent of northern citizens approve of government handling of conflict 
management compared to 19.03 percent of south-eastern citizens and 12.96 percent of south-
western region citizens. The consistent patterns of negative ratings for government by the eastern 
North South-East South-West FCT Total
99          
29.91
162          
48.94
68            
20.54
2               
0.60
331            
100.00
151        
39.53
137         
35.86
92          
24.08
2                 
0.52
382              
100.00
336           
53.67
        120                  
19.17
158                 
25.24
12                
1.92
626                  
100.00
168                          
68.02
47                 
19.03
32         
12.96
0             
0.00
247             
100.00
6                
42.86
6             
42.86
2               
14.29
0               
00
14           
100.00
760              
47.50
472             
29.50
352                        
22.00
16               
1.00






 Pearson chi2 (12)  =   156.8621     Pr  =   0.000 
How well or badly is the government preventing or resolving violent conflicts?






region and positive ratings by the north corroborates the assertion that the ratings of government 
by the northern and eastern regions are influenced by regional affinities, ethnic differences, and 
disparate experiences.  
 
Table 5.54: Ethnic Discrimination  
 
 
 Interethnic discrimination is a major bane of violence and constitutes a significant 
threat to national unity. Although the nation has made a significant attempt at promoting 
equitable access to power and resources, ethnic discrimination is still a dangerous obstacle to 
political stability (Bach 1997). So, to examine whether there is any association between region 
and citizens’ opinions about interethnic discrimination I tested the null hypothesis that there is no 
association between region and opinions of citizens from diverse ethno-regional backgrounds 
about discrimination. The results of the test in Table 5.54 shows that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the two variables. Accordingly, c2 (15, N = 1600) =108.37, p < 
.05. Likewise, c2 =108.37 exceeds critical value (24.996), so we reject the null hypothesis. 
Interestingly, 45.06 percent of northerners indicated that they have never been discriminated 
North South-East South-West FCT Total
520                
45.06
297               
25.74
326           
28.25
11                       
0.95
1154               
100.00
109         
51.17
85          
39.91
16                  
7.51
3                        
1.41
213                  
100.00
93            
54.71
70                 
41.18
5             
2.94
2                      
1.18
170                    
100.00
37          
61.67
19          
31.67
4              
6.67
0              
0.00
60                         
100.00
0              
0.00
0                 
0.00
1                      
100.00
0                   
0.00
1                  
100.00
1                      
50.00
1                 
50.00
0                            
0.00
0                   
0.00
2                       
100.00
760                
47.50
472                
29.50
352                           
22.00
16         
1.00
1,600         
100.00Total
 Pearson chi2 (15)  =     108.3733   Pr  =   0.000 
How frequently have you been disciminated against  ?










against compared to 25.74 percent of south easterners and 28.25 percent of south westerners. 
Given the above, it can be deduced that the south-easterners and south-westerners experience 
discriminations much more than the northerners. 
 
Table 5.55: Citizens’ Views on National Integration  
 
 
Analysts have argued that intergroup conflict is a major threat to the unity of Nigeria 
(Olowu, Adebayo, Soremekun 1999). Therefore, I used chi-square statistics in Table 5.55 to 
examine the preferences of citizens by region for two statements; the first statement stipulates 
that the country should remain united even if the extremists continue to ferment violence. The 
second statement specifies that the country should split into two if the problems of violent 
conflict cannot be resolved. The null hypothesis for this analysis is: there is no association 
between the preferences of the citizens for either statement one or two. Based on the results (See 
Table 5.56) the association between regions and citizens’ opinions about the two statements is 
statistically significant, c2 (9, N = 1597) =59.48, p < .05. Furthermore, c2 =108.37 exceeds the 
critical value (16.919), so we reject the null. According to within-column results, (first column) 
56.82 percent northerners, agree with the first statement, compared to 26.77 percent south 
North South-East South-West FCT Total
225             
56.82
106            
26.77
58            
14.65
7                  
1.77
396                         
100.00
532              
44.86
362                  
30.52
283                      
23..86
9                 
0.76
1,186          
100.00
1                      
7.69
1                       
7.69
11                 
84.62
0              
0.00
13                       
100.00
0                 
0.00
2               
100.00
0                     
0.00
0                     
0.00
2                
100.00
758                        
47.46
471             
29.49
352             
22.04
16                    
1.00
1,597        
100.00
Agree with statement    1




                         Regions of Participants' Origin 
Response Options
Should Nigeria remain united as on country?
 Pearson chi2 (9)  =       59.4802    Pr  =   0.000 
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easterners and 14.65 percent south westerners. Paradoxically, the fourth column also shows that 
44.86 percent northerners would support the second statement compared to 30.52 percent south 
easterners and 23.86 percent south westerners. It is understandable that the northern region, 
being pro-government, would support the first statement to preserve unity of the country. 
However, it seems irrational that the region that enjoys power dominance would also support the 




In this chapter I tested the two hypotheses using qualitative and quantitative methods of 
analysis. First, the results of the analysis support Hypothesis 1 in that ethnic groups whose 
regions benefit more from the national government than others are more likely to trust and 
support the national government than those whose regions do not.  
This finding is important because there is evidence that the differences in the feelings of 
citizens from various ethnic groups toward changes in government policies and how it handles a 
variety of issues were the triggers of large-scale violence, including the Kano riot in1953, the 
pogrom against Ibos in 1966, and the civil war (1967-1970), to mention a few. Some of the 
policies of successive administrations in reaction to the grievances of the citizens from the 
southern regions against the structural imbalance of the country include the creation of an 
additional region and states that further accelerated interethnic antagonism and struggles for 
ownership of resources will be addressed.  
Moreover, the drastic changes to the revenue allocation formula that eliminated the 
derivative principle was received by the northern region as a step in the right direction toward 
national integration. In contrast, the eastern region perceived it as a flagrant step by the north to 
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dispose the eastern region of its rightful revenue. In sum, mixed perceptions are sufficient factors 
that can trigger discontent and ultimately civil war.  
According to Hypothesis 2, ethnic groups from regions with high levels of participation 
in civil society should be more likely to hold national government accountable than those from 
regions with low participation. This hypothesis is also supported by the results of the analysis.  
Further, the results of the chi-square analysis indicate that in the south-west region where belief 
in civil society is the strongest, violence and conflict have been less prevalent in comparison to 
the north, where belief in civil society is the weakest. 
In conclusion, the findings of the qualitative and quantitative analyses support the study 
hypotheses that in a resource rich multiethnic state, ethnic tensions have the potential to devolve 
into civil war, while the existence of a strong civil society helps mediate ethnic tensions and 
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This dissertation set out to answer two questions. First, how do the perceptions of citizens 
about government policies influence violent conflict in ethnically diverse, resource-rich sub-
Saharan African states? Second, how does a strong civil society influence citizens’ perceptions 
of government institutions’ performance in ethnically diverse, resource-rich, sub-Saharan 
African states? In chapter one I introduced the background problem of the research and outlined 
the structure of the dissertation. In chapter two I examined the extant literature of violent 
conflict. In chapter three I presented the theoretical framework for the analysis in which I 
explored the role of the relationships between civil society and political trust on citizens’ 
perceptions about government policy and performances. In chapter four I discussed the method 
of analysis and explained the rationale for using bivariate statistics and descriptive statistical 
analysis. In chapter five I analyzed the data on the opinions of Nigerian ethno-regional groups’ 
perceptions about trust and performance of the national government on various issues.116  
To examine the perceptions of the people from different ethno-regional groups on 
government policies and performances I analyzed the data collected during my fieldwork in 
Nigeria, and Afrobarometer survey data (2017, Round 7) on Nigeria. The results were explored 
to evaluate the two research hypotheses.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
The findings from this research demonstrate that the respondents’ opinions are shaped by 
                                               
116 See Udogu (2007) for an in-depth research the impact of ethnicity on socio-economic and political development 
of African states. In the analysis Udogu shows that ethnicity is a powerful cause of violence and supports his 
analysis with the effects of mitigating role of civil society in ethnically instigated crises.  
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their regional relationships, experiences with the federal government, and biases either in favor 
of or in opposition to the government. As shown in the results of the bivariate analysis, the 
respondents from the northern region trust the government and have favorable opinions about the 
policies and performance of government institutions. In contrast, the ethnic groups from south 
east and south west regions do not trust the government as the north does and have less favorable 
perceptions about the government policies and performance. Furthermore, the presence of civil 
society groups—not ethnic militants—play a significant role in the relative peace enjoyed by the 
south east and south west regions compared to the northern region. This finding is consistent 
with the findings of Kuenzi (2008). The perceptions of respondents from the three regions are 
demonstrated the chi-square analysis and the survey interview on the issues examined, including 
the handling of the 2015 general election, management of the economy, management of 
corruption, handling of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen all of which 
indicated that people from the south eastern and south western regions are not satisfied with the 
government’s performance on the same issues mentioned above and do not trust government and 
its institutions.117  
As a result of data analysis, it is logical to infer that perhaps the polarization among 
Nigerians along ethno-regional boundaries emanated from ethnicization of government policies. 
Therefore, it seems plausible that the northern region benefits more from the federal government 
policies on resource allocation and access to power than the south eastern and south western 
regions. The inherent asymmetry in access to power and resource allocation probably accounts 
for the grievances of the southern.118 Since the 1990s, the active role of a coalition of civil 
society network has prevented or at least blurred many instances of impending violence 
(Joseph1987; Elaigwu 2002). The literature of ethnicity and violent conflicts (Horowitz 1985; 
                                               
117 See The Guardian (April 10, 2016) for a report on the study of the Igbo question.  
118 See Appendix B, sections A and B to see how each region benefit from state creation and revenue allocation. 
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Jesse and Williams 2010) supports the viewpoint that when a region dominates power it is likely 
to expropriate resources-wealth for its regional advantage (Osaghae and Suberu 2005).119 Indeed, 
archival records and evidence from previous studies on Nigerian politics suggest that the 
northern region dominates power and reaps relative benefits as a result, and at the same time the 
eastern region faces incessant discrimination (Ukiwo 2005; Easterly 1999; Nnoli 1998; Kuenzi 
2008).120 The responses of the participants both in the Afrobarometer survey and my field 
interview support that finding. 
In the south east and south west regions there is widespread participation in civil society 
activities. Similarly, archival record shows that there is low violence in the regions. For instance, 
civil society groups such as Ohaneze Ndigbo mediate earnestly between the federal government 
and MASSOB to resolve grievances of the south east region against the national government 
politically rather than militarily to forestall the repeat of the civil war (1967-1970).121 In fact, if 
we compare the south eastern region, where the militant groups are receptive to political 
negotiation, with the north eastern region, where Boko Haram henchmen are obdurate about 
achieving their anti-modernism goals through violence, and the Fulani herdsmen’s ferocious 
violence against farmers in the middle-belt and southern Nigeria unless they are rewarded for 
their violence with the establishment of Grazing Reserve, or Ruga settlement, it is possible to 
infer the willingness of civil society in south east and south west to hold the government 
accountable reduces violent conflict because social capital facilitates political support. This 
viewpoint is supported by literature of civic community and state relations (Putnam 1993, 
Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, 1997). Indeed, civil society groups such as 
                                               
119 Osaghae and Suberu (2005) provided articulate explanations to demonstrate how identity politics exacerbate 
violent conflict in a deeply divided society. 
120 Information used to construct the states / regions creation and revenue allocation formula were obtained from 
Akinsanya and Ayoade (2005) and Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Oyediran (1997). Also, see Appendix A & B. 




Afenifere, Democratic Alliance Network, and others, reignited their intermediary role by 
presenting a proposal to the federal government on how to mediate between the government and 
all the militant groups across the three regions in the country.122 It has been observed that the 
efforts of this civic group and others alike mitigate violent conflicts that could have ravaged the 
country (Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Adeniran 1997). 123 Evidently, militant ethno-regional 
groups in southern Nigeria have all suspended actions on their threats to rebelling against the 
country.  
In sum, this research supports the idea that the regions whose people feel discriminated 
against may rebel if the situations that spur such feelings persist and are subsequently exploited 
by political entrepreneurs (Lake and Rothchild 1996 and Kaufman 2006; Ismagilova 1978).  
 
Contribution to Literature  
This research contributes to the literature of violent conflict by emphasizing the 
significance of the trends in the causal mechanism of violent conflict with ethnic power 
dominance as the nucleus. Furthermore, this research suggests that while resource-dependence is 
a significant latent risk factor of conflict, it is the discriminatory policies of the dominant ethnic 
group(s) that triggers division and grievances which could contribute to an outbreak of violent 
conflict. That seems to be the case between the Hausa-Fulani north and the southern Nigeria 
(including the Yorubas, Ibos, and the riverine people of Niger-Delta area). Furthermore, the 
findings of this research demonstrate that the competition for ethnic dominance and attendant 
                                               
122 See The News (June 26, 2019) for the detail of the five-point plan that Afenifere presented to the president for 
mitigating the conditions and processes that lead to violent conflict in Nigeria. 
123 See The Guardian (June 8, 2016) for summary of the reports on how the absence of mitigation and the 
lopsidedness in government policies bolsters the Fulani herdsmen’s violence. In contrast, see Thisday (September 
13, 2011) for the mitigating role of civil society that fostered the peace negotiation that was brokered between the 
federal government and Niger-Delta militant groups.  
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demand for justice in multiethnic resource-rich states can easily metastasize into violent conflict 
when the phenomenon is not mitigated by an umpire (civil society).  
Moreover, in multiethnic states where the institutions of government are dominated by 
one region or some ethnic groups, the marginalized ethnic groups are not likely to trust the 
government. And without trust it’s rational that the perceptions of the aggrieved ethnic groups or 
region about the government tend to be negative. This is consistent with Putnam’s (1993) 
statement that “Trust lubricates cooperation … and cooperation itself breeds trust” implies that 
symbiotic relationships exist between trust and cooperation (p.171). Therefore, just as 
interpersonal trust can build social trust and then social capital, when intergroup trust is 
combined with distrust for other groups and the political institution, the political arena may be 
rendered precarious. Subsequently, negative feelings toward the government among the 
aggrieved ethnic groups could trigger violence if they are not ameliorated. Therefore, as Kuenzi 
(2008) notes, it is logical to infer that the relative peace among the ethnic groups in the south 
eastern and western regions can be attributed to the accumulation of social trust, while the 
incessant contentions between these two regions and the national government, which is 
dominated by the northern region, indicate lack of political trust. Additionally, it may arbitrary to 
infer that while interpersonal trust may have developed into social trust among the ethnic groups 
in the southern regions, there is no evidence that it translated into social capital that could have 
facilitated exogenous political trust.  
 
Limitations and Implications for Future Research  
This research consists of two major limitations including the number of cases examined 
and the sampling size for the interviews.  Interestingly, the three regions seem to have different 
policy priorities and show different attitudes toward conflict mitigation role of civil society 
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(Ofcansky and Yeager 1997; Kurtz 1978). The result might change, however, if more countries 
are examined (Peters 1994). Second is the issue of generalizability of the research findings, 
which is related to the first limitation. However, it is important to note that since it is difficult if 
not impossible to generalize based on the findings of a single case analysis, future research will 
be able to generalize the findings by applying the hypotheses and research questions to examine 
multiple case studies. Furthermore, future surveys should include specific questions on relevant 
issues such as resources revenue management or revenue allocation formula, and other issues 
that are included in the national question, federal character principles, and civil society. It is 
assumed that the inclusion of these germane issues and consideration of multiple cases in the 
analysis will make the findings robust, and the conclusions generalizable. Hence, this research 
only provides a precursor that tends to guide future research on similar topics.124 
 
Conclusion  
This research set out to achieve two goals. First, to analyze the causal mechanisms of 
violent conflict in resource-rich multiethnic states with the view to explaining the role of 
ethnicity (ethnic dominance). Second, to explore the mitigating influence of the civil society in 
the conflicts in SSA. At this juncture, it is appropriate to submit that this research achieved the 
two goals. First, it finds that factors causing latent disputes are intrinsic attributes of every 
multiethnic resource-rich state. Secondly, it asserts that for latent factors to cause violent conflict 
they must be triggered by a chain of accelerating issues or events that often emanate from the 
lust for ethnic dominance in the case of sub-Saharan Africa.           
                                               
124 See Perotti (1993) for a robust explanation on the impact of political equilibrium on political economy. Perotti 
described how investment in human capital affects intergroup developments and relationships. In his view, the  
externalities of such investment will spur political equilibrium between all groups. So, as I had mentioned in the 
findings the nucleus of spatial equilibrium which evolves from broad investment in human capital. 
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Therefore, based on the findings of this research it is safe to state that no single factor 
such as natural resources, environment, state weakness, economic recession, greed, or grievance 
can cause war. To be sure, grievances that are concomitants of ethnic dominance are the leading 
accelerator of violent conflicts in the Nigerian context. So, it is not arbitrary to submit that in the 
sub-Saharan Africa context, the ubiquitous accelerator of latent factors of violent conflict is 
ethnicity (Bates 2015; Ismagilova 1978, 80). In connection with the disruptive role of ethnicity is 
the absence of a vibrant civil society to mitigate conflict (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren 2016). As 
such, equilibrium theory provides a new approach for analyzing the behaviors of competing 
ethnic groups that culminate in violent conflicts (Vickers and Post 1973).  
In the final analysis, this research suggests that distrust for political institutions which are 
expressed in terms of negative perceptions of government policies and performance is highly 
detrimental to national integration. In fact, the rising trends in separatist agitation in the south 
eastern region in Nigeria supports the finding that distrust and negative perceptions by aggrieved 
ethnic groups or regions can trigger rebellion if not resolved.125  
  
                                               
125 See Appendix B, section A and B for examples of structural imbalances that shaped the trends in disequilibrium 
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Oral Interview Questions 
Ethnic Power Dominance in a Resource-Rich Sub Saharan African State 
My name is Victor Fakoya. I am a graduate student from the Department of Political Science, 
University of Nevada Las Vegas. I am conducting fieldwork for my dissertation on “Ethnic 
power dominance in a resource-rich Sub-Saharan African state. An Analysis of Violent Conflict 
Accelerators and the Mitigating Influence of Civil Society in Nigeria.” 
 
Demographic Background 
1. What region are you from? North _______South East _______South West__________. 
2. How do you identify your gender? Female ______Male ______Other _____________.  
3. What is your religious background? Christianity ______Islam ____Other_____________. 
4. What is your highest educational qualification? Secondary/High _____College________. 
I would like to ask you a few questions relating to the onset of violent conflict and resolution 
process in Nigeria. Below is a list of the questions. Following your responses, you will have an 
opportunity to support your selected options with brief explanations. 
 
PART A: Conflict and causal processes 
Question 1 
a)       In your view, which of these conflicts are the Nigerians most afraid of an outbreak? Please 
answer yes or no to each of the following. Select one response for each type of conflict. 
Intraethnic conflict                                                                   Yes No No Response 
Civil Disobedience    
Armed robbery and kidnapping    
Violent protests    
Military offensive vs. Boko Haram/ Herdsmen    
Islamic fundamentalism Boko Haram /Herdsmen    
Ethnic militants’ violence    
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Civil war    
 
b)    Can you briefly explain the reasons for your choices? 
 
Question 2 
a)        In your opinion, which of the following are the causes of violent conflict in Nigeria? 
Please answer yes or no to each of the following. Select one response for each causal factor. 
Modernization                                                                               Yes No No Response 
Civil society    
Government weakness    
Land    
Housing    
Poor or lack of infrastructure    
Climatic issues-drought    
Military rule    
Illiteracy    
Poverty    
Water    
Environmental pollution    
Fear of Islamization / Jihad    
Electoral malpractices    
Power sharing    
Corruption    
Ethnic discrimination    
Resources revenue allocation    
 
b)         Can you elaborate on the reasons for the factors that you mentioned? 
 
 
PART B: Government Performance 
 
Question 3 
a) How satisfied are with government’s management of the economy? Which one of the 
following options best describe your opinion? Select only one response. 
Highly Satisfied  
Somewhat Satisfied  
Not Satisfied  
Not Sure  
b) Can you elaborate on your response? 
 
Question 4 
a) How confident are you in the ability of the government to manage corruption in its 
institutions and agencies? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select 
only one response. 
Highly Satisfied  
Somewhat Satisfied  
Not Satisfied  
Not Sure  
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b) Can you explain the reasons for your view? 
 
Question 5 
a) How would you rate your confidence in the ability of the government to conduct free and 
fair elections? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one 
response. 
Highly Confident  
Somewhat Confident  
Not Confident  
Not Sure  
b) Can you explain the reasons for your choice of response? 
 
 
PART C: Ethnic Dominance and Discrimination 
 
Question 6 
a) How confident are you in the ability of the government institutions to protect citizens and 
distribute justice equitably? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? 
Select only one response. 
Highly Confident  
Somewhat Confident  
Not Confident  
Not Sure  
 
b) Can you tell me more about your view? 
 
Question 7 
a) How would you rate your approval of government’s handling of Boko Haram violence, 
and Herders versus Farmers conflict in Nigeria? Which one of the following options best 
describe your opinion? Select only one response. 
Highly Approved  
Somewhat Approved  
Not Approve  
Not Sure  
 
b) Can you elaborate on your choice of response? 
 
Question 8 
a) How satisfied are you with government’s management of natural resources as it affects 
interethnic relations in the country? Which one of the following options best describe your 
opinion? 
Highly Satisfied  
Somewhat Satisfied  
Not Satisfied  
Not Sure  
 




a) How confident are you that the government have the ability to protect all ethnic groups 
equally? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one 
response. 
Highly Confident  
Somewhat Confident  
Not Confident  
Not Sure  
 
b) Can you please elaborate briefly on your view? 
 
Question 10 
a) How satisfied are you with the composition of government power sharing and inclusion 
of different ethnic groups in the country? Which one of the following options best describe your 
opinion? Select only one response. 
Highly Satisfied  
Somewhat Satisfied  
Not Satisfied  
Not Sure  
b) Can you briefly elaborate on your view? 
 
 
PART D: Mitigating Influence of civil society and National Integration 
 
Question 11 
a) How confident are you that the conflict-mitigation role of civil society can influence 
political stability in Nigeria? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? 
Select only one response. 
Highly Confident  
Somewhat Confident  
Not Confident  
Not Sure  
 
b) Can you explain the reason for your opinion? 
 
Question 12 
a) How actively if at all are you involved in any community or voluntary organization’s 
activities? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one 
response. 
Actively Involved  
Somewhat Involved  
Not Involved  
Not Sure  
 





a) How much confidence do you have interethnic integration and preservation of the unity 
of Nigeria? Which one of the following options best describe your opinion? Select only one 
response. 
Highly Confident  
Somewhat Confident  
Not Confident  
Not Sure  
 
b) Briefly elaborate on your opinion. 
 




Appendix B. Nigerian States by Region 
Northern Region South-Eastern Region South-Western Region 
Adamawa Abia Delta 
Bauchi Akwa Ibom Edo 
Benue Anambra Ekiti 
Borno Bayelsa Lagos 
Gombe Cross River Ogun 
Jigawa Ebonyi Ondo 
Kaduna Enugu Osun 
Kano Imo Oyo 
Katsina Rivers  
Kebbi   
Kwara   
Kogi   
Nassarawa   
Niger   
Plateau   
Sokoto   
Taraba   
Yobe   
Zamfara   










Appendix C. Civil Society Network in Nigeria  




Committee for Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), Campaign for 
Democracy (CD),  National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), 
Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Center for Advancement of 
Democracy (CAD),League of Democratic Women (LEADS) 
Alliance of Nigerian Youth (ANY). 




Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National Union of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas (NUPENG), Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), Medical and 
Health Workers Union of Nigeria, National Union of Air Transport 
Employees, National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial 
Institution Employees, National Union of Road Transport Workers 
Nigeria Civil Service Union, Nigeria Labour Congress, The 
Nigeria Union of Local Government employees, Nigeria Union of 
Teachers, Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated 
Institutions, Radio, Television and Theatre Workers Union of Nigeria. 
Humanitarian  
 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Nigeria Network of 
NGOs (NNGO), Nigerian Organization for Solidarity & Development 
(NOSAD),Voluntary Service Association of Nigeria (VOSAN) 
Professional 
Groups 
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National Union of 
Petroleum and Natural Gas (NUPENG), Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), Medical and 
Health Workers Union of Nigeria, National Union of Air Transport 
Employees, National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial 
Institution Employees, National Union of Road Transport Workers 
Nigeria Civil Service Union, Nigeria Labour Congress, The 
Nigeria Union of Local Government employees, Nigeria Union of 
Teachers, Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated 







The Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), Nigeria Union of Journalists 





Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigeria (CEPAN) 
Justice, Development and Peace Commission / Caritas (JDPC). 
Cultural Groups  
 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), Oodua 
People Congress (OPC), Arewa People’s Congress 
Religious Groups 
 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Transparency International 





Appendix D. Label, Definition, and Coding of Afrobarometer Dataset Questions Indicator 
in Stata. 
(Question 9) How much, if at all, do you depend on receiving remittances from relatives or 
friends living in foreign countries? Label define remittance 0 “Not at all / does not receive 
remittances” 1 “A little bit” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t know” 
(Question 21 A) How frequently did you attend community meeting during the past year? Label 
define commtng 4 “Often” 3 “Several times” 2 “Once or twice” 1 “Would if had the chance” 0 
“Would never do this” 9 “Don’t Know” 
(Question 21 B) How frequently did you get together with others to raise an issue during the past 
year? Label define raiseissue 4 “Often” 3 “Several times” 2 “Once or twice” 1 “Would if had the 
chance” 0 “Would never do this” 9 “Don’t know” 
(Q 23) How would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election (2015)? Label 
define ffelectn 4 “Completely free and fair” 3 “Free and fair, but with minor problems”  
2 “Free and fair with major problems” 1 “Not free and fair” 8 “Do not understand” 9 “Don’t 
know” 
(Question 26) How frequently did you participate in demonstration or protest march to show 
dissatisfaction with government performance during the past year? Label define ptdempro 4 
“Often” 3 “Several times” 2 “Once or twice” 1 “would if had the chance” 0 “Would never do 
this” 9 “Don’t know” 
(Question 43 A) How much do you trust the president? Label define trust_pr 0 “Not at all” 1 
“Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t know / Haven’t heard” 
(Question 43 B) How much do you trust the national assembly? Label define trust_nas 0 “Not at 
all” 1 “Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don't know / Haven’t heard” 
(Question 43 C) How much do you trust the Independent National Electoral Commission-INEC? 
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Label define trust_inec 0 “Not at all” 1 “Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t 
know/Haven’t heard” 
(Question 43 G) How much do you trust the police? Label define trust_pol 0 “Not at all” 1 “Just 
a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don't know/ Haven’t heard” 
(Question 43 I) How much do you trust the courts of law? Label define trustcourt 0 “Not at all” 1 
“Just a little” 2 “Somewhat” 3 “A lot” 9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard” 
(Question 51) Do you think the public officials treat you better, the same, or worse than other 
people? Label define equa_treat 0 “Much worse” 1 “Worse” 2 “Same” 3 “Better” 4 “Much 
better” 9 “Don’t know” 
(Question 56 K) How well or badly would you say the current government is fighting corruption 
in government? Label define fgtcoruptn 1 “Very Badly” 2 “Fairly Badly” 3 “Fairly Well” 4 
“Very Well” 9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard enough” 
(Question 56 A) How well or badly would you say the current government is managing the 
economy? Label define mngeco 1 “Very Badly” 2 “Fairly Badly” 3 “Fairly Well” 4 “Very Well” 
9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard enough” 
(Question 56 K) How well or badly would you say the current government is preventing or 
resolving violent conflict between communities? Label define fgtviolenc 1 “Very badly” 2 
“Fairly Badly” 3 “Fairly Well” 4 “Very Well” 9 “Don’t Know / Haven’t heard enough” 
(Question 83 B) How strongly do you agree with the following statements? Statement 1: Nigeria 
should remain united as one country even if the extremist groups continue to cause violence. 
Statement 2: Nigeria should split into two countries if the problems caused by the extremist 
groups cannot be resolved. Label define integration 1 “Agree Very Strongly With Statement 1” 2 
“Agree With Statement 1” 3 “Agree With Statement 2” 4 “Agree Very Strongly With Statement 
2” 5 “Agree With Neither” 9 “Don’t know” 
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(Question 86 C) How frequently if at all, have you been discriminated against based on your 
ethnicity in the past year? Label define discriminate 0 “Never” 1 “Once or Twice” 2 “Several 








Variable Observation Mean S.D Min     Max
Community 1600 1.918125 1.352799 0 9
Raise issue 1600 1.65875 1.342451 0 9
Election 1600 3.18875 1.11362 1 9
Protest 1600 1.285625 1.159152 0 9
Trust President 1599 1.1467792 1.291663 0 9
Trust Assembly 1599 0.9618512 1.240905 0 9
Equal Treatment 1600 2.118125 1.374901 0 9
Managing Economy 1599 2.013133 1.130066 1 9
Managing Corruption 1600 2.609375 1.140767 1 9
Managing violence 1600 2.554375 1.156667 1 9
National Integration 1597 3.518472 0.8943939 2 9
Trust Police 1600 0.934375 1.209745 0 9
Trust Courts 1600 1.3675 1.269232 0 9
Regions 1600 1.945 0.7431825 1 4
Participate in protest 1600 0.466875 0.8634922 0 9
Discrimination 1600 0.4725 0.8886717 0 9
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Appendix F. Phases of State Creation and Revenue Sharing in Nigeria  
 
i. Region/State Creation, Federal Character, and Inequality in Nigeria  
 
 







Philipson	Commission 1946 100% N/A
Hicks	-	Phillipson	
Commission 1951 50% 50%
Chick	Commission 1953 50% 50%
Raisman	Commission 1958 UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
Binns	Commission 1964 UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED






























iii. Revenue Allocation Commission, Committee, and Decrees 1977-2007 
 
 
Source: Akinsanya, Adeoye A., and John AA Ayoade. Readings in Nigerian government and 
politics. Gratia Associates International, 2005. 
RAD: Revenue Amendment Decree # 36 of 1984 
RAMFC: Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
NCCCRA: National Constitutional Conference Committee on Revenue Allocation 
  
COMMISSION 
/ DECREES DATE FEDERAL STATE LOCAL
SPECIAL 
GRANT/FUND







Aboyade 1977 57% 30% 10% 3% NA NA NA NA NA
Okigbo 1980-81 53% 30% 10% 7% NA NA NA NA NA
RAD 1984 55% 32% 10% 2.5% NA NA NA NA NA
RMAFC 1989 50% 30% 15% 5% NA NA NA NA NA
DECREE	#	3 1991 50% 25% 20% 5% NA NA NA NA NA
REVISED 1992 48% 24% 20% 7.5% NA NA NA NA NA
NCCCRA 1999 33% 22.5% 20% NA 1% 5% 2% 11% 6%
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Anthropological and Sociological Association. Special edition, 2002, pp.  219-226. 
 
• Book chapters  
Omitola Bolaji and Fakoya Victor. “Weak State Vs. Failed State: Towards an Assessment of  
Leadership Failure in Africa.” (with Bolaji Omitola). In Oloruntoba and Gumede, ed. State  
and Development in Post-Independent Africa. Austin, TX: Pan-African University Press,  
2018, pp.47-62. 
 
• Working papers / Under review 
Fakoya Victor. “Constructing a Cohesive Foundation for a Sustainable and Peaceful State of  
South Sudan.” (Under review: Book chapter in Peaceful State of South Sudan). 
 
Fakoya Victor and Omitola Bolaji. “Pathways to Democracy: Consociationalism, Rotational  
Presidency, and Nigeria’s return to Democratic Rule.” (Accepted for publication as a  
book chapter). 
 
Fakoya Victor, and Adepoju Wale. “The OAU and Pan-Africanism: The Vision, Challenges, and  
Prospects for African Development.” (Accepted for Publication as a book chapter). 
 
Fakoya Victor, Akintayo Dayo, and Bolaji Omitola “Globalization, Commodity Export  
dependence, and Violent Conflict in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria.” (Under  
review). 
 
Fakoya Victor. "Normative Impediments to the Control of Corruption in  
Nigerian State: beyond the Orthodoxy of Theoretical Postulations." 
 
Working and Teaching Experience  
Instructor, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada (2017- 
Present). 
Introduction to American Politics                                                                  Spring  2017   
Introduction to American Politics                                                                  Fall      2017   
Introduction to American Politics                                                                  Spring  2018   
Introduction to American Politics                                                                  Fall      2018   
Introduction to American Politics                                                                  Spring  2019   
Introduction to American Politics                                                                  Fall      2019   
 
Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Ogun State University, Ogun State, Nigeria. 
International Economic Relations                                                              Rain 1999-2003                                                   
Introduction to International Relations                                                      Harmattan 1999-2003                                                   
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Inter-Governmental Relations                                                                    Rain 1999-2003 
African Political Thoughts and Systems                                                    Harmattan 1999-2003 
Introduction to Public Affairs                                                                    Rain 1999-2003                                                 
 
Guest Lecture & Public Speaking  
University of Nevada Las Vegas: 
Politics of Africa, Department of Political Science                                       Spring 2019 
Politics of Africa, Department of Political Science                                       Spring 2018 
Politics of Africa, Department of Political Science                                       Spring 2017 
 
 Political Training Workshop: 
Victor Fakoya and Rasaq Adefulu. “Scanning Nigerian Political Environment”. A Lecture  
delivered at the Political Training Workshop for Lagos State Legislature-Members of  
House of Assembly, August 2000.  
 
Victor Fakoya. Corruption, Vicious Circle of Poverty, and Political Trust in Nigeria.  A Lecture  
delivered at the Political Training Workshop for Lagos State Legislature-Members of 
House of Assembly, August 2002.  
 
Academic Achievement Awards  
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Department of Political Science  Conference Travel Grant 
Award-2019. 
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Department of Political Science  Dissertation Research 
Fieldwork / Travel Grant Award-2018. 
 
Adegbenro D.S. scholarship- Awarded by Ogun State University (Now Olabisi Onabanjo 
University), to the graduating student in Political Science with the Highest GPA, April 1997. 
 
Political Departmental scholarship- Awarded by Ogun State University (Now Olabisi Onabanjo 
University), to the graduating student with the best Research Thesis in Political Science, April 
1997. 
 
Political Departmental scholarship - Awarded by Ogun State University (Now Olabisi Onabanjo 





American Political Science Association 
African Political Science Association 
International Studies Association 
Nigerian Political Science Association 
National Conference of Black Political Scientist  
 
Conferences Attended  
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International Studies Association Annual Conference, August 1-3, 2019, Legon Center for 
International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, Accra Ghana.  
5th Annual International Conference on Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution and 
Peacebuilding, October 30-November 1, 2018. Queens college, New York. 
American Political Science Annual Conference on “Democracy and its Discontent” Held at 
Boston, August 30-September 2, 2018. 
Annual African Conference at University of Austin, University of Texas Austin, March 2016. 
The Inaugural Pan African Colloquium at The University of West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, 
Barbados, January 12-15, 2016. 
Annual African Conference at Pretoria, South Africa, July 2-4, 2015. 
Annual Conference of The Society of Research on African Culture (SORAC), at Montclair State 
University, New Jersey, USA. November 7-9, 2002. 
World Summit on Sustainable Development: Economy, Environment and Society, Johannesburg, 
South Africa, August 27th & 28th, 2002. 
Annual Conference of Anthropological and Sociological Association. Held at University of Ife, 
Nigeria, August 2001. 
African Political Science Association, International Conference, Ibadan, Nigeria, September 
1995.  
Kunle Oyero Leadership Award – Granted through Ogun State University (Now Olabisi 




Quantitative Research Analysis software: Stata, SPSS.  
Language: English and Yoruba 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
